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This thesis explores the prospects of a distinction between subjective and 
objective properties in terms of how they are instantiated.  
While there are many ways in which the subjective can be separated 
from the objective, the one that interests me here is the difference between 
properties instantiated subjectively and properties instantiated objectively. The 
idea is that in some cases what makes it so that object o has the property p is 
what a thinking subject thinks of it or how she reacts to it, while in other cases 
what makes it so that o has p has nothing to do with what the subject thinks or 
does. In the first kind of case, the instantiation of the property is mind-
dependent, or subjective, and in the second kind of case the instantiation is 
mind-independent, or objective. 
I examine ways to draw a distinction between subjective and objective 
properties in this sense and defend the possibility of such a distinction against 
conceivable threats. I then go on to arguing that instead of sorting properties 
into two groups, subjective and objective, it is more fruitful to think of them as 
on a continuum ranging from entirely subjective to entirely objective. While 
there may be cases of properties that are entirely objective, i.e. instantiated 
only objectively, finding entirely subjective properties if more difficult.  
Candidates for subjective properties do not seem to be exclusively subjective; 
i.e. they are instantiated objectively to some extent.  
I use color as a paradigm case to argue for my account of properties 
whose instantiation is partly objective and partly subjective. I then go on to 
arguing that all sensory properties should be treated as color in this respect. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
1.1. Subjective and Objective Instantiation 
The focus of this dissertation is the distinction between subjective and 
objective properties. Can such a distinction be made and if so on what 
grounds? Of course there are several different ways to sort properties into 
different types, and I am not looking at all of them. More specifically, my focus 
is on different ways for properties to be instantiated; different ways for objects 
to have their properties. Are some properties such that what it is for things to 
have them is fundamentally different from what it is for them to have certain 
other properties? Hence, my search is for a distinction between objectively 
and subjectively instantiated properties. Is the instantiation of some properties 
subjective, or mind-dependent, in a sense in which the instantiation of some 
other properties is not? 
After examining some attempts at making this kind of distinction, I come 
to the conclusion that the subjective properties I want are response-dependent 
in a specific sense. But there are other things that can be said about them, 
such as that they are subject-relative and that we do not distinguish between 
their appearing to be instantiated and really being instantiated. These are all 
things that differentiate subjective from objective properties. 
After outlining my account of a distinction between subjective and 
objective properties, I consider how it might be rejected from two different 
directions. One involves rejecting the possibility of subjective properties while  
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the other rejects the possibility of objective properties. I argue that neither 
poses a lasting threat to my account. 
Although I first defend an account of a distinction between subjectively 
and objectively instantiated properties, I go on to amend it to an account of 
subjective and objective instantiation. That is, I claim that the same property 
can be both subjectively and objectively instantiated. This may not be true of 
all properties, but for some it seems to be the most viable account. I develop 
such an account by using color as a prototype. I then argue that the same 
holds for other sensory properties. 
In what follows I describe the role of each chapter. 
 
 
 
1.2. On Objective and Subjective Properties 
In Chapter 2, I first discuss the notions of subjective and objective. What 
do the terms subjective and objective mean? The pair of terms subjective and 
objective can stand for many things. Sometimes it indicates an epistemological 
distinction. In that case, what we know objectively or have come to know 
objectively is something we know without an allusion to our personal 
experiences or a personal point of view. What we know subjectively is, on the 
other hand, something we base on our personal experiences. The terms 
subjective and objective can also stand for a methodological distinction or a 
difference in attitude toward a subject. An example of this is when we expect a 
judge to be objective in her rulings. My focus, however, is on the third notion of 
subjective and objective; the ontological notion. And more narrowly, I will be  
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looking at the distinction between the subjective and the objective when 
applied to properties in an ontological sense.  
I go on to examining some of the ways in which the subjective/objective 
distinction has been made for properties. I find none of them adequate, 
although I think there are some insights from some of them that deserve to be 
retained. Before going through these attempts, however, I discuss the terms 
subjective and objective more generally. I take a brief look at their history: 
interestingly, their current use is almost perfectly opposite to their medieval 
use. I then examine what appears to be the layperson’s use of these terms 
and find that there is a connection between subjectivity and relativity in the 
layperson’s mind that may be worth holding onto to some degree.  
The first way I consider of making a distinction between objective and 
subjective properties is Locke’s account of primary and secondary qualities
1. 
Many have claimed that the primary qualities are are objective, mind-
independent, whereas the secondary qualities are subjective, mind-
dependent. I argue that it is by no means obvious that this is the case. Locke’s 
secondary qualities are frequently understood as dispositions to produce 
subjective reactions while primary qualities are considered categorical 
properties or more basic. I explain that there is no reason to think of a 
disposition to produce a subjective reaction as mind-dependent in the sense 
relevant for the distinction for which I am aiming. While the manifestation of 
the disposition, i.e. the subjective reaction itself, is obviously (and even 
trivially) mind-dependent (it cannot take place without itself), the instantiation 
of the disposition to produce it cannot be dependent on the occurrence of the 
reaction. This, of course, does not exclude the possibility of a disposition to 
                                                 
1 Cf. Locke (1975).  
4 
produce a subjective reaction being mind-dependent, but the reason for that 
must be something other than its being a disposition of this type.  
Another somewhat common interpretation of Locke’s primary and 
secondary quality distinction is an error theoretic interpretation according to 
which we falsely project the secondary qualities onto the objects without them 
having any corresponding properties. On that interpretation, the objects only 
have primary qualities; the secondary qualities exist only in our heads. This 
cannot be used for making a distinction between objective and subjective 
properties, as it only leaves one kind of properties in the objects. According to 
a distinction between objective and subjective properties, both types of 
properties are instantiated in the objects.  
Finally, Locke’s primary/secondary quality distinction is focused on 
properties that we perceive with our five senses and attribute to objects on that 
basis. A distinction between objective and subjective properties has a wider 
scope. We often attribute various kinds of properties to objects for reasons 
very different from our perceiving them (or believing that we perceive them) 
and I am looking for a distinction that can be used for all properties regardless 
of whether they ever are (or can be) perceived. 
Another suggestion for how to distinguish between subjective and 
objective properties involves a focus on objective properties. The idea is that 
an objective property is a property for which we make an appearance/reality 
distinction. If it can appear to me that an object has a property p without it 
really having p, or if an object can really have p without it appearing to anyone 
that it does, then p is an objective property. For a subjective property, on the 
other hand, appearing to have the property and really having the property 
amount to the same thing.   
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While I think there is much to be said for this account, I believe it has 
some flaws. One is that it is not a clear-cut matter for which properties we 
make this kind of distinction and for which we do not. Quite a few properties 
seem to fall in some in-between category for which we sometimes find an 
appearance/reality distinction approriate and sometimes not. Another flaw is 
that I find this account insufficient as an explanation for why and how some 
properties come to fall into one category while other properties fall into 
another. My conclusion is that while the core idea in this account is worth 
saving, it requires further elaboration. 
After this, I discuss accounts according to which a move seems to be 
made from epistemology to ontology. Some philosophers seem to have 
assumed that an ontological distinction between objective and subjective 
properties somehow follows from a distinction between different ways of 
conceiving of properties or from different ways of knowing about them. I briefly 
consider whether this can be true; that is, that it really is so that properties of 
which the conception requires an allusion to phenomenal experiences are also 
ontologically mind-dependent whereas properties of which we can conceive 
without such an allusion are instantiated independently of our minds. I find that 
no such ontological conclusion follows from the epistemological distinction. 
Finally, I draw attention to the idea of response-dependent properties, 
which I think can be of use in making the kind of distinction for which I am 
looking. 
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1.3. Response-Dependence and Subjectivity 
So-called response-dependence has by some been considered the 
solution to the gap between the subjective and the objective, i.e. that 
response-dependent properties are the paradigm subjective properties. 
Obviously, such a claim cannot be evaluated without a clear account of what 
response-dependence is and what it entails. I go through some of the main 
accounts of response-dependence and find that there are two ways of defining 
it: one in terms of concepts and the other in terms of properties. Defining 
response-dependence for concepts does not seem helpful for sorting 
properties into two groups, whereas defining it for properties seems more 
promising. I examine this second option, trying to get a clearer account of 
exactly how we can get subjectivity through response-dependence. 
As defined by Mark Johnston (1993), a response-dispositional concept is 
a concept of a disposition to produce a mental response in a certain subject or 
group of subjects under some specified conditions. For example, nauseating 
and tiresome would be such concepts.  Johnston calls a concept response-
dependent if it is a response-dispositional concept or “a truthfunctional or 
quantificational combination of concepts with at least one non-redundant 
element being a response-dispositional concept” (p. 104). 
While Johnston’s definition is focused on the kind of property that is the 
content of the response-dependent concept, I examine whether it, or 
something similar to it, can also entail something that makes the possession of 
the concept dependent on an experience of the associated response. For 
instance, I consider whether it can mean that someone who has never 
experienced nausea cannot possess the concept nauseating. That does not 
seem plausible. I consider two possible explanations of how someone who  
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has never felt nauseated can still possess the associated concept: 1) That 
while both nausea sufferers and those with exceptionally stable stomachs 
possess the concept nauseating, the latter group must ride on the first-hand 
experience of others and their testimony. While both groups share the 
concepts, their conceptions of nauseating differ. 2) That there are two different 
concepts associated with nausea; one response-dependent reserved for those 
with first-hand knowledge of it, and one for the others. 
On both readings above, the concept can be considered dependent on 
the mental response
2. If nobody had ever had this kind of response, then the 
concept would not exist. However, this is not entailed by Johnston’s definition. 
It seems quite consistent with his definition of response-dispositionality that 
there could be a concept of a disposition to produce some mental response 
that nobody has ever had. Consider, for instance, the concept of being 
bewitched. Presumably, no one has ever actually been bewitched, yet we can 
easily have a concept of it. Or suppose we had a concept of a disposition to 
produce an after-death experience which we imagined to be an essentially 
mental response. These are both concepts of “a disposition to produce a 
mental response in a certain subject or group of subjects under some 
specified conditions” and thus qualify as response-dispositional on Johnston’s 
definition. 
An account of response-dependence that I find more helpful for 
distinguishing between different kinds of properties is Ralph Wedgwood’s 
(1998): “A property counts as response-dependent if, and only if, it is part of 
what it is for something to have the property that it stands in a certain relation 
                                                 
2 In this case, the dependence seems causal: the concept’s existence is causally dependent 
on the occurrence of the response. However, causal dependence is not the kind of 
dependence I consider most important for my account, as will become clear later.  
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to a certain mental response to that property” (p. 36), and further on: ““I 
propose that a property is response-dependent just in case any adequate 
constitutive account of what it is for something to have the property must 
mention some type of mental response to that property” (p. 41). A constitutive 
account, he says, is an account that answers the question of why an object 
has the property in question, of what constitutes the object’s having the 
property, in what it consists, what makes it the case that it has the property or 
in virtue of what it is true that it does.  
Wedgwood’s response-dependent properties are what I call truly 
response-dependent. That is, for such a property to be instantiated, the 
associated response must occur. It is not enough for the response to have 
occurred at one time or another (i.e. this is not about causal dependence); the 
response must be occurring while the property is being instantiated. This 
makes it a promising candidate for the kind of subjective properties I am 
seeking. If a property’s instantiation is dependent for its instantiation on a 
certain mental response, it is mind-dependent in the sense relevant for my 
search.  
In order to clarify what it is that makes some, but not all, properties truly 
response-dependent, I consider the distinction between rigid and non-rigid 
response-dependent terms. It has been suggested that rigid or rigidified 
response-dependent accounts are accounts of objective properties while the 
non-rigid accounts are of subjective properties. I first consider Peter 
Vallentyne’s
3 account which is presented as analogous with Kripke’s
4 account 
of designation; something I argue does not work if the idea is to distinguish 
                                                 
3 Vallentyne (1996). 
4 Kripke (1980).  
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between two kinds of properties. On Kripke’s account, a rigid and a non-rigid 
designator can refer to the same object; he distinguishes between two kinds of 
terms, but not between two kinds of objects or substances. It is unclear how 
an analogous account for property terms is supposed to yield something 
ontological about different kinds of properties. I next examine Nick Zangwill’s
5 
account which appears to be one of intrinsic and extrinsic dispositions rather 
than of rigidity. 
A more useful account is presented by Peter Railton
6. He speaks of 
properties being rigidified or non-rigidified. Rigified response-dependent 
properties are such that their definition is fixed to the actual responses in the 
actual world. Such properties are not subjective in the sense I need. On the 
other hand, non-rigidified response-dependent properties come out as truly 
response-dependent, or subjective, in my sense. I then go on to discussing 
how world-relativity and subject-relativity can be used in an account of mind-
dependent or subjective properties. I also argue that response-dependence 
with an element of what I call “because-I-say-so” can be used in such an 
account. 
 
 
 
1.4. On Two Challenges 
In Chapter 4, I consider two potential threats to a distinction between 
subjective and objective properties. Roughly speaking, one is the view that all 
                                                 
5 Zangwill (2000). 
6 Railton (1998).  
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properties are objective, and the other is that all properties are subjective. I 
argue that neither view poses a serious threat to my distinction. 
According to the first challenge, it takes the possibility of faultless 
disagreement about a property to make it subjective. If a property p is 
subjective, it means that subjects A and B can disagree about whether p is 
instantiated, yet both be right. For this to be possible, it must be the case that 
the truth about p’s instantiation is somehow relative or that facts about p’s 
instantiation are relative or subjective. If truth or facts cannot be relative or 
subjective, there cannot be faultless disagreement, and thus no subjective 
properties. 
A version of this view is put forth by Gideon Rosen (1994). He argues 
that the notion of mind-dependence does not apply to any properties, and 
therefore there is only one kind of properties: objective. At the core of his 
argument is the claim that a subjective property is one about which there are 
subjective facts. He then goes through a list of candidates for such properties 
and finds that all the facts about them are objective. He thereby concludes that 
there is no class of subjective properties. 
I argue that Rosen does not consider the most plausible candidates for 
properties about which facts might be subjective. Furthermore, I argue that 
there is another way to account for subjective properties than through relying 
on subjective facts and faultless disagreement. Rosen seems to treat most of 
his property candidates as index-relative, i.e. rather than considering whether 
something is funny simpliciter, he sticks to discussing properties such as 
funny-to-Jane. While it is true that there does not seem to be anything 
subjective or relative about the fact that something is funny to Jane at this 
moment, I think many of us prefer to be able to speak of funniness (and other  
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properties) from a more general perspective. And if we ask not about Jane’s 
opinion at the moment but more generally whether a joke is funny, there 
seems to be some room for saying that it depends on what we think of it. I 
consider two options in this respect. One is that we take facts about the 
instantiation of funniness simpliciter to be relative or subjective, which makes 
funniness a subjective property. If we do not like the idea of relative or 
subjective facts, we may say that there are no facts about the instantiation of 
funniness simpliciter. What makes funniness a subjective property, then, is 
that the only facts about its instantiation are index-relative, i.e. relative to a 
subject. 
The second challenge to the distinction under examination is universal 
subjectivism: the view that all properties are subjective, perhaps because the 
world has no structure independently of how we think of it. This view does not 
in and of itself concern property instantiation, which is my focus, but property 
existence. I consider some forms of it and argue that only their most extreme 
versions, those that reject any kind of objective features of the world, entail 
subjectivism about property instantiation. I argue that the things that seem 
appealing about subjectivism are retained in its weaker versions 
 
 
 
1.5. Are Sensory Properties Subjective or Objective? 
In the fifth chapter, I argue that some properties, including sensory 
properties, are partly subjective and partly objective. Instead of a clear 
distinction between subjective and objective properties, we should consider a 
continuum, ranging from entirely objective to entirely subjective.   
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In developing this account, I use color as an example. While I disagree 
with both color primitivism and error theories about color, I believe such 
theories reflect something that is important to consider. Namely, that we seem 
to want to think of color both as subjective and as objective. 
According to primitivism about color
7, colors are intrinsic, mind-
independent properties of objects around us that perfectly resemble the way 
they are phenomenologically presented to us in color vision. I argue that there 
is an inconsistency involved in primitivism: a property cannot at the same time 
be mind-independent (and thereby externally determined) and guaranteed to 
be in perfect accordance with a mental response (which suggests it is 
internally determined). If there are properties that are perfect resemblances of 
our mental responses to them, they must be subjective.  
Error theorists about color
8 share the first part of the story with color 
primitivists: that we believe that colors are intrinsic, mind-independent 
properties of objects around us that perfectly resemble the way they are 
phenomenologically presented to us in color vision. The second part is 
different; according to error theorists, our beliefs about color are systematically 
false. There are no properties in the objects around us that correspond to the 
colors as we think of them. While I agree that objects do not have mind-
independent properties that are exactly like colors as phenomenologically 
presented to us, I think the error theorists are wrong on both counts. Even 
though no properties are exactly like what is presented to us in color vision, 
there can be properties that correspond well enough to our experiences to 
                                                 
7 Cf. Campbell (1993) and McGinn (1996). 
8 An example of such a view can be found in Boghossian and Velleman (1989).  
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count as the colors. Furthermore, I strongly doubt that our beliefs about the 
nature of colors are as error theorists and primitivists take them to be.  
Even though color primitivists and error theorists are wrong, I think their 
views suggest something important: that our visual experiences of colors and 
their phenomenology play an important role in telling us what the colors are, 
i.e. in forming our color concepts. This brings us back to the notion of 
response-dependent concepts. The point is that whatever, say, blueness is, it 
cannot possibly be something that is not (generally) visible to us, or not 
(generally) a cause of our experiences of blueness. A property that is not 
behind those phenomenological experiences of ours has to be something 
other than blueness. At the same time, we are strongly inclined to think of 
colors as properties of the world as it is independently of us. 
A possible solution to this apparently contradictory view we have of 
colors is to consider our color terms as having multiple meanings; a so-called 
dual or multiple reference theory. According to such a theory, the term ‘blue’ 
does not always refer to the same thing and we may switch between those 
different meanings without giving it much thought. I claim that while a multiple 
reference theory solves some of the problems involved in our use of color 
terms, it does not solve all of them. An account on which colors are to some 
extent subjective and to some extent objective at the same time works better. 
An example of a case that is best explained with my account is variation 
in color perception or the case of “true blue”
9. Among normal human 
perceivers there is some variation as to which shade of blue is seen as true 
blue. If asked to select a color chip with the shade closest to true blue, one 
person may select a chip that the next will consider slightly greenish or slightly 
                                                 
9 A discussion of the true blue case can for example be found in Tye (2006).  
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reddish. The intuition seems to be to say that none of these people is wrong 
about the chip’s color, i.e. that it is subjective whether the color property 
instantiated in the chip is true blue, greenish blue or reddish blue. On the other 
hand, we do not consider it a subjective matter whether the color property 
instantiated is blue or red. If one person says the chip is blue and another that 
it is bright red, at least one of them must be wrong. Someone who sees a 
bluish color chip as red must be misperceiving or in some way very wrong 
about colors. 
My solution to this is that there is a limited range of eligible candidates for 
true blueness, and that whether an object has features within this range is an 
objective matter. On the other hand, the choice between those features is a 
subjective matter. The range of eligible candidate for true blue shares quite a 
bit with the range of eligible candidates for greenish blue whereas it shares 
nothing with the range of eligible candidates for bright red. 
I claim that many of the properties frequently considered subjective have 
an objective element. Examples of such properties are funniness and beauty. 
While it can be subjective whether one joke is funnier than another or which 
flower is more beautiful than another, it is possible to be wrong about 
funniness and beauty as well. Someone who finds the death of a loved one 
funny or a massacre beautiful must either be in error about the meaning of 
those terms or have something wrong with her evaluation process. The death 
of a loved one is not in the range of eligible candidates for funniness and a 
massacre is not in the range of eligible candidates for beauty. 
After the discussion of color, I argue that we have good reasons to think 
that what holds for color in the respect described above is true for all sensory 
properties. What makes it so that colors are both subjective and objective also  
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holds for other sensory properties. For all of these properties, we have 
concepts that allude to the sensation we have when we perceive them. And 
they all share that they are properties that we perceive with our senses in 
order to gather information about the world around us. 
It has been argued that there are some fundamental differences between 
our sense modalities with respect to how they work and how they present the 
world to us. I argue that while there are differences, they do not seem 
fundamental, and that when it comes to presenting the world to us, different 
sense modalities seem to work together, which suggests that they are 
consistent with each other in their presentation. I support this with findings 
from recent research in neuropsychology.  
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CHAPTER 2 
ON OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE PROPERTIES 
 
 
 
2.1. A Distinction between Two Kinds of Properties 
We frequently see distinctions made between the subjective and the 
objective. These distinctions can be metaphysical, epistemological, and 
perhaps even something we could call methodological. While they differ in 
many ways, they share one feature: that which is subjective, rumor has it, is 
mind-dependent in some significant sense in which the objective is not. 
The main goal of my project is to find a metaphysically significant 
distinction between subjective and objective properties. Can such a distinction 
be made for properties and do properties of the corresponding two categories 
actually exist? Is such a distinction an interesting one from an ontological point 
of view? It becomes clear, when the relevant literature is examined, that the 
criteria for determining whether a property falls into the subjective or the 
objective category vary widely. One person’s use of the term ‘subjective 
property’ may differ vastly from another’s. Obviously, whatever distinction I will 
come up with cannot be consistent with all the different ways of making such a 
distinction. The distinction that interests me is one according to which some 
properties are such that our thinking that a thing has the property in question is 
what makes it so that it does, whereas some other properties are such that 
whether a thing has the property is not dependent on what we think.  In other 
words, the instantiation of one of the kinds of properties should be mind-
dependent in some way in which the other is not. The ways in which properties  
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may or may not exist is not my primary concern. I will assume that there are 
properties and that we can meaningfully speak of their instantiation. My 
concern is to find a way to distinguish between properties that are subjectively 
and objectively instantiated. 
So-called sensory properties are among those disputed in this respect, 
and of recent, colors most famously so. While some claim they are obviously 
subjective, others claim they are obviously objective. Then there are those 
who claim that we can go either way with sensory properties or that nothing is 
obvious in the matter. Another goal of my project is to establish a 
subjective/objective distinction that helps clarify the status of sensory 
properties. Are the properties that we perceive with our five senses properties 
of the objects, independent of us, or is their instantiation mind-dependent, and 
if so, in what sense?  
In this chapter, I will provide an overview of some of the relevant 
background issues. First, I will give a brief account of the distinction between 
the subjective and the objective from a general perspective. Then I will 
describe some accounts that have been given of the distinction between 
subjective and objective properties, most of which seem unsatisfactory as 
bases for an ontological distinction. Finally, I will briefly discuss where to go 
next. 
 
 
 
2.2. Objectivity and Subjectivity 
In his Meditations on First Philosophy,  René Descartes (1986) makes a 
distinction between formal reality and objective reality. Something that has  
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objective reality only exists as an idea. The word objective refers to something 
that exists within a mind, the object of thought. This objective idea can, 
however, be caused by something that has formal reality, i.e. exists outside of 
the mind. This is consistent with the medieval use of the terms objective and 
subjective, where ‘subjective’ referred to that which actually existed in a 
subject or substance and ‘objective’ to that which existed as an object of 
thought (Daston 1992). Another explanation of the verbs subiicio and obiicio is 
that while subiicio refers to the logical discernment of the intellect, obiicio 
refers to the investigative activity of the senses. According to that use: “[a] 
subject is what accidents subject to and is grasped by the intellect. An object 
is what one looks at and is felt by the senses” (Pozzo 2003, p. 5). 
Over time, the use of the terms objective and subjective has been more 
or less reversed, changing, as it appears, in the 18th and 19th centuries. 
Furthermore, while the meanings of the terms seem to have been strictly 
ontological in the Middle Ages and first thereafter, a much wider use was later 
adopted. Now we have subjective and objective judgments, methods, 
procedures, manners, as well as things and properties. In the words of 
Lorraine Daston about the term ‘objectivity’: 
Current  usage  allows  us  to  apply  the  word  [objective]  as  an 
approximate synonym for the empirical (or, more narrowly, the 
factual);  for  the  scientific,  in  the  sense  of  public,  empirically 
reliable knowledge; for impartiality-unto-self-effacement and the 
cold-blooded  restraint  of  the  emotions;  for  the  rational,  in the 
sense  of  compelling  assent  from  all  rational  minds,  be  they 
lodged in human, Martian, or angelic bodies; and for the “really 
real,”  that  is  to  say, objects  in  themselves  independent  of  all 
minds except, perhaps, that of God (Daston 1992, pp. 597-598). 
This aggregate of applications certainly has a hodgepodge appearance. 
What does an object existing unperceived have in common with scientific  
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methods or impartiality of judges? While these different senses seem diverse, 
I do believe there is a common thread to be found. In all cases, the subjective 
is considered to be dependent on the mind of a subject in some sense in 
which the objective is not. That sense, however, is not always the same. For 
instance, a subjective judgment is based on partiality, or dependence on 
certain emotions, while an objective judgment is supposed to be impartial or 
independent of emotions. An objective judgment is obviously not independent 
of all mental activity. Objective things on the other hand, in the ontological 
sense, are supposed to have the ability to exist independently of anyone’s 
mental activity, whereas subjective things are dependent on certain mental 
activities. So while both distinctions are based on a contrast between mind-
dependence and mind-independence, the relevant kinds of mind-dependence 
differ vastly. 
While what we can call “everyday” use of the words ‘objective’ and 
‘subjective’ may somewhat differ from the philosophical use, perhaps mainly 
because in everyday use of language people are less concerned with applying 
terms consistently and accurately. The everyday use of these words is worth 
some consideration. I asked a few people untrained in philosophy to explain 
the two words under discussion and these are the results: 
Objective:  “Gas  is  $1.99  per  gallon.”  Subjective:  “Gas  is 
expensive!”  (compared  to  a  year  ago),  “Gas  is  cheap!” 
(compared to what it is in other countries). 
As an engineer, I consider ‘objective’ to be anything to which 
you  can  attach  a  number.  ‘Subjective’  is  anything  that  is  a 
matter  of  opinion.  Example:  a  root  canal  is  painful  and 
uncomfortable (objective). HOW painful is subjective. 
I consider an opinion subjective when it is likely to be influenced 
by the many other things by which the person whose opinion it 
is is affected. It's subjective when it's affectable to a greater or 
lesser extent by any other factor.  
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An objective view would be one dictated by proven or provable 
facts and not open, or much less open, to an individual's own 
spin. Another way of looking it at, for me: a subjective view is 
the view from down here, looking up through it - whatever it is. 
An  objective  view  would  be  the  view  from  up  there,  looking 
down on it - whatever it is. This probably isn't clear or helpful but 
it kind of illustrates the weight of the subjective view; all that 
clogging weight that hampers clarity. 
Objective = impartial, not swayed by bias or opinion. Subjective 
= partial; more a matter of opinion (can be based on facts). can 
be swayed by personal experience, opinion, etc. 
I had a meeting tonight in G'ville and on the way home we were 
discussing odd clients/cities. A colleague was doing the comp 
plan for the town of Palm Beach. They did a SWOT (strengths, 
weaknesses,  opportunities,  and  threats)  exercise.  Under 
strengths  one  of  the  residents  said  'affordable  housing'.  The 
facilitator  said  “I'm  sorry,  did  you  say  affordable 
housing?”...”Why yes, this is by far my most affordable property. 
My  houses  in  Cannes,  Monaco,  Kennebunkport,  Paris,  and 
London are far more costly.” It's all relative...or subjective, as 
the case may be.  
Almost all of what I do [urban planning] is subjective. I may base 
my conclusions on a series of data and statistics, but much of 
that data is open to interpretation. 
One thing I find striking about these examples is how frequently 
‘subjective’ and ‘relative’ are used as synonyms. Philosophically speaking, it is 
hardly in order to conflate the two terms. That is, we need to be able to speak 
of relativity that has nothing to do with mind-dependence. However, as I will 
explain later, the idea of subjectivity seems related to the idea of relativity. 
Another interesting description is the last one, according to which the 
subjective is “open to interpretation”. It suggests that while the objective (the 
data and statistics) is something outside of our reach, the subjective is 
something over which we have more power. While I find it necessary for my 
project to distinguish between terms such as ‘relative’, ‘subjective’ and ‘open 
to interpretation’, I believe there is something essential involved in the above  
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intuitions that should be retained in a distinction between the subjective and 
the objective. 
The examples above about gas and real estate prices seem to be 
examples of relativity, at least in the way they are formulated. Saying that gas 
is expensive compared to last year is not much different from pointing out that 
the price this year is higher than the price last year. It is expensive relative to 
last year’s gas prices and no mind-dependence is involved. But what about the 
following example? 
Elinor and Marianne live in the same area and have similar incomes. 
Elinor frequently indulges in gourmet cheeses, but Marianne never does 
because she finds gourmet cheese too expensive. Marianne always buys Top-
Notch ice cream, because it tastes so much better than the other brands; 
Elinor never buys it because she finds it too expensive. This is not an example 
of price in one place being higher or lower than somewhere else. In this case, 
the term ‘expensive’ seems to be applied on the basis of a value judgment. 
The reason why Elinor thinks Top-Notch ice cream is expensive, and 
Marianne apparently does not, and vice versa with gourmet cheese, has 
something to do with how Elinor and Marianne value these food types (let us 
suppose that the nutritional value of gourmet cheese and Top-Notch ice cream 
is about the same). Perhaps it is ultimately a matter of differences in their taste 
buds. At any rate, the application of the term ‘expensive’ is here based on 
something regarding how Elinor and Marianne feel about cheese and ice 
cream, their experiences when eating these foods, their desires for them, or 
their thoughts about what is important in their lives. 
This example suggests that the term ‘expensive’ refers to something that 
can be dependent on what someone thinks, or the way she feels about  
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something, and perhaps what we could call mind-dependent; an example 
comparing gas prices in different countries and/or times just does not happen 
to be the right way to illustrate it. On the distinction between subjective and 
objective properties that I want to outline, the instantiation of subjective 
properties should be relative to some mental activity to which instantiation of 
the objective properties is not. Hence, we could say that if we apply 
philosophical standards of consistency and accuracy to the everyday notion of 
subjectivity, the layperson is sometimes guilty of a scope confusion: Even 
though the subjective may always be relative, the relative is certainly not 
always subjective.
10 This does not mean that we should apply philosophical 
standards to the everyday use of the term or that the layperson should be 
using these terms differently. On the contrary, my point is that while looking to 
the everyday use of the terms can be useful for the philosopher’s information 
gathering, this everyday use need not be taken too literally. 
Even though it does not appear in the examples I collected from 
“laypeople,” the terms ‘subjective’ and ‘arbitrary’ are sometimes used 
synonymously in everyday speech. The same decision may, for instance, be 
interchangeably called arbitrary and subjective. Again, I believe there are 
scope issues at play here. An arbitrary decision is a decision based on 
something that is not substantial; a case when a different decision would have 
been just as good
11. Sometimes, such a decision is based on something that 
seems undeniably subjective (such as an emotion), but sometimes it is based 
                                                 
10 I will discuss the relation between subjectivity and relativity in more detail in the next 
chapter. 
11 It is not a necessary requirement for the arbitrariness of a decision that another decision 
would actually have been just as good. What matters is the information available to the person 
making the decision and her evaluation of the options. If, given what she knows, the different 
options seem equally good and/or desirable to the decision-maker, then a choice between 
them will be arbitrary.  
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on something random (such as the result of the flipping of a coin) that is not 
mind-dependent. So while the arbitrary is sometimes subjective and the 
subjective is sometimes arbitrary, neither extension is a subset of the other. 
An acceptable distinction between subjective and objective properties must 
account for this. 
Let us now narrow our focus to subjective and objective properties. It is 
not always obvious what kind of mind-dependence it is that makes a property 
subjective. Sometimes it may be appropriate to make a distinction with respect 
to certain things that may be useless for distinctions needed at other times. 
One downside, of course, is the confusion that sometimes results from the 
lack of indication of which particular kind of mind-dependence is playing the 
key role in someone’s use of the terms subjective and objective. 
Messy terminology is not the only issue at play here. There are also 
some genuine disagreements concerning the status of some properties as 
objective or subjective. While most consider a property such as triangularity 
objective, there are certain groups of properties that we could call the disputed 
ones. Sensory properties such as colors are a prime example of properties 
disputed in this respect. Other disputed groups of properties include moral 
properties and aesthetic properties. My focus here will be on sensory 
properties. In order to come to a conclusion about whether sensory properties 
can be considered objective, it is necessary to discuss some of the attempts 
that have been made toward a distinction between objective and subjective 
properties and try to make sense of in what these accounts differ, and whether 
or how each of them can be useful.  
Another reason for different ways of making the distinction is that there 
are many different ways in which one thing can depend on another. My  
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children are historically and causally dependent on me: had I never existed 
then neither would they. But they are also dependent on me in various ways 
that have nothing to do with how they came to exist; for instance they are both 
financially and emotionally dependent on me. Similar things can be said of the 
properties of things. Suppose I draw a triangle on a piece of paper. If we now 
focus on the figure on the piece of paper, there is a sense in which we can say 
that its being triangular is mind-dependent. Had I decided to draw the figure 
differently, it would not have been triangular. The figure’s triangularity is then 
causally dependent on some mental activities of mine. There is also a sense in 
which any property of a mind is mind-dependent as it must be dependent for 
its instantiation on the thing in which it is instantiated. And then there are 
various senses in which any properties somehow associated with minds or 
something mental are mind-dependent. 
The account I want should involve a particular way of distinguishing 
between mind-dependent and mind-independent properties; one that yields 
two ontologically significant categories of properties. More specifically, the 
mind-dependent properties I have in mind are those that are dependent for 
their instantiation on someone thinking (in a loose sense of ‘thinking’) that they 
are instantiated. The mind-independent, or objective, properties are those 
instantiated independently of what anyone thinks. For this purpose, I will now 
discuss a few attempts at making a distinction between subjective and 
objective properties, and their merits and flaws given my goal. 
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2.3. Primary and Secondary Qualities 
No overview of accounts of different kinds of properties can neglect the 
distinction between primary and secondary qualities, so famously described by 
John Locke: 
Qualities thus considered in bodies are, 
First,  such  as  are  utterly  inseparable  from  the  body,  in  what 
state soever it be; and such as in all the alterations and changes 
it suffers, all the force can be used upon it, it constantly keeps; 
and such as sense constantly finds in every particle of matter 
which  has  bulk  enough  to  be  perceived;  and  the  mind  finds 
inseparable from every particle of matter, though less than to 
make itself singly be perceived by our senses … These I call 
original  or  primary  qualities  of  body,  which  I  think  we  may 
observe to produce simple ideas in us, viz. solidity, extension, 
figure, motion or rest, and number… 
Secondly, such qualities which in truth are nothing in the objects 
themselves but power to produce various sensations in us by 
their  primary  qualities,  i.e.  by  the  bulk,  figure,  texture,  and 
motion of their insensible parts, as colours, sounds, tastes, &c. 
These I call secondary qualities (Locke 1975, II, viii, 9-10). 
Interpretations of Locke’s words vary. Many take his secondary qualities 
to be dispositions; others have read him as an error theorist about secondary 
qualities
12. While there are some who think of the distinction between primary 
and secondary qualities as conceptual only
13, I will focus here on metaphysical 
interpretations of it. Let us assume that Locke’s view is that things possess 
their primary qualities independently of our mental activities, and that the 
instantiation of secondary qualities is mind-dependent. This is an interpretation 
that many take for granted. In fact, many philosophers seem to assume that 
the distinction between primary and secondary qualities is synonymous with a 
distinction between objective and subjective properties. 
                                                 
12 Mackie 1976; Alexander 1977. 
13 An example of such a reading can be found in A.D. Smith 1990.  
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Assuming that this is how Locke’s distinction between primary and 
secondary qualities goes, can it be the distinction for which I am looking? Let 
us suppose, to begin with, that the primary qualities are some kind of basic, 
first-order properties, and that the secondary qualities are dispositions to 
produce certain sensations in us. Among Locke’s examples of the primary 
qualities are shape and size, whereas properties such as color and taste are 
meant to be secondary qualities.
14 If this distinction is supposed to make 
primary qualities objective and secondary qualities subjective, the idea must 
be that an object’s size (a primary quality according to Locke) is independent 
of our mental states: it is 5 cm long no matter how long we think it is. But its 
disposition to produce, say, sensations of redness in us (the same property as 
redness, on this interpretation of Locke) is somehow dependent on our 
thinking. Is this really the case? 
The idea that a property such as the size or shape of an object is 
independent of how we think it is does not seem problematic (unless we are 
ready to adopt some kind of universal subjectivism, which I do not think we 
should be at this point). My doubts concern the other category. Why should 
being dispositions of a particular sort make secondary qualities subjective or 
mind-dependent?
15  
Simply being a disposition does not make a property subjective. The 
most common examples of dispositions, such as fragility and flammability, can 
hardly be considered mind-dependent. Hence, the reason why someone 
would think of dispositional secondary qualities as subjective must have to do 
                                                 
14 I am not making a judgment as to whether color, taste or other properties really are 
dispositional. Let us assume for now that they could be. 
15 The assumption that dispositions to produce subjective reactions are subjective can be 
found, for instance, in Campbell (1993) and in Jackson and Pargetter (1987).  
27 
with what they are dispositions for, since it cannot be simply that they are 
dispositions. So presumably, secondary qualities are subjective because they 
produce subjective responses. Rose scent, for instance, is mind-dependent on 
this view because it is a disposition to produce a rose-scent sensation in 
human perceivers.  
But remember what it is that makes a property subjective in the sense I 
am considering: It is subjective if its instantiation in an object is mind-
dependent, i.e. that its being instantiated is somehow dependent on a 
subject’s thinking that it is. If this is supposed to be true in the case of 
dispositions to cause subjective responses in human subjects, it must mean 
that a certain rose’s having the disposition to produce a rose-scent sensation 
is dependent on someone’s thinking that it has the disposition to produce a 
rose-scent sensation. But is the rose’s disposition really mind-dependent in 
that way? Perhaps it is, but that does by no means follow from its being a 
disposition to produce a subjective response. It seems possible to think of a 
rose’s having such a disposition even though it is growing somewhere far 
away where nobody can ever smell it or even have any thoughts about it as no 
one knows of its existence. It can still be true that the rose has that disposition 
because if someone were to find it and smell it she would have a rose-scent 
sensation.  
Let us consider a disposition that accompanies one of the primary 
properties: We can reasonably claim that a rock that weighs 100 kg has a 
disposition to produce a sensation of heaviness in most human subjects who 
try to carry it. The rock has this disposition in virtue of its mass (a primary 
property) as well as some facts about human size and anatomy. These facts 
remain the same whether or not anyone ever tries to carry this rock or has any  
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thoughts about whether it is likely to feel heavy. Hence, there is no reason to 
think of the rock’s having this disposition as dependent on a subject’s thinking 
it does. The same can hold in the case of the rose’s fragrance. If the rose has 
its disposition to produce a certain smell sensation in virtue of, say, its 
containing a certain substance as well as some facts about human anatomy, 
then there is no more reason to think of the instantiation of the disposition as 
mind-dependent than there is to think of the rock’s disposition’s to feel heavy 
as mind-dependent. 
I could modify my account to include properties whose instantiation is 
dependent on the occurrence of a particular subjective response, even though 
it is some response different from thinking that the object in question has the 
given property. That is, we might want to call heaviness subjective if its 
instantiation in the 100 kg rock were dependent on our having a heaviness-
sensation, even though it is not dependent on our thinking that the rock has 
the disposition to produce a heaviness-sensation. But this is not the case. Of 
course the rock can have the disposition to cause a heaviness-sensation even 
though nobody ever tries to lift it, i.e. the disposition can be instantiated even 
though the associated subjective response never occurs. 
In many cases, dispositions are never manifested, such as in the case of 
the rose that grows far away from anyone with a functioning sense of smell. 
How could that rose’s disposition to produce a rose-scent sensation be 
dependent on someone’s having a rose-scent response to it or thinking any 
thoughts about it if such a response to it never occurs? It implies that the 
disposition is not instantiated unless it is manifested, which is hardly a 
desirable result. The upshot is that if rose scent and other secondary qualities 
are subjective (which is at least possible), it is not because they are  
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dispositions of some kind or other. There must be some other reason for their 
subjectivity. 
Now, let us instead assume an error theoretic interpretation of the 
primary/secondary quality distinction. According to that version, the primary 
qualities are actually inherent in the objects, whereas the secondary qualities 
merely exist as ideas in our minds, and we somehow (falsely) project them 
onto the objects. The objects do not have the secondary qualities at all. The 
distinction becomes one between properties that the objects really have and 
imaginary properties that they do not have. 
An obvious concern regarding this version is that I am looking for a 
distinction between two kinds of properties that things really do have. Are the 
only possible subjective properties not real; properties that do not exist (or 
exist only in our minds) and are falsely projected by us onto the objects? That 
hardly sounds like a distinction between two kinds of properties; while the 
objective properties exist, the “subjective properties” are not really properties 
so we end up with properties on one side and non-properties on the other. At 
best, the subjective properties will be properties of, say, our minds instead of 
properties of the objects of our perception. But if so, will they be different in 
kind from the primary properties? That is by no means clear, and many error 
theorists even seem to assume that we think of these secondary qualities 
exactly like primary qualities.  
My goal is to find a distinction between two different kinds of properties 
that something actually has. The idea is that object A has objective property 
po independently of our thinking and that it has subjective property ps because 
we think it does, or at least because of our having some sort of subjective  
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response to it. For that to make sense, A must actually have both these 
properties. 
Despite the failure of the two versions of the primary/secondary quality 
distinction that I have outlined above, it is possible to draw this distinction in a 
way that would satisfy my goal. And indeed, many philosophers have thought 
of the primary/secondary distinction as synonymous with a metaphysical 
objective/subjective distinction. However, since there seem to be many ways 
to draw each distinction, it is by no means guaranteed that they are 
synonymous. So while the distinction that I am looking for between subjective 
and objective properties might be the same categorization as some would call 
the primary/secondary distinction, it may be a different distinction than what 
others have in mind when they speak of primary and secondary qualities. I 
believe the words subjective and objective come closer to describing the two 
types of properties that I want to describe than primary and secondary do. In 
any case, whether the distinction is called objective/subjective or 
primary/secondary, we will need a more adequate description of it. 
 
 
 
2.4. The Appearance-Reality Distinction 
One attempt to distinguish between objective and subjective properties 
consists in using a distinction between appearance and reality as a test. The 
idea is that in the case of something objective, something can appear to us 
differently from the way it really is, whereas for the subjective, appearance is 
reality. Hence, when dealing with the objective, a distinction between 
appearance and reality is in place while such a distinction does not apply to  
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the subjective. For instance, I might be in my house at night and it could 
appear to me that a mouse just ran by. However, the reality might be that the 
creature that ran by was a small rat, or a hamster escaped from next door, or 
this could be a moving shadow. This would be an example of a difference 
between appearance and reality. But I cannot be wrong about the fact that it 
appears to me that a mouse just ran by, or that I have a headache, or that I 
like licorice.
16 
The examples above regard facts; on the one hand facts about 
objectively existing things (rodents, in this case) and events concerning them, 
and on the other hand facts about subjective things such as mental states 
(pains and likings of a subject). We can apply an appearance/reality distinction 
in a similar manner to objects themselves instead of applying it to facts about 
them: Whether a mouse really exists is independent of whether it appears to 
us that it exists. My headache, however, seems to exist if and only if it appears 
to me that I have a headache—or at least such a claim is plausible. 
 Can an appearance/reality distinction help us distinguish between 
objective and subjective properties in the same way? If so, we should be able 
to find out whether a property is objective or subjective by running it through 
an appearance/reality test: If we can make an appearance/reality distinction 
for it, it is objective; if we cannot make such a distinction, it is subjective. 
Kathleen Akins and Martin Hahn (2000) suggest this distinction as a 
criterion for the objectivity of a property: 
...we  should  treat  color  as  we  would  any  other  putatively 
objective  property  by  asking  whether  it  conforms  to  an 
appearance/reality  distinction.  As  we  said  above,  if  color  is 
                                                 
16 To be perfectly safe here, I should probably say that I cannot be wrong that I have 
something I believe to be a headache and that I like what I take to be licorice, as I could be 
mistaken about what headaches and licorice are.  
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objective, then we must be able to draw a distinction between 
our  representations  of  color  properties  and  color  properties 
themselves, a distinction which we must be able to make under 
all circumstances...(pp. 238-239). 
The idea is that if we make a distinction between something’s appearing 
to have the property and something’s actually having it, the property qualifies 
as objective. If a property is subjective, on the other hand, we do not make 
such a distinction. Possessing the property and appearing to possess it are 
the same thing. 
This does not seem too bad. Surely, if objectivity corresponds to mind-
independence, then it seems that whatever is objective must be something 
about which we can be mistaken. It is the way it is independently of what we 
know or believe about it; therefore error must be possible. On the other hand, 
if we are by definition always right about the instantiation of a property, it could 
be because it is dependent on whatever we think or judge about it, i.e. it could 
be mind-dependent or subjective. 
Now, one problem regarding this way of making the distinction is that we 
sometimes make an appearance/reality distinction for properties that are 
frequently considered paradigm subjective properties. “First, I thought the joke 
was funny, but after thinking more about it, I realized that it was not funny at 
all.” One possible response to this is of course to say that these properties 
may be objective after all, and that using them as paradigm subjective 
properties is highly misleading. That is certainly an option, but let us leave it 
aside for the moment and get back to it later. 
We are less likely to make a distinction between appearing funny and 
actually being funny than we are to make a distinction between appearing and 
actually being 2 meters long. If Kitty thinks a joke is funny and Lydia thinks it is  
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not, we usually do not conclude that one of them must be wrong. On the other 
hand, if Kitty claims that the height of the front door of her house is exactly 2 
meters and Lydia claims that the same door is 2 meters and 20 centimeters, 
we conclude that at least one of them must be wrong. This suggests that a 
distinction between the appearance and reality is sharper or stronger for at 
least some of the properties generally considered objective than it is for some 
of the properties generally considered subjective, even though it is not entirely 
absent for the so-called subjective properties. Even though we usually do not 
conclude that people’s different reactions to a joke mean that one of them is 
mistaken, there are some cases where we might. There are things that we 
consider too sad, offensive, dangerous or disgusting to be funny. If someone 
finds the loss of a loved one or the actions of a mass murderer funny, we will 
very likely consider her to be wrong. These things just are not funny. Thus, 
while an appearance/reality distinction certainly seems relevant to a distinction 
between objective and subjective properties, it can hardly be the only basis for 
dividing properties into subjective and objective unless we review our basis for 
that distinction.  
As I already mentioned, it could be the case that the “paradigm” 
subjective properties are in fact objective and that instead there are other 
properties that qualify as the subjective properties. That is, if the 
appearance/reality criterion is to be taken seriously, we might want to say that 
properties that are subjective are those that fail it entirely. But are there any 
properties that do? I cannot think of any. From that, we could draw the 
conclusion that there are no subjective properties. We could also go in the 
other direction and say that a property that never fails the appearance/reality 
test is objective and all other properties are subjective. That seems like a more  
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fruitful interpretation as it seems more likely that there are properties that 
never fail the test than that there are properties that always fail it. That way, 
we get to keep both objective and subjective properties. If we always make an 
appearance/reality distinction for triangularity (which seems likely that we do, 
at least without further investigation), then triangularity is an objective property. 
And even if we sometimes make an appearance/reality distinction for beauty, 
in many cases we do not make the distinction, and that makes beauty a 
subjective property. 
My main worry about this second option is that important nuances can be 
lost. It may not account for a possible difference between properties for which 
we almost always make an appearance/reality distinction and those for which 
we almost never make such a distinction. And it does not give an explanation 
of why we sometimes make an appearance/reality distinction and sometimes 
not for something that seems to be the same property in both cases. Perhaps 
this can all be solved and a usable account worked out from this as a basis. 
 Our third option is that subjectivity and objectivity of properties come in 
degrees. If so, a property for which we rarely make this distinction is more 
subjective than a property for which me make the distinction more frequently, 
which is then more objective. Suppose an appearance/reality distinction is 
more often appropriate for size than for beauty. In that case, we might say that 
size is more objective and less subjective than beauty. Instead of assigning a 
value of “subjective” or “objective” to each property we could assign it a place 
on an objectivity-subjectivity scale. Perhaps this is the best of our options. 
John Campbell (1993) endorses a view similar to the appearance/reality 
view, which he calls “a simple theory of perception.” He finds his simple theory 
preferable as a means to describe objectivity to the notion of an absolute or  
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objective description of reality (p. 260). According to the simple theory of 
perception, perception consists in two things: the way things are “anyway” and 
the perceiver’s meeting necessary conditions for perception. By employing this 
theory, we can think of objects as “being there anyway,” that is as being mind-
independent. An objective property, on this view, is a property that a thing 
possesses “anyway.”  
I do not see anything wrong with this kind of distinction and it seems 
consistent with making an appearance/reality distinction for the objective. After 
all, if an objective property is supposed to be mind-independent, we could just 
as well say that it is a property that is possessed by objects “anyway” or 
independently of our perceptions of it. In other words, a property being there 
“anyway” means that it is really there, regardless of whether it appears to be 
there. And the main idea behind mind-dependence or subjectivity is that it is 
supposed to be something produced by our minds. For some purposes, this 
way of cashing out the distinction may be all that is needed. However, since I 
am looking for an account that illuminates and explains a metaphysical 
distinction between objective and subjective properties, I find the Campbell-
account inadequate. In virtue of what are some properties going to be there 
“anyway”? While this approach does make it clear that some kind of mind-
dependence is involved in subjectivity, it does not involve an explanation of 
what kind of mind-dependence that is. 
What we have learned here is that while the appearance/reality test may 
be of some help in distinguishing subjective from objective properties, it is not 
a handy tool we can use to divide properties quickly into two groups. A scale 
or a continuum may be where this matter is destined to end. While the kind of 
objective property for which I am looking must fulfill the appearance/reality  
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criterion, I would like to dig deeper into the reasons for why some properties 
fulfill this criterion better than others, and what it is that makes it so. 
 
 
 
2.5. It’s All About the Concepts 
We ascribe properties to things on the basis of what we find worth saying 
or thinking about them. Assuming that properties can exist, and be possessed 
by objects independently of human thought, a property will still never get 
mentioned unless we humans direct our attention to it. Furthermore, our talk of 
properties is of course governed by our way of sorting things into groups, so 
that when we attribute some property to an object, we are also shedding light 
on our own system of classification. Hence, for any property that is mentioned, 
there must be at least one corresponding concept. That is, it is safe to assume 
that the only way to succeed in referring to a property when we speak lies 
through a concept corresponding to the property. Another way to put this is 
that if we think and speak of something as a property, it entails that we 
conceive of it as a property. Each of those who conceive of the property 
thereby have some kind of conception of it
17. And for us to successfully refer to 
the same property as other speakers, there must be a concept of the property 
involved. How exactly the concept is derived is not a part of the story here; 
perhaps it is somehow a product of pooling different conceptions together, 
                                                 
17 I am assuming the following distinction between conceptions and concepts: A conception is 
something belonging to each subject. Anyone who conceives of A has a conception of A. A 
concept is something that at least on some theories can belong to a society or other form of 
aggregate of subjects in conjuction with other external factors. Hence, a conception is by 
definition internal; it is what the subject in question thinks about the object, whereas 
externalism about concepts is at least a meaningful view. If externalism is true, then I can 
have a false or flawed conception of some given concept.  
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perhaps it is defined by a group of experts, and so on. What matters here is 
that there is at least one concept in play for each property about which we 
think and talk. 
 I will be assuming a certain distinction between properties and concepts: 
a property resides in an object, as a state or as something characteristic of it, 
but a concept must reside in the mind of a subject (or the collection of minds of 
many subjects) and represents something other than itself, such as a property, 
object or event. Our concept of blue resides in our minds and represents the 
property ‘blue’ which resides in various objects (or which we at least attribute 
to the objects) . It is important to keep in mind that there can be more than one 
concept associated with each property and that we should not get our 
concepts mixed up with our properties: 
There can be many different concepts of the same property. To 
mistake  the  requirements  on  a  theory  of  a  concept  for 
requirements on a theory of a property, and vice versa, can lead 
to errors and spurious problems. The results of such a mistake 
are comparable to those that result in the singular case from 
confusing theories of modes of presentation with theories about 
the objects so presented (Peacocke 1992, p. 2). 
Since the only epistemic access we have to properties is through 
concepts of them, it would seem that at least to some extent, the answer to 
whether a property is subjective or objective must lie in the concept. Some say 
that for a property to be subjective is simply for us to conceive of it as 
subjective. Such a view is, for example, endorsed by Brian McLaughlin: 
It  is  concepts  that  are,  in  the  first  instance,  subjective  or 
objective,  not  properties.  A property  is  subjective  or objective 
only  under  a  conceptualization,  i.e.  under  a  concept.  The 
concepts under which properties count as objective differ in their 
a  priori  possession  conditions  from  those  under  which 
properties count as subjective (McLaughlin 2003, p. 144).  
38 
On McLaughlin’s account, a property is objective when it is represented 
by (or it “is under”) an objective concept and the same property is subjective 
when represented by a subjective concept. A subjective concept, according to 
McLaughlin, is a concept that is introspective or is linked to an introspective 
concept. An objective concept is one that is not linked to an introspective 
concept: 
Some concepts are such that full possession of them a priori 
requires being able to apply them directly in introspection. We 
may call such concepts ‘introspective’ concepts. The concept of 
pain is an introspective concept; and so is the concept of what it 
is  like  to  see  red.  Introspective  concepts  are  subjective 
concepts;  but  not  all  concepts  that  count  as  subjective  are 
introspective  concepts.  Non-introspective  concepts  can  be 
linked to introspective ones in the sense that full possession of a 
non-introspective concept can a priori require full possession of 
an introspective one. A concept can be more or less subjective 
depending on the extent and nature of its links to introspective 
concepts. A concept is wholly objective if and only if it is not 
linked to any introspective concept (Ibid.). 
 
McLaughlin does not provide us with any examples of non-introspective 
concepts linked to introspective ones, or of any non-introspective concepts for 
that matter. Hence, it may not be entirely clear which concepts he has in mind. 
However, his general idea should come across here: Degrees of objectivity 
and subjectivity are possible depending on whether the concepts under which 
the properties are presented are linked to introspective concepts. 
McLaughlin says he derives his view that properties can only be objective 
or subjective under a concept in part from Brian Loar (1990/7). On Loar’s 
account, the same property can be described both under a subjective and an  
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objective mode of presentation. It is, however, not clear whether Loar thinks of 
this as  an ontological distinction between different kinds of properties.
18 
Now, obviously, properties can be presented to us in different ways. If 
squareness is my favorite property, I can experience a certain kind of pleasure 
whenever I encounter square things or conceive of squareness in terms of 
some sensation or other that it causes in me. I can also conceive of it in 
mathematical terms; a mode of presentation that certainly seems objective if 
anything is. Funniness can be presented to me by its inducement of 
amusement in me. On the other hand, suppose I am feeling miserable and in 
no condition to appreciate funniness. I could still recognize funniness through 
other people’s reactions to something said or even by knowing that I would 
feel amused by this joke if only I were feeling better.  
 In fact, it seems quite likely that this is true about all properties. 
McLaughlin, however, is not quite certain whether each and every property 
can be both subjective and objective in his sense: “While subjective concepts 
are distinct from wholly objective ones, it is at least an open question whether 
a property might be both subjective (even introspective) and wholly objective, 
subjective under one concept and wholly objective under another” (p. 144). 
This suggests that he may have something slightly different in mind than a 
property’s having different kinds of possible modes of presentation. It could be, 
for instance, that he only wants to count concepts under which the property is 
typically conceived, suggesting that a subjective appreciation of squareness 
and funniness recognized via the laughter of others are ruled out as concepts 
                                                 
18 A related view can be found in McGinn 1983, “secondary qualities are subjective in the 
sense that experience enters into their analysis: to grasp the concept of red it is necessary to 
know what it is for something to look red” (p. 8) .  
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for squareness and funniness respectively. After all, a concept of a property 
does not include all its possible modes of presentation. 
McLaughlin’s way of making the distinction between subjective and 
objective properties is epistemically, rather than ontologically, based. In other 
words, his claims are really about the concepts and not about properties. 
However, McLaughlin claims that a distinction between subjective and 
objective properties can be made strictly on the basis of concepts; i.e. that an 
ontological distinction can be epistemically based in this way. I disagree. That 
what it takes for us to know, grasp or conceive of something is not what 
determines its ontological status. A view similar to mine here has been 
expressed by Stephen Yablo: 
To call a property “subjective” is to comment in an ontological 
vein  about  what  it  is.  But  to  say  that  it  is  not  adequately 
conceived except (e.g.) in terms of how it makes things look is 
to  applaud  certain  ways  of  thinking  of  the  property.  Unless 
standards of adequate conception are dictated by the property 
and it alone, no ontological conclusions follow (Yablo 1995, p. 
491).  
Yablo is pointing out that nothing about the ontological status of a 
property follows from claims about adequate conceptions of it. So a subjective 
conception of a property does not automatically make the property itself 
subjective. McLaughlin, on the other hand, claims that a property can only be 
subjective or objective under a concept and even considers the possibility of 
all properties being both subjective and objective. Hence, he cannot be 
claiming that ontological conclusions follow from the concepts or ways of 
thinking of the properties. The important issue here is that McLaughlin seems 
to be suggesting that there is no such thing as a subjective/objective 
distinction for properties; only for concepts. Maybe he is right, but we are  
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hardly ready to concede that yet. If we want to keep looking for an actual 
distinction between objective and subjective properties, we must at least look 
elsewhere before settling for this. 
 
 
 
2.6. Another Epistemically Motivated Distinction 
For another attempt at distinguishing between subjective and objective 
properties, let us consider what Alice Crary (2002) describes (and then 
challenges) as the traditional philosophical conception of objectivity: 
...a property is objective—in the familiar sense that it can form 
the  subject-matter  of  judgments  to  which  no  conclusive 
objections can be raised—if it excludes everything that counts 
as  subjective  by  the  lights  of  a  traditional  philosophical 
conception of subjectivity. According to the pertinent conception 
of subjectivity, subjective properties are properties such that no 
fully satisfactory conception can be formed of what it is for an 
object  to  possess  them  except  in  terms  of  the  mental  (i.e., 
perceptual  and  affective)  responses  the  object  elicits  from 
subjects (p. 377). 
This sounds quite similar to the account in the previous section according 
to which subjectivity was defined in terms of adequate conceptions. It does 
however seem strange that Crary considers it a familiar sense of an objective 
property that “it can form the subject-matter of judgments to which no 
conclusive objections can be raised.” Is that supposed to mean that conclusive 
objections can be raised against judgments about subjective properties? Why 
should the difference between subjective and objective properties lie in the 
possible objections to statements about them? I will not be focusing on this 
issue here but instead get on with her account:  
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Thus conceived, the class of subjective properties includes what 
might be described as merely subjective properties—properties 
an object can be said to possess just in so far as it in fact elicits 
a  certain  mental  response from  some  subject  (e.g.,  “seeming 
funny to me” or “appearing green to me”). It also includes what 
might  be  described  as  marginally  subjective  properties—
properties an object can be said to possess in so far as it is the 
kind  of  thing  that  would  elicit  certain  mental  responses  in 
appropriate  circumstances.  The  set  of  marginally  subjective 
properties  comprises  both  affective  properties  like 
“humorousness” and also, given a fitting story about how, e.g., a 
thing’s “being green” cannot be properly understood apart from 
its having a tendency to seem green in suitable circumstances, 
perceptual properties like “green” (Ibid.). 
It seems quite convincing that at least the merely subjective properties, 
and possibly the marginally subjective, as described, can only be adequately 
conceived in terms of mental responses of subjects, or at least that such a 
conception is our most common conception of such a property. If a property is 
such that an object can only possess it in virtue of a mental response of a 
subject, then surely a conception of it will involve that response. This is less 
clear in the case of marginally subjective properties, but it is probably true 
regarding the conception involved in the most commonly used concept of the 
property in question. 
Now, what distinguishes this account from McLaughlin’s account from the 
previous section? The difference is that Crary assumes that the account she 
describes involves metaphysical claims about properties whereas McLaughlin 
considers the claims epistemic (even though he seems to think that ontological 
claims can be derived from them). In fact, she presents her paper as one 
about metaphysical issues concerning moral properties (p. 373) and the main 
goal of the paper is to argue against “the traditional philosophical conception 
of objectivity” in order to alleviate the metaphysical problems she claims arise  
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as its result. She argues that the properties she calls marginally subjective do 
not have to count as subjective in a metaphysical sense. 
To sum things up, Crary’s interpretation of the “traditional view” with a 
focus on properties is this: The class of subjective properties, those that 
require a conception in terms of mental responses of subjects, includes both 
so-called merely subjective and marginally subjective properties. They are 
subjective both in an epistemological and a metaphysical sense. Objective 
properties are those that are not subjective. In this, she seems to assume that 
epistemic subjectivity entails ontological subjectivity: the fact that it takes 
certain things to have a conception of a property somehow makes the property 
itself subjective. 
Is there really a reason to think that this traditional view involves 
metaphysical claims about properties? If so, who would the proponents of 
such a view be? And if the view is intended as an epistemic one, is there a 
reason to think that it still entails something metaphysical? Crary attributes the 
traditional view, or what she also calls a “narrow conception of objectivity” to 
Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel, among others. Her claim is that their 
approaches to objectivity as a certain perspective on the world are among the 
strongest available defenses of the narrow conception. 
In Williams’s terms (Williams 1978), objectivity is associated with “an 
absolute conception of the world,” while Nagel associates it with the “view from 
nowhere” (Nagel 1986). A perfectly subjective description of the world is one 
that is entirely from the point of view of an individual, whereas a perfectly 
objective description is the exact opposite, i.e. one that is entirely removed 
from an individual’s viewpoint. As we are all subjects and individuals, we 
cannot attain an objective point of view. Furthermore, as Nagel makes clear in  
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his paper “Subjective and Objective” (Nagel 1979), this distinction is not a 
clear-cut either/or distinction but more of a distinction along a continuum: 
Although  I  shall  speak  of  the  subjective  viewpoint  and  the 
objective viewpoint, this is just shorthand, for there are not two 
such viewpoints, nor even two such categories into which more 
particular viewpoints can be placed. Instead, there is a polarity. 
At one end is the point of view of a particular individual, having a 
specific  constitution,  situation,  and  relation  to  the  rest  of  the 
world.  From  here  the  direction  of  movement  toward  greater 
objectivity  involves,  first,  abstraction  from  the  individual’s 
specific  spatial,  temporal,  and  personal  position  in  the  world, 
then from the features that distinguish him from other humans, 
then  gradually  from  the  forms  of  perception  and  action 
characteristic of humans, and away from the narrow range of a 
human scale in space, time, and quantity, toward a conception 
of  the  world  which  as  far  as  possible  is  not  the  view  from 
anywhere  within  it.  There  is  probably  no  end-point  to  this 
process, but its aim is to regard the world as centerless, with the 
viewer as just one of its contents (p. 206). 
This distinction is epistemological: We think of two different ways of 
considering the world, from a subjective viewpoint and an objective one. Since 
references to subjective experience do not belong in the objective view, it is 
hardly going to include any conceptions of merely subjective properties. It 
might include alternative conceptions of marginally subjective properties. That 
is, it might include conceptions of properties that also happen to be 
dispositions to cause certain mental responses, but it will certainly not include 
a conception of a property as such a disposition.  
Is there a reason to think that a metaphysical distinction between 
objective and subjective properties follows from this distinction between an 
objective and subjective viewpoint? Presumably, an objective property would 
be detected via the objective point of view and a subjective property via the 
subjective view. As Crary has already set things up, this holds for a certain 
kind of distinction between “objective” and “subjective” properties, but it is by  
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no means clear that this particular distinction is ontological. Is there an 
ontological distinction between properties that follows?  
We can only try to imagine what an objective view of the world would be 
like; a view independent of any individual point of view. Perhaps it could be the 
viewpoint of an omniscient deity stripped of any references to mental 
responses of individuals. Presumably, it would include information about what 
things are like, including which properties they have, as well as hypothetical 
information about what things would be like if it were not for us subjects and 
thus the properties which depend on us. Why would properties that depend 
upon certain kinds of mental activity be excluded in this case? Couldn’t this 
kind of view involve information about all properties? If so, an objective 
property defined as the kind of property about which an objective view informs 
us could be any property. That is, all properties would be objective. To avoid 
that conclusion, we will have to assume that certain properties, namely those 
that depend ontologically on mental responses, cannot be conceived of from 
an objective point of view, but only in terms of mental responses. There is no 
particular reason to think that is the case. In fact, there are some good 
reasons to think it is not. 
Focusing on the other extreme, a subjective view, it seems quite likely 
that even a highly idiosyncratic, personal, subjective description is going to 
include properties that “would be there anyway.” That is, even a subjective 
description might include mind-independent properties. To each of us, things 
appear in a whole lot of ways: pleasant, sweet, round, threatening, boring, 
concave, hot, cold, thought-provoking, etc. All these properties appear to us 
from a subjective point of view; whether the properties in question are 
objective or subjective seems to be a different matter.   
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But what about an entirely subjective view? A point of view according to 
which only the experiences of the subject are taken into account and nothing 
else? If we imagine a being with such a point of view, it makes sense to 
assume that she does not acknowledge anything that is mind-independent. 
She only views and considers the world in terms of how she is being affected 
or how she is feeling. Or does the entirely subjective view perhaps consist in 
only thinking of what she is feeling and not acknowledging things separate 
from herself at all?  
An example of such a fictional being is Gareth Evans’s Hero (Evans 
1980), a being whose only functioning sense modality is the sense of hearing. 
Evans’s claim is that because Hero does not possess what he calls 
simultaneous spatial concepts, he cannot conceive of existence unperceived, 
i.e. of mind-independent objects. Evans offers a couple of arguments for this 
claim; one is that Hero lacks the capacity to think of an objective causal 
ground for what he senses, and another is that he lacks the resources to form 
so-called simultaneous spatial concepts, i.e. concepts necessary for having an 
idea of different things existing simultaneously at different locations. The core 
idea is that Hero’s limited ability to experience the world around him prevents 
him from conceiving of the world in terms that are not strictly subjective. 
Evans’s claim about Hero’s inability to conceive of unperceived existence 
seems quite compelling. What seems most striking, if we try to imagine Hero’s 
situation, is that Hero seems isolated from the rest of the world. If Hero cannot 
distinguish between his own perception of a sound and the sound perceived, it 
would seem that he was generally unable to make a distinction between 
himself and the rest of the world. Therefore, if this is a case of an absolutely 
subjective view, it is not really a view of the world. Is ‘subjective conception of  
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the world’ perhaps an oxymoron? And could someone like Hero even conceive 
of something like properties? This idea of an absolutely subjective view does 
not seem helpful for picking out a particular kind of property (i.e. subjective 
properties). 
The conclusion is that an objective view does not seem particularly 
helpful for distinguishing between different types of properties, and that a 
subjective view, if it involves any property conception at all, might just as well 
inform us about the same properties as an objective view does. Hence, basing 
an ontological distinction between different kinds of properties on these two 
different points of view is not what we need. In other words, it is highly doubtful 
that an ontological distinction between objective and subjective properties 
follows from epistemological accounts such as Nagel’s and Williams’s of an 
absolute conception of the world or a view from nowhere. Furthermore, it is by 
no means clear that this is really the “traditional philosophical conception” of 
the distinction between subjective and objective properties. 
 
 
 
2.7. What Now? 
So far, I have not reached any interesting conclusion about what makes a 
property objective or subjective. I have gone through a list of attempts at 
making a distinction between objective and subjective properties and found 
none of them satisfactory for my goal. The main problem with accounts such 
as those of McLaughlin and Crary is that they are epistemologically based. 
While there is nothing wrong in and of itself with distinguishing between 
properties on the basis of how we come to know about them or of how we  
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conceive of them, I am looking for a distinction that runs deeper from an 
ontological perspective. An epistemically based distinction does not provide 
the necessary tools for considering the reality or instantiation of the two kinds 
of properties different. 
The shortcomings of the account given by Akins and Hahn are of a 
different nature. Their account does describe an ontological difference; a 
difference on the level of the instantiation of the properties. However, that is as 
far as it goes: description. I am looking for more of an explanation. 
I have not yet mentioned what I think may be the most promising type of 
accounts: the response-dependence account of subjective properties. While 
such accounts can certainly be messy and confusing, I believe they can be 
used to throw light upon a viable distinction between subjective and objective 
properties. The next chapter will be dedicated to that. 49 
CHAPTER 3 
RESPONSE-DEPENDENCE AND SUBJECTIVITY 
 
 
 
3.1. Response-Dependence 
So-called response-dependence has by some been considered the 
solution to the gap between the subjective and the objective
19. Among other 
things, it has been proposed that response-dependent properties are the 
paradigm subjective properties; i.e. that response-dependence is sufficient to 
make a property subjective. 
As I am seeking an account that clarifies the distinction between 
subjective and objective properties, looking at accounts of response-
dependence seems essential. Can the notion of response-dependence help 
me outline a distinction between subjective and objective properties? 
In this chapter, I will argue that response-dependence understood in a 
certain way does yield subjectivity for properties. That does not mean that all 
response-dependence accounts are accounts of the “right” kind of 
dependence. The most difficult task is to spell out exactly in what the required 
response-dependence consists. 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 Examples include Wright 1992; Johnston 1993; Wedgwood 1998; Norris 2002a; Norris 
2002b.  
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3.2. What Is Response-Dependence? 
According to the legend, the term response-dependence was coined by 
Mark Johnston in a seminar at Princeton University in 1986 (Wright 1992). 
Johnston’s definition of response-dependence is as follows: 
...a  concept  is  response-dependent  just  in  case  it  is  either  a 
response-dispositional  concept  or  a  truth-functional  or 
quantificational combination of concepts with at least one non-
redundant  element  being  a  response-dispositional  concept 
(Johnston 1993, p. 104). 
According to Johnston, a concept is response-dispositional if it is 
dispositional (concept F = the concept of the disposition to produce R in S 
under C) and furthermore: 
 
(i)  the  manifestation  R  is  some  response  of  subjects  which 
essentially  and  intrinsically  involves  some  mental  process 
(responses like sweating and digesting are therefore excluded), 
(ii) the locus S of the manifestation is some subject or group of 
subjects, and (iii) the conditions C of manifestation are some 
specified  conditions  under  which  the  specified  subjects  can 
respond in the specified manner. Moreover, we shall require (iv) 
that  the  relevant  identity  does  not  hold  simply  on  trivializing 
‘whatever it takes’ specifications of either R or S or C (Ibid.). 
In short, a response-dispositional concept is a concept of a disposition to 
produce a mental response in a certain subject or group of subjects under 
some specified conditions. For example, nauseating and tiresome would be 
such concepts. Other response-dispositional concepts include color concepts 
and other perceptual or sensory concepts, concepts of pain and other 
emotions or experiences, and concepts of funniness and other evaluative 
concepts. Johnston’s account is epistemological as it concerns the relation 
between our possession of certain concepts and certain mental responses.
20 
                                                 
20 Johnston discusses and endorses his view of response-dispositional properties in a number 
of papers, such as Johnston 1989; 1992; 1993; and 1998.  
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Johnston calls a concept response-dependent if it is a response-
dispositional concept or “a truthfunctional or quantificational combination of 
concepts with at least one non-redundant element being a response-
dispositional concept” (1993, p. 104). Quoted above, the term ‘response-
dependent’ implies a dependence of the concept on a response. In what can 
this dependence consist? Does this mean that the concept is somehow 
dependent on the occurrence of the response in question? Let me note here 
that Johnston’s account is strictly about concepts and not about properties. As 
I am looking for an account of different kinds of properties, it is by no means 
clear that an account such as Johnston’s will be satisfactory for that purpose. 
However, as the notion of response-dependence owes so much to Johnston’s 
account, it is worth considering whether a basis for the distinction I want can 
be found in it. 
Johnston’s definition of response-dispositional concepts quoted above 
does not in any obvious way imply that the concept is dependent on the 
response itself. But his use of the term ‘response-dependent’ might indicate 
that a less obvious dependence relation is supposed to follow from the 
definition. Let us consider some options: 
Someone might think that response-dispositional concepts are the 
concepts we would not possess if it were not for some specific mental 
response of ours, such that each of those concepts corresponds to a certain 
response. If so, these concepts are dependent on the existence of the 
response associated with the response-disposition.  The disposition must have 
been manifested at some time or other. An example of such a concept could 
be the concept of nausea being dependent on the mental response of nausea. 
But what kind of dependence do we have here? Is personal experience of  
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nausea essential to possessing a concept of it? Hardly; someone who is lucky 
enough never to have felt nauseated can still know that there is a certain kind 
of sensation that people have just before throwing up and to which they refer 
as nausea. While those who have never felt nauseated have an incomplete 
conception of nausea, they can still posses a concept of it. Those who have 
felt nauseated could then be the experts defining the concept and the others 
form their incomplete conceptions on the basis of that. Arguably, the concept 
would not exist if it were not for those who have felt nauseated having that 
response. Those who have never felt nauseated might not possess the 
concept of nausea if someone had not had the response and reported it. 
The above seems similar to Frank Jackson’s famous example of Mary 
who has never seen anything colored, having spent her life secluded in a 
black-and-white environment (Jackson 1982). Even though Mary studies the 
world and visual experiences of it intensely in a scientific manner, there is still 
something that she is missing, says Jackson. Although the argument Jackson 
develops, the so-called Knowledge Argument, is not exactly about response-
dependence, the idea is similar to a certain extent. Certain conceptions rely on 
certain experiences such that without these relevant experiences, something 
is lost. 
 While the above account of how response-dispositional concepts are to 
be possessed sounds reasonably plausible, there are other equally plausible 
accounts of the same, such as this (and this account may be even closer to 
Jackson’s account of Mary): Even though anyone can possess some concept 
of nausea, there might be another concept of nausea that can only be 
possessed by those who have experienced it: a concept more closely 
associated with what it is like to be in that state. As a result, there may be two  
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different concepts of the disposition to produce nausea: one for those who 
have experienced the response and another for those who must rely on their 
testimony. Both concepts are response-dispositional as they are concepts of a 
disposition to produce a mental response in suitable subjects under suitable 
conditions. And while not everyone has experienced the appropriate  mental 
response, those who have not rely on the testimony of those who have and 
thus their concept is indirectly dependent on the existence of the response. 
In both of the above versions, the concept of the disposition has a certain 
ontological dependence on the occurrence of the response. But is it always 
the case with concepts of dispositions to produce mental responses that they 
would not exist (i.e. nobody would possess them) if nobody had ever had such 
a response? I think not; at least it seems by no means necessary. We could 
have a concept of, say, a disposition to produce an after-death experience 
which we imagine to be an essentially mental response. For obvious reasons, 
neither I nor anyone I know has had an after-death experience. Furthermore, 
as far as I know, no appropriately reliable testimony of after-death experience 
has ever been made available. The concept admittedly does not involve a 
vivid notion of what an after-death experience would be like, but it is still a 
concept of a disposition to produce a mental response in suitable subjects 
under suitable conditions. Other similar examples are the concepts of being 
bewitched and of reaching nirvana. From this I must conclude that a response-
dispositional concept in Johnston’s sense is not a concept that relies on the 
existence or occurrence of a certain response. It merely consists in this: I 
cannot possess a concept of a disposition to produce an after-death 
experience without also possessing a concept of an after-death experience 
(the response) itself.  
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The dependence involved may become clearer when Philip Pettit’s 
(1991) account is considered.
21 Pettit characterizes response-dependence in 
terms of what he calls response-privileging concepts. He uses the concept of 
redness as an example of such a concept:  
It is a priori knowable that if something is red then it will look red 
in normal circumstances to normal observers, so ignorance is 
ruled  out  in  that  situation.  And  it  is  a  priori  knowable  that  if 
something  looks  red  in  normal  circumstances  to  normal 
observers  then  it  is  red,  so  error  is  equally  ruled  out  in  that 
situation (p. 597). 
Here, the “looking red”-response is privileged in the sense that it is 
guaranteed to be involved in the concept. A concept that is not that of looking 
red in the appropriate circumstances must be a concept of something other 
than redness. The concept of redness is dependent on the response we have 
when things look red. While Pettit’s account of response-dependence differs 
from Johnston’s, this dependence ought to hold for Johnston’s response-
dispositional concepts as well. According to Pettit, response-dispositional 
concepts must be response-privileging even though a concept can be 
response-privileging without being response-dispositional. 
Contrary to those already mentioned, some accounts of response-
dependence emphasize response-dependence as applied to properties and 
not concepts. One such account is endorsed by Ralph Wedgwood: 
...a  response-dependence  account  is  an  ontological  or 
metaphysical account, of what it is for things to be F. It is stated 
entirely at the level of reference, not at the level of sense. It is 
not a semantical account, of the meaning of the term ‘F’; nor is it 
an  epistemological  or  psychological  account,  of  the  way  in 
which  we  think  about,  or  achieve  epistemic  access  to,  an 
object’s  being  F.  In  that  sense,  it  is  not  an  account  of  the 
concept F—at least not if the concept is the meaning of the term 
                                                 
21 Other writings by Pettit on the subject of response-dependence include Pettit 1993 and Pettit 
1998.  
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‘F’,  or  a  way  of  thinking  about  the  property  of  being  F 
(Wedgwood 1998, pp. 35-36).  
Wedgwood is basing his account of response-dependence on the 
intuition that some properties are less objective than others. The account of 
response-dependence is intended to throw light on that intuition and the 
definition is this: “A property counts as response-dependent if, and only if, it is 
part of what it is for something to have the property that it stands in a certain 
relation to a certain mental response to that property” (p. 36). 
The intuition with which Wedgwood is dealing is more or less the same 
as the one driving my search for an objective/subjective property distinction, 
and I agree with Wedgwood that a response-dependence account of concepts 
does not cover that intuition adequately. In the next section, I will discuss in 
more detail why Wedgwood—and I—think response-dependence accounts of 
concepts are insufficient for this purpose. 
 
 
 
3.3. Concepts or Properties? 
As I explained in the last section, response-dependence accounts can 
have either concepts or properties as their focus. We can call those which 
focus on concepts semantic accounts and those which are directed at 
properties ontological accounts.  
For my purposes, a semantic account of response-dependence is 
insufficient. An account of a concept is not an account of a property and it is a 
property account that I want. The account I seek of subjective properties must 
distinguish them from objective properties on an ontological level. If response- 
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dependence is to be of any use for that, it must be so on the level of 
properties. In other words, do response-dependent concepts represent 
properties that are subjective in the sense that matters? If so, a semantic 
account could still be useful by providing me with the directions to the 
properties for which I am looking. 
Johnston’s response-dependent concepts are concepts of a certain kind 
of dispositions. While, as I have pointed out, a concept of a disposition to 
produce a response must rely on a concept of the response, there is not an 
analogous reliance of the disposition itself on the response itself. An object 
can have the property without the response occurring, that is, it can have a 
disposition to produce a response without that disposition’s ever being 
manifested. Just as the fragility of an object is not dependent on the actual 
breaking of the object, its disposition to produce a feeling of pleasure under 
certain conditions is independent of whether those conditions ever occur and 
thus the feeling of pleasure is produced. To put it simply: claiming that all 
dispositions were ontologically dependent on their manifestations would be 
absurd. 
If we turn to Pettit’s response-privileging concepts we see that Pettit 
himself emphasizes that they do not have to represent properties that are 
subjective. He claims that response-dependence can be consistent with 
objectivism, which he describes in this way: “The objects posited exist and 
have their character fixed independently of the dispositions of participants in 
the discourse to assert and believe things about them” (Pettit 1991, p. 590). 
When a concept is response-privileging it means that a response had by a 
suitable subject under the specified conditions is guaranteed to be 
appropriate. By definition, the subject’s response is a correct representation.  
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However, that does not entail that the subject’s response is what makes it so 
that the object in question has the property in question. 
A response-dependence account providing the metaphysical distinction I 
am seeking must be an account of properties. It is possible that the subjective 
properties for which I am looking happen to be exactly those represented by 
response-dependendent concepts, but I doubt we have a particular reason to 
think that is the case. At any rate, if response-dependent concepts really are 
the key to subjective properties, some explaining of why it is so is necessary. 
An account that is of concepts only is insufficient; the account must involve a 
description of the properties themselves. 
Since I am looking for an ontological difference between something we 
can call subjective and objective properties, according to which subjective 
properties are dependent on something mental, it should go without saying 
that an account of properties ontologically dependent on mental responses 
would be what I need. Properties that are, ontologically speaking, response-
dependent could be the subjective properties I want, and properties that are 
not response-dependent in this sense would then be the objective ones. This 
account must explain in what this dependence consists and what kinds of 
properties have this dependence. The subjective property I want is a property 
that an object has in virtue of a mental response of a subject. If it were not for 
the response, the object would not have the property. The objective property I 
want is a property that a thing has regardless of such a mental response. 
Hence, a truly response-dependent property—a property dependent for its 
instantiation on a mental response—must be subjective. But is this what 
accounts of so-called response-dependent properties are really about?   
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The criteria I have been outlining for truly response-dependent properties 
find some resonance in Wedgwood’s account. According to Wedgwood, an 
account of a response-dependent property is a constitutive account: “I propose 
that a property is response-dependent just in case any adequate constitutive 
account of what it is for something to have the property must mention some 
type of mental response to that property” (Wedgwood 1998, p. 41). A 
constitutive account, he says, is an account that answers the question of why 
an object has the property in question, of what constitutes the object’s having 
the property, in what it consists, what makes it the case that it has the property 
or in virtue of what it is true that it does. This sounds promising. If a mental 
response is a part of what makes it so that a property is instantiated, the 
property is mind-dependent in the appropriate sense. But how can this 
account be stated more specificly? 
As Wedgwood points out, it is not very clear what it means for something 
to constitute the having of a property and thus it requires further clarification 
what this kind of account involves. While he claims that a constitutive account 
can be stated as a necessary, universally quantified biconditional, he makes it 
clear that not all such biconditionals qualify. The biconditional must involve the 
essence of the property. Wedgwood goes on to give an account of essence, 
according to which a statement of essence is a “real definition” of something or 
a “basic necessary principle” determining its extension. His description of 
property essence is as follows:  
...if we are concerned, not with an individual, but with a property 
or relation, then the basic necessary principle about the property 
or relation will concern what it is for a sequence of objects to 
exemplify  this  property  or  relation:  it  will  be  the  principle  that 
determines which sequences of objects (if any), in any possible 
world, are instances of that property or relation (p. 48).  
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Wedgwood’s clarified definition of a response-dependent property 
follows: “A property is response-dependent just in case it is an essential part of 
something’s being an instance of the property that it stands in some relation to 
some sort of mental response to that property” (p. 50). This looks like 
something that might work. But what is it that makes it so that constitutive 
accounts of some properties, but not of others, must mention a mental 
response? Let us consider an account that might help. 
 
 
 
3.4. Rigidity 
The ongoing search is one for the right kind of response-dependence; the 
kind that gives us the proper relation to a mental response. One hopeful 
candidate is so-called non-rigidity. It has been suggested that rigid or rigidified 
response-dependent accounts are accounts of objective properties (Pettit 
1991, Vallentyne 1996, Railton 1998). Peter Vallentyne (Vallentyne 1996) , for 
one, defends the view that while non-rigid accounts of response-dependence 
have ontological significance, rigid accounts have only semantic significance 
and hence do not make the properties in question subjective:  
...response-dependent accounts that rigidly fix (in a way that I 
shall  make  precise)  the  relevant  responsive  dispositions  and 
conditions  are,  I  shall  argue,  ontologically,  simply  a  form  of 
objectivism (p. 102). 
In order to evaluate this, we must of course make clear what rigid and 
non-rigid accounts of response-dependence are. First, let us take a look at 
Vallentyne’s way of making that distinction:  
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A rigid response-dependent account of wrongness, recall, is one 
for  which  there  is  a  fixed  (non-variable)  set  of  responsive 
dispositions and conditions (including the laws and regularities 
governing  those  responsive  dispositions)  that  is  the  basis  for 
evaluating the wrongness of all actions. Historically, the most 
well-known  sort  of  rigid  account  is  the  ideal  observer  theory. 
According  to  (a  simple  form  of)  this  account,  to  say  that  an 
action is wrong is to say that it would be disapproved of when 
considered  under  specified  ideal  conditions  by  specified  ideal 
(e.g.,  fully  rational  and  perfectly  benevolent)  beings.  Such  an 
account is rigid, because neither the relevant conditions nor the 
relevant  responsive  dispositions  vary  with  the  action  being 
assessed (p. 105). 
On a non-rigid account, on the other hand, the responsive dispositions 
and conditions are not fixed:  
A  well  known  sort  of  non-rigid  account  is  one  for  which  the 
wrongness of an action is determined by how the members of 
the agent’s society would at the time and in the world of the 
action  respond  to  it.  Given  that  the  specified  responsive 
dispositions typically vary, at least somewhat, by society, time, 
and  world,  wrongness  on  this  account  genuinely  tracks 
responsive dispositions. The dispositions vary, and wrongness 
varies along with them (p. 104). 
What Vallentyne seems to be saying is that on a rigid account of p, what 
determines its instantiation is fixed to the actual world whereas on a non-rigid 
account, the conditions for the instantiation of p are relative to each world. If 
the account of p is rigid, two intrinsically identical objects, one in world W1 and 
the other in world W2, will either both have p or neither of them will have it, 
depending on responses to such objects in the actual world. If the account of p 
is non-rigid, one of the objects could have p in W1 and not in W2, depending on 
responses to such objects in those worlds. The distinction Vallentyne has 
given seems to be one between world-relative and non-relative properties. 
There certainly seem to be reasons to consider such a distinction a plausible 
candidate for a distinction between subjective and objective properties. For 
instance, many disputes about the objectivity of color have rested on the issue  
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of whether two instrinsically identical objects would have the same color in 
different possible worlds. The color objectivists will claim that they would while 
the subjectivists will claim that deny it. But what does rigidity have to do with 
it? 
Vallentyne seems to think of his distinction between rigid and non-rigid 
response-dependent accounts as similar to Saul Kripke’s account of rigid 
designation (Kripke 1980). For instance, Vallentyne considers the Kripkean 
notion of ‘water’ as H2O analogous to a rigid response-dependent account 
(Vallentyne 1996, p. 107). According to Kripke, a term is a rigid designator if it 
refers to the same individual in all possible worlds. A name is a rigid 
designator while a description such as “the president of the US” is not. 
Accounts of response-dependent properties are, however, not accounts of 
singular terms. Is it possible to give the same kind of account for ontological 
entities such as properties as for singular terms? 
If the distinction is intended to be perfectly analogous with Kripke’s, then 
first of all it must be about property terms rather than the properties 
themselves. It must be so that a property term is rigid if it refers to the same 
property in all possible worlds, and non-rigid if it refers to different properties in 
different possible worlds.
22  It is somewhat unclear what this means unless we 
have an account of sameness for properties. When is a property the same 
property in W1 and W2 and what makes two properties different properties? 
                                                 
22 This definition is similar to the one described by López de Sa (2001) as a straightforward 
characterization of rigidity for predicates. Different attempts have been made to define rigidity 
and non-rigidity for predicates or property terms, such as defining rigid property terms as 
those referring to essential properties (Marti 2004). That definition, however, is obviously not 
one helpful for distinguishing between subjective and objective properties and will not be 
discussed further here.  
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However, let us leave that issue aside and assume that a distinction between 
rigid and non-rigid property terms can be made this way.  
Now we have a distinction between two different kinds of property terms. 
It is by no means clear that it entails a distinction between two kinds of 
properties. Can it be said that a property is subjective if and only if it is 
represented by a non-rigid term and objective if and only if it is represented by 
a rigid term? For that to be the case, there must be a one-one correspondence 
between property terms and properties. Each property can only be 
represented by one term and each term can only refer to one property. But the 
whole idea behind non-rigid property terms was that such terms referred to 
different properties in different possible worlds. 
Let us take a closer look at this: An account of subjective and objective 
properties derived from a distinction between rigid and non-rigid response-
dependent property terms must look something like this: A property is 
subjective if and only if it is represented by a non-rigid response-dependent 
property term. A property is objective it is represented by a rigid property term.  
What properties could be examples reflecting this distinction? Finding an 
example of an objective property is easy enough. Presumably, the term 
squareness refers to the same property in all possible worlds, namely the 
property of squareness. And taking squareness to be an objective property 
does not seem far-fetched. But what would be a good example of the other 
kind of property; a property represented by a response-dependent property 
term that refers to different properties in different possible worlds?  
A property frequently considered subjective is funniness. Is funniness 
represented by a property term referring to different properties in different 
possible worlds? I take it that it is best represented by the term funniness. But  
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what does it mean for that term to refer to different properties in different 
worlds? It can hardly mean that it only refers to the property funniness in some 
worlds and to, say, grotesqueness in some other worlds and to 
reasonableness in yet other worlds. The idea must be that in some possible 
worlds, things with green spots are funny, in other worlds square things are 
funny and in yet other worlds, clumsy people tripping on banana peels are 
funny. So in W1, funniness refers to the property of having green spots, in W2, 
funniness refers to the property of squareness, and in W3, funniness refers to 
the property (or property conjunction) of being human and tripping on banana 
peel. This either implies that there is no such property as funniness (only the 
term funniness exists but not the associated property) or that the property 
funniness is identical with various other properties in a world-relative manner. 
In W1, the property of funniness is the property of green-spottedness, etc. This 
seems strange. 
Another problem with the account is reflected in this example: In W2, the 
term funniness (allegedly) refers to squareness. That means that squareness 
is a property that (in some worlds) is represented by a non-rigid response-
dependent property term. But that can hardly make squareness a subjective 
property—a result inconsistent with the previous claim that squareness is an 
objective property.  
The upshot is that for an account of subjective properties, we cannot use 
an account that makes the subjective properties disappear. If funniness is 
going to be a subjective property, we must be able to assume that there is 
such a property and not that there is only the corresponding property term 
referring to some other properties. Furthermore, it simply sounds implausible 
to say that a term such as funniness refers to different properties in different  
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possible worlds. It seems to me that funniness refers to the property of 
funniness in all possible worlds (in which funniness is instantiated). Whatever 
it is that distinguishes funniness from squareness cannot be explained by the 
rigidity or non-rigidity of the terms funniness and squareness as both seem 
equally rigid given an account analogous to Kripke’s.
23 
As I mentioned above, Vallentyne thinks of his distinction between rigid 
and non-rigid accounts of response-dependence as consistent with Kripke’s 
account. He uses “water=H2O” as an analogy to explain his account of rigid 
response-dependent accounts. Furthermore, Vallentyne’s explanations of the 
difference between rigid and non-rigid accounts certainly involve the 
assumption that the distinction has to do with the identity of properties in a 
Kripkean spirit. For instance, he says that on a non-rigid account, wrongness 
varies along with the varying dispositions in different societies (1996, p. 104), 
and about rigid accounts he has this to say: 
...wrongness, so understood, just is whatever it evokes, under 
the rigidly specified conditions, the specified response from the 
rigidly fixed responsive dispositions of the beings at the rigidly 
specified  conditions,  the  specified  response  from  the  rigidly 
fixed  responsive  dispositions  of  the  beings  at  the  rigidly 
specified time and world. Consequently, wrongness is identical 
with the evoking attributes (p. 106). 
If Vallentyne’s account really is an account of term reference, as Kripke’s, 
he is wrong about its ontological repercussions. Kripke’s account is semantical 
and one of the points he makes is that the same object can be represented by 
both rigid and non-rigid designators. There is no reason to think that an 
                                                 
23 It has been suggested by López de Sa (2001) that the predicates that count as non-rigid are 
predicates such as being the color of ripe tomatoes (as it refers to redness in some possible 
worlds but other colors in other possible worlds). Schnieder (2005) rejects that and claims that 
non-rigid predicates are even more difficult to find.  
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analogous account of the reference of property terms should be more likely to 
reflect an ontological distinction.  
As I have shown, a distinction between subjective and objective 
properties based on an account of the reference of rigid and non-rigid property 
terms does not work.  However, if we ignore what appears to be Vallentyne’s 
commitment to Kripkean rigidity, and interpret his account as one of the 
conditions determining the instantiation of a property, we may end up with a 
distinction between subjective and objective properties based on world-
relativity. What remains unclear, then, is where rigidity comes into play. I will 
take a closer look at relativity in the next section. 
Another account of rigid and non-rigid response-dependence is Nick 
Zangwill’s (2000). Zangwill claims that rigid response-dependence has to do 
with intrinsic dispositions while non-rigid response-dependence has to do with 
extrinsic dispositions: 
For  a  rigid  response-dependence  theorist,  the  disposition  to 
provoke responses is an intrinsic disposition whereas for a non-
rigid  theorist,  it  is  an  extrinsic  disposition.  Rigid  response-
dependence theories allow that the disposition is determined by 
the intrinsic properties of the thing in question plus the laws, and 
it  does  not  vary  with  varying  responses.  Non-rigid  response-
dependent  theories,  by  contrast,  deny  that  the  disposition  is 
determined solely by the intrinsic properties of a thing plus the 
laws, and they allow that if our responses were to vary then the 
colors or sounds would vary (p. 607). 
Zangwill seems to be saying that according to a rigid account, the 
disposition has the same cause or categorical base in all possible worlds. In 
the non-rigid case, the disposition’s cause varies. Our subjective responses 
(or those of some other subjects) then play a crucial role in determining the 
disposition and it seems more than reasonable to think of such properties as 
subjective. It makes perfect sense to think of an extrinsic disposition that has  
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to be partly determined by a subject’s response as subjecive. The problem, 
however, is that it is by no means clear what this has to do with Kripkean 
rigidity. 
The accounts offered by Vallentyne and Zangwill of rigid and non-rigid 
response-dependence share a flaw: Where is the rigidity? It seems to me that 
things would be much clearer if Vallentyne simply spoke of relative and non-
relative response-dependence and Zangwill stuck to speaking of internal and 
external dispositions. Calling the accounts rigid and non-rigid does not seem 
to help. 
Pettit’s (1991) and Railton’s (1998) applications of rigidity or rigidification 
are more enlightening. Their accounts of rigid/rigidified definitions of response-
dependent properties are basically the same. Here is Railton’s example of a 
rigidified definition: “x is red = x is such as to elicit in normal humans as they 
actually are (and in actually normal circumstances) the visual impression of 
redness” (Railton 1998, p. 69). The definition is rigidified because it is tied to 
the responses as they actually are in the actual world. Hence, the instantiation 
of redness (according to this definition), is determined in the same way in all 
possible worlds. This can be a helpful way of explaining why a property is not 
world-relative. But here rigidity does not share much with Kripke’s semantic 
rigidity, despite sharing the element of a tie to the actual world having a certain 
importance. 
Indeed, there is no reason to suspect Railton of confusing his account 
with Kripke’s account of rigidity. The term he uses is ‘rigidification’ and he 
speaks of rigidified definitions. Rigidification is not to be understood as 
semantic rigidity. It consists in the definition of the property being “attached” so 
to speak to the associated response in the actual world.  
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3.5. On Relativity, Biconditionals, and More 
It still remains to be clarified what exactly it is that makes a property truly 
response-dependent in the sense that its instantiation is dependent on the 
occurrence of a subjective response. While sorting response-dependent terms 
into rigid and non-rigid does not seem to help, distinguishing rigidified from 
non-rigidified definitions of response-dependent properties is more promising. 
I believe that Wedgwood is on the right track. It sounds very plausible 
that the true response-dependence of a property would have something to do 
with whether its instantiation consists in the response. To refresh our 
memories, Wedgwood’s definition is this: “A property is response-dependent 
just in case it is an essential part of something’s being an instance of the 
property that it stands in some relation to some sort of mental response to that 
property” (1998, p. 50). Adding a description of what kind of relation is involved 
will make things clearer: 
I propose that the relation that counts is one of ontological dependence. 
In fact, given Wedgwood’s general discussion, it seems likely that he would 
agree. The difficult part is to specify the relevant kind of ontological 
dependence. It can hardly be causal dependence. As an example of causal 
dependence we can take the property of being a coin. For an object to have 
that property, a group of subjects must have attributed “coinness” to it. 
However, it seems to be the case that a coin could still be a coin even if no 
subjects were around anymore or if coins were not in use anymore (perhaps 
not such a distant possibility) and people were to forget everything about 
coins.  
The dependence I am seeking must be different from this. It is the kind of 
dependence that is such that if the relevant group of subjects were  
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permanently to give up any attributions of the property, an object could not 
have this property any longer. 
I said earlier that there was no reason to think of a disposition as 
dependent on its manifestation. A disposition can be instantiated even though 
the response it would produce given the appropriate conditions is never 
manifested (because the right conditions never come up). However, if a 
response-dependent property is a disposition, or thought of as a disposition, it 
is a disposition that in fact is dependent on its manifestation. In such a case, 
object O has property P precisely because of response R by subject S. If p is a 
disposition to produce R, it means that O would not have the disposition if it 
were not for R. However, whether or not the property is a disposition is 
irrelevant. Think of this example: Let us suppose that funniness is response-
dependent in the relevant sense. Something is funny because subjects of type 
S think/believe/decide it is funny, or would find it funny if they were to 
encounter it. It so happens that something that is funny is disposed to produce 
amusement in S, but that is not what makes funniness response-dependent. 
What makes it response-dependent is that O is funny because S would judge 
it to be funny if S were in a position to do so (that is, if S were to encounter O). 
A biconditional of the form frequently used to describe dispositions is not 
sufficient to account for a truly response-dependent property even though it 
may be true of it. What is needed for the response-dependence is what can be 
called the “because-I-say-so” factor. If P is truly response-dependent, the 
reason why O has P is that S (or subjects of type S) says so, because they 
have response R. If a property is response-independent, on the other hand, it 
is entirely possible that a biconditional involving a disposition holds, yet the 
“because-I-say-so”-factor is missing. For response-independent property P, a  
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biconditional of the form “O has P if and only if O is disposed to produce R in S 
in C” holds, but the production of R is not the reason why O has P. 
Truly response-dependent properties can also be thought of as subject-
relative or world-relative. In a world in which the subjects have response R to 
object O, O has P. In a world in which the subjects do not have response R to 
O, O does not have P. This is consistent with Vallentyne’s account. It is also 
consistent with how the line has frequently been drawn between subjective 
and objective properties, such as in the debate about whether colors are 
subjective or objective. But what makes a property subjective, or mind-
dependent, is not its being relative to something. It is its dependence on an 
actual mental response that does. So perhaps we can say that its being 
relative to a mental response makes it mind-dependent. 
While it is true of a mind-dependent property that its instantiation is 
relative to worlds and/or subjects, that is a product of its dependence on a 
mental response. If the instantiation of a property is dependent on a specific 
type of mental response, then it is inevitably going to be relative to the 
occurrence of the response. If subjects in W1 are amused by green-spotted 
things and subjects in W2 are not but instead amused by square things, and 
funniness is a property dependent on the mental response of being amused, 
then it is true that green-spotted things are funny in W1 but not in W2. So it will 
be true that the instantiation of funniness is world-relative. What makes it so is 
its dependence on a mental response. Hence, response-dependence is a 
more accurate description of what makes the property subjective than relativity 
or world-relativity.   
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3.6. The Distinction 
I will now summarize what I consider the fundamentals of a distinction 
between subjective and objective properties, based on my discussion above in 
this chapter as well as the one preceding it.  
Response-dependence: 
Subjective properties are properties whose instantiation depends on a 
subject’s corresponding mental response. This response often involves or is 
accompanied by a judgment to the effect that the object in question has the 
property. However, such a judgment does not seem necessary. For instance, 
suppose that the property of being aggravating is instantiated if and only if a 
subject (or a group of subjects) is aggravated by the object. It is possible that 
the subject is not aware of her being aggravated; she may not outright judge 
the aggravating object as such. She may even be in denial about her 
aggravation. So if we want to insist that a judgment must be involved, at least 
we must make do with a very loose sense of ‘judgment’. What matters is that 
the subject has the mental response of aggravation. This is what makes it so 
that the property is instantiated.  
Objective properties are those that are, or can be, instantiated 
independently of subjects’ mental responses. Given the assumption that 
shapes are objective, an object’s being spherical is independent of what shape 
subjects believe it has. Of course it can be dependent on subjects’ thoughts in 
other ways. For example, the reason why a ball is sphereshaped is that those 
who manufactured it designed it and made it to be of that shape. But that is 
not the relevant kind of dependence. The ball manufacturers may, after getting 
hit on the head, suddenly forget all about their previous thoughts about the ball 
and from then on consider it cube-shaped. The ball would still be spherical.   
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What I just said about dependence on mental responses indicates that 
subjective properties are truly response-dependent in my sense of that term.  
Rigidification: 
Objective properties are those whose definition is rigidified. That is, even 
though the definition involves a response, it does not make a truly response-
dependent property if it is rigidified. The instantiation of the property is not 
actually dependent on the occurence of the response. Suppose that we define 
redness as whatever property that causes a sensation of red in humans, as 
they actually are, today. This property can be instantiated in another possible 
world in which humans have a different visual system. It can also be 
instantiated in this world tomorrow, even if there are no humans around 
because of some major overnight disaster (or rapture?). And if it is, it means 
that redness is also instantiated, because redness is that property. Then the 
instantiation of redness is not really dependent on the sensation of redness. 
Subjective properties, then, are response-dependent properties whose 
definition is not rigidified to actual human responses as they are now or 
anything of the kind. If we defined redness as whatever property that causes a 
sensation of red in any subject, anytime, anywhere, we would get a 
subjectively instantiated property. 
Appearance/reality: 
An objective property is such that it can appear without being real. That 
is, it can appear to me that property p is instantiated even though it is not. This 
follows from the property’s instantiation being independent from what I think 
about it. 
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Relativity: 
A subjective property can be considered world-relative or subject-relative. 
The world-relativity is another way of describing non-rigidification. If property p 
is subjective, then in another possible world in which humans (or the relevant 
subjects—they may not have to be human) have a different perceptual or 
evaluatory system, property p picks out different features of objects than it 
does in this world. A subjective property can also be subject-relative: Suppose 
Jack finds chocolate delicious and Jill finds it far from delicious. Assuming 
deliciousness is subjective, we can say that it is instantiated in chocolate 
relative to Jack but not relative to Jill. What exactly that means will be 
considered in more depth in the next chapter. 
I have now listed the criteria that subjective and objective properties 
should fulfill on my account. However, several questions remain. Are these 
criteria consistent? Can there be properties that fulfill them? Is there a clear 
distinction between those properties? Where do so-called sensory properties 
fall given such a distinction? These are questions I will address in the 
remaining chapters.73 
CHAPTER 4 
ON TWO CHALLENGES  
 
 
 
4.1. Why Reject the Distinction? 
As I have mentioned in a previous chapter, the specifics of a proposed 
distinction between objective and subjective properties can differ widely. 
However, such accounts all share the basic idea that a subjective property 
must be mind-dependent in some relevant way in which an objective property 
is not. Most often, this dependence is understood as strictly ontological and 
that is the dependence which is relevant here. I established in Chapter 3 that 
what I would call true response-dependence serves my purpose of making a 
distinction between subjective and objective properties. Truly response-
dependent properties are subjective in the sense that matters, which makes 
properties whose instantiation is independent of mental responses objective. 
In the present chapter I discuss two possible challenges to this distinction 
between objective and subjective properties, coming from contrasting 
directions. Each of them implies that there being two kinds of properties, one 
objective and the other subjective, is impossible. The first challenge makes all 
properties objective by rejecting the notion of mind-dependent properties. The 
idea behind it is that facts about a subjectively instantiated property must be 
somehow subjective or relative. If facts cannot be that way, there are no 
subjective properties. The second challenge consists in the claim that all 
properties are subjective, resulting in the futility of a distinction between 
subjective and objective properties. The kind of subjectivism about properties  
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that is my main concern is subjectivism about property instantiation. That is, it 
has to do with the instantiation of a property being contingent in some relevant 
sense on the responses of subjects: Object o possesses property p if and only 
if subjects s respond to it in the appropriate manner. But another type of 
property subjectivism, the view that the existence of properties is subjective, is 
also possible. Such subjectivism may seem tempting to those who find it 
plausible that our property concepts are mainly a reflection of our thinking.  
Below, I discuss and address both of these challenges. Regarding the 
first challenge, I argue that while doubts about the notion of subjective or 
relative facts may be warranted, there are other ways to define subjective 
properties that reflect how they differ from objective properties. My answer to 
the second challenge is that the appeals of subjectivism can be saved without 
giving up the notion of objectively instantiated properties. 
 
 
 
4.2. No Subjective Properties 
As I mentioned in chapter 1, the intuition seems to be that there can be 
so-called faultless disagreement about the instantiation of subjective 
properties
24. That is, assuming funniness is a subjective property, Emma can 
say “Grover is funny” and Harriet can say “Grover is not funny” on the same 
occasion, yet neither of them must be wrong. The intuition about objective 
properties is different; if Emma says “Grover is 130 cm tall” and Harriet says 
“Grover is not 130 cm tall” then one of them must be wrong. This is considered 
                                                 
24 For a thorough discussion of faultless disagreement, see Kölbel 2004a, MacFarlane 2007, 
and Wright 2001.  
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one of the main differences between subjective and objective properties. The 
idea is that funniness is not a property Grover has inherently, independently of 
Emma and Harriet’s opinions, whereas his exact height is. But how is this 
possible? Can it really be the case that two people can genuinely disagree 
about the facts of a subject matter yet both be right about it? That seems to 
defy the law of non-contradiction. 
There is quite a bit at stake here. Let us suppose that the possibility of 
faultless disagreement about the instantiation of a property is a necessary part 
of what it is for it to be subjective. If faultless disagreement then turns out to be 
impossible, there cannot be subjective properties. Therefore, I will first 
consider the notion of faultless disagreement, and then how important that is 
for the notion of subjective properties. 
 
 
 
4.2.1. Faultless Disagreement 
While an exact definition of disagreement is not to be provided here, a 
few things can be taken for granted. If Emma and Harriet truly disagree, it is 
the case that they hold contradictory beliefs. Emma believes p while Harriet 
believes not-p. What exactly that entails may be characterized in different 
ways, but some might say that it also means that Emma believes that a is a 
fact (assuming p is the proposition “a obtains” or “It is the case that a”), and 
Harriet believes that a is not a fact. 
If Emma and Harriet’s statements about Grover’s funniness or lack 
thereof are a case of genuine disagreement, the following holds:  
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GD: 
1. Emma believes that “The property of funniness is instantiated in 
Grover” is true. 
2. Harriet believes that “The property of funniness is instantiated in 
Grover” is false. 
 
If Emma and Harriet’s disagreement is faultless, we also get: 
FL: 
3. Neither Emma nor Harriet is wrong. 
 
GD and FL taken together seem to lead to a contradiction: The 
proposition “The property of funniness is instantiated in Grover” appears to be 
both true and false. How can this be solved? 
One option is to reject FL. If we do that, we accept that Emma and 
Harriet genuinely disagree about Grover’s properties, but deny that both of 
them are right. This means that one of them must be wrong. Possible ways to 
reject FL include: 
Realism or objectivism about funniness: Whether Grover is funny or 
not is not a matter of the judgments of Emma or Harriet but independent of 
them. We treat funniness the same way as we treat height. Whether Grover is 
130 cm tall is not a matter of Emma and Harriet’s judgments; his height has 
nothing to do with them. 
Monarchy: Suppose Emma is the queen. We define funniness as a 
property possessed by whatever thing the queen finds amusing and judges to 
be funny. Then Grover is funny if and only if Emma judges him to be funny. In 
this case, whether Grover is funny has everything to do with Emma’s  
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judgments but nothing with Harriet’s. Emma’s judgments about funniness are 
infallible and by definition everyone who disagrees with her about the 
instantiation of funniness is wrong. 
While both realism and monarchy appear to be internally consistent 
views, the insistence that Harriet must be mistaken about Grover’s lack of 
funniness seems to be a high price to pay. If at all possible, we should try to 
retain a view consistent with the intuition that neither Emma nor Harriet must 
be wrong. Rejecting FL should be a last resort. 
Questioning GD, the claim that Emma and Harriet genuinely disagree, 
seems to be a more fruitful approach. One way to do that is to adopt non-
cognitivism about statements assigning properties such as funniness. On that 
approach, attibutions of funniness or lack of funniness do not have truth-value. 
Hence, Emma and Harriet are not in disagreement about the truth value of 
anything, or in disagreement about the facts, because their utterances do not 
involve propositions. Our so-called attributions of subjective properties are not 
really attributions of anything. And since Emma and Harriet are not really 
attributing any properties to Grover, they do not really disagree about the truth-
value of any proposition. Refuting non-cognitivism is not a task I will take on 
here. Let it suffice to say that if some kind of non-cognitivism about the 
properties we might consider subjective is correct, then I am wrong about a 
great deal of things. I will assume that a statement such as “Grover is funny” 
really does involve a proposition. 
Let me now turn to a view I find more convincing: indexical relativism or 
indexical contextualism. According to such a view, when Emma says “Grover 
is funny,” she is really saying something about herself and her relation to 
Grover while Harriet is saying something about Harriet’s relation to Grover.  
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They are not really disagreeing. Emma is saying “Grover has the property of 
being funny-to-Emma” while Harriet is saying “Grover does not have the 
property of being-funny-to-Harriet”. Emma is saying that Grover has the 
property of funniness-to-Emma (and we could even make it time-indexed as 
well) and Harriet is saying that Grover does not have the property of 
funniness-to-Harriet. There are no contradictory beliefs involved as there is 
nothing inconsistent about funny-to-Emma being instantiated in Grover even 
though funny-to-Harriet is not instantiated. 
On this account, there is no such property as funniness simpliciter, or at 
least such a property is never instantiated. Funniness can only be instantiated 
in the context of a subject. The term ‘funny’ functions as an indexical; just as 
Emma and Harriet refer to different people when they use the word ‘I’, they 
refer to different properties when they use the word ‘funny’.  
Some philosophers have adopted a view like this about color. Because of 
variations in color perception, both among humans and between animal 
species, they claim that shades of color are relative to perceivers and 
circumstances. One example is Brian McLaughlin’s account: 
Relativized Colours. Redness for a visual perceiver of type P in 
circumstances  of  visual  observation  C  is  that  property  which 
disposes its bearers to look red to P in C, and which had by 
everything so disposed (2003, p. 122). 
The idea is that there is no such thing as redness; only redness-for-P-in-
C. Redness is not one property, but as many properties as there are 
perceiver/circumstance combinations
25. Suppose Emma and Harriet are 
looking at a wall in front of them. Emma says “The wall is red; not orange” and 
Harriet says “The wall is orange; not red”. On McLaughlin’s account, Emma 
                                                 
25 Similar accounts can be found in Spackman 2002 and Cohen 2004; 2006.  
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and Harriet’s statements are not contradictory. Emma’s statement really 
means “The wall is red-for-Emma-at-C1; not orange-for-Emma-at-C1” and 
Harriet’s statement means “The wall is orange-for-Harriet-at-C1; not red-for-
Harriet-at-C1”. 
If an indexical relativist account can be given of any property we might 
want to consider subjective, we do away with the notion of faultless 
disagreement. The good thing about that is that then we get rid of the 
contradiction that GD and FL seem to entail when taken together. GD no 
longer holds, as Emma thinks that Grover is funny-for-Emma and Harriet 
thinks Grover is not-funny-for-Harriet. Then we do not have to worry about 
how faultless disagreement works; even though Emma and Harriet appear to 
be in disagreement there is no real disagreement. 
Some think that the possibility of faultless disagreement about the 
instantiation of a property is necessary for making it subjective. According to 
such a view, faultless disagreement is meant to indicate that facts about the 
instantiation of the properties in question are relative or subjective. And 
furthermore, a property can only be subjective if the facts about its 
instantiation are subjective. Hence, if funniness is a subjective property, then 
Emma and Harriet can both be right when one of them claims that funniness is 
instantiated in Grover and the other denies it, because facts about the 
instantiation of funniness are not like facts about Grover’s height. If, however, 
this relativity or subjectivity of facts can be stripped away (through explaining 
away faultless disagreement), there are no subjective properties.  
Although it is not exactly how he presents it, this seems to be what 
Gideon Rosen has in mind in his paper “Objectivity and Modern Idealism: 
What is the Question?” (Rosen 1994). His claim is that no properties can be  
80 
subjective in the sense he considers relevant for a distinction between realism 
and idealism. The reason, says Rosen, is that subjective facts are nowhere to 
be found, and it takes a subjective fact to make a subjective property. Facts 
about the properties people might think of as subjective are, after all, no 
different from any other facts; therefore the properties are not subjective in the 
relevant sense. Given Rosen’s premises, he seems to be right. That is, if it is 
the case both that facts about the instantiation of subjective properties must be 
subjective, and that the candidates Rosen considers for such properties are 
the best candidates, he must be right. However, both of these premises can 
be questioned. 
Rosen claims that there is no motivation to be found for realism, or for a 
conflict between realists (about any given subject matter) and those to whom 
he refers as modern idealists. He describes the core of the realists’ project as 
a claim to objectivity in the relevant sense: 
We can epitomize the realist’s basic commitment by saying that 
for  the  realist  as  against  his  opponents,  the  target  discourse 
describes  a  domain  of  genuine,  objective  fact.  The  basic 
foundational question is then: What is objectivity in the relevant 
sense, and what are the alternatives? Can we find a definite and 
debatable thesis upon whose truth the legitimacy of the rhetoric 
of objectivity depends? (pp. 278-9) 
The task of the antirealists or idealists is to reject this sense of objectivity 
that the realists propose. Rosen claims that the kind of objectivity that must be 
relevant to the conflict is nowhere to be found. And since we are missing the 
relevant objectivity, there can be no real dispute between realists and anti-
realists. Hence, Rosen proposes a quietism concerning the matter, “a rejection 
of the question to which ‘realism’ was supposed to be the answer” (p. 279). It 
follows that there can be no interesting ontological distinction between  
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objective and subjective properties as there is only one ontological kind to 
which properties can belong. The relevant kind of objectivity to which a 
meaningful sense of subjectivity could be contrasted does not exist. 
Even though Rosen is out to show the lack of a relevant kind of 
objectivity, the focus of his arguments is to show that there is no relevant 
sense of subjectivity, or mind-dependence, against which objectivity can be 
contrasted. Objectivity in the relevant sense is a kind of mind-independence, 
to be contrasted with the relevant sense of mind-dependence. Rosen 
discusses a few candidates for the position of mind-dependent property and 
rejects them one by one. His arguments for doing so share the following 
structure: A candidate for a subjective property is considered. Rosen then 
shows how facts about the instantiation of this property are no different from 
other facts, i.e., that there is nothing distinctively subjective about them. Since 
a property is subjective only if facts about its instantiation are subjective, the 
property in question is disqualified as a candidate for being a subjective 
property. Rosen goes through a list of what he considers the most suitable 
candidates and reaches the conclusion that since there are no subjective 
facts, there can be no subjective properties. The upshot seems to be that 
mind-dependent properties are nowhere to be found, which makes any 
distinction between subjective and objective properties pointless. Therefore, 
the basis for realism is missing. 
I have now outlined Rosen’s undermining of a distinction between 
subjective and objective properties. Next I will turn to a closer inspection of his 
arguments and what I consider the best response to them.  
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4.2.2. Subjective Facts? 
Objectivity in the relevant sense is something Rosen attributes to objects, 
properties, and facts: “The residual issue concerns not the existence of the 
objects, properties and facts described by the disputed discourse, but rather 
what we have called their objectivity” (p. 282). However, in this respect Rosen 
considers facts prior to objects and properties. In fact, he defines objective 
properties and objects in terms of objective facts: 
From  the  present  perspective,  the  line  between  the  objective 
and  the  rest  is  a  line  drawn  within  the  world  of  facts  so 
conceived.  If  the  world  is  the  totality  of  facts,  then  we  may 
distinguish (at least notionally) the objective world — the totality 
of objective facts — from the world as whole. P is an objective 
property if it is an objective fact whether an object possesses it: 
and  an  object  x  is  objective  if  the  fact  that  x  exists  is  an 
objective fact (p. 287). 
Rosen’s claim is that if we are to be able to make sense of realism, we 
must be able to divide facts into objective and non-objective facts. Rosen does 
not provide us with a definition of objective facts, but his discussion suggests 
that he has in mind facts that exist independently of us, waiting to be 
discovered. On the other hand, non-objective or subjective facts would be 
made up by the subjects. This distinction is, for example, suggested here: 
“The question about the objectivity of mathematics (which may or may not be 
the question Kreisel called the question) is similarly: Are the mathematical 
facts – the states of affairs that correlate with the truths of mathematics – 
entirely independent of our mathematical thinking, or are they rather somehow 
constructed by it?” (p. 287). Hence, a non-objective fact (or a subjective fact) 
would be dependent on or constructed by human thought in some important 
sense in which an objective fact is not.  
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The term subjective fact is not one widely used in the philosophical 
literature. It has sometimes been used in association with Frank Jackson’s 
knowledge argument, as described by Tim Crane (2003): “The knowledge 
argument is a sound argument for the conclusion that there are subjective 
facts: facts about the subjective character of experience” (p. 69). Crane 
defines a subjective fact focusing on what it takes for someone to come to 
know it: 
A subjective fact, as I defined it above, is a fact the learning of 
which requires that the learner has a certain kind of experience 
or occupies a certain position in the world” (Crane 2003, p. 79). 
What makes a fact subjective in this sense is its content or what it is 
about. Physical facts are facts about the physical, objective facts are facts 
about the objective, and subjective facts are facts about the subjective. This 
distinction between different kinds of facts is not based on what it is that 
makes it so that the facts obtain. The facts subjective in this sense are not any 
different in structure, so to speak, from objective facts. The notion Rosen is 
assuming is, on the other hand, one according to which the obtaining of a 
subjective fact is dependent on the mind of the speaker. It is not clear that the 
facts that are subjective in Crane’s sense fulfill that. 
The notion of ‘subjective fact’ found in Iris Einheuser’s “Three Forms of 
Truth-Relativism” (forthcoming) is closer to what Rosen has in mind. On 
Einheuser’s account, subjective facts are determined not only about the way 
the world is but also by the perspective of a subject (or a similarly minded 
group of subjects). Hence, they are perceiver-relative or subject-relative and 
thereby different from objective, absolute facts that are determined solely by 
the way the world is independently of a subjective perspective. This is similar  
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to the ontological distinction between different kinds of facts that Rosen 
considers necessary for a distinction between different kinds of properties. 
From the start, Rosen is skeptical of the possibility of a distinction 
between subjective and objective facts: “So far as I can see, it adds nothing to 
the claim that a certain state of affairs obtains to say that it obtains objectively” 
(p. 279). The intuition expressed here is convincing. However, if it is so clear 
that a subjective/objective distinction cannot apply to facts, then why should 
we assume that such a distinction for properties would have to be based on it? 
What Rosen shows is that given his definitions of the properties he describes, 
there is no faultless disagreement about them. What he infers from that is that 
there is no room for relative or subjective facts and thus no room for subjective 
properties. 
 
 
 
4.2.3. Rosen’s Arguments 
Even though Rosen ultimately rejects the notion of ‘subjective fact’, he 
seems to have something fairly specific in mind when he rejects it. In order to 
show that facts about certain properties are not subjective, he must outline the 
requirements they are failing to fulfill. He measures some candidates for 
subjective properties against these criteria and finds that none of them are 
adequate, that is, facts about these candidates seem no different from any 
other facts. Thus, there are no subjective facts and no subjective properties.  
One of the candidates Rosen considers for the relevant kind of 
subjectivity is Mark Johnston’s notion of response-dependence
26, already 
                                                 
26 Cf. Johnston 1993.  
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discussed in Chapter 3. The candidacy proposal Rosen outlines for response-
dependent properties is as follows: 
When  the  central  concepts  of  a  discourse  are  response-
dependent, the true sentences within the discourse represent a 
range of subjective or mind-dependent facts. A fact is genuinely 
objective,  then,  when  it  is  represented  in  a  discourse  whose 
central  concepts  are  response-independent  (Rosen  1994,  p. 
292). 
According to this proposal, if a property is represented by response-
dependent concepts, then facts about it are presented as subjective. Rosen 
then argues that the facts in question are not subjective; therefore the 
properties cannot be either. This is Rosen’s argument: 
The concept of being annoying to fox terriers is a response-dependent 
concept, as it involves the mental state of annoyance. However, we can make 
a list of the things that qualify as annoying to fox terriers (pullings of tails, 
pokings of eyes, etc.) and speak of the list as we speak of any other fact. We 
can speak of how tail pulling is disposed to produce annoyance in a fox terrier 
just like we speak of any other disposition: 
The point is the obvious one: dispositions to bring about mental 
responses would seem to be on a par, metaphysically speaking, 
with  dispositions  to  produce  merely  physical  responses  in 
inanimate things: the qualities Locke calls mere ‘active Powers’. 
Absent a reason to construe mentality itself as less than fully 
real,  the facts about  the  annoying,  the embarrassing  and  the 
rest  are  no  different  from  facts  about  the  poisonous  or  the 
corrosive (p. 293). 
The conclusion is that we have no reason to think of the facts in question 
as any less objective than any other facts. There is nothing more subjective 
about the fact that eye-poking is annoying to fox terriers than there is about 
the fact that arsenic is poisonous.   
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Rosen next considers whether different rules may apply when it comes to 
concepts involving our own mental responses. He argues that if this simply 
means that the concept in question is one of a disposition to produce mental 
responses in a group to which we happen to belong, there is no reason to 
think of the facts as failing to be objective: “The facts about which things annoy 
human beings or late twentieth-century bourgeois intellectuals are not 
materially different from the corresponding facts about fox terriers” (p. 294). As 
a result, Rosen considers the proposal to have failed. 
I think Johnston’s definition of response-dependence is a bad choice for 
Rosen’s purpose. Johnston himself proposes a “qualified” realism about 
properties of which we have response-dependent (or response-dispositional) 
concepts. His definition is one of concepts of properties and not of the 
properties themselves. As I argue in detail in Chapter 3, a response-
dependent concept is by no means the same thing as a response-dependent 
property. It is not the same thing for a concept to be somehow dependent on a 
mental response as it is for a property represented by the concept to be 
dependent for its instantiation upon the response. Properties represented by 
response-dependent concepts are not the most suitable candidates for 
subjective properties.  
However, I think we can disregard the concept/property issue here and 
keep the focus on the underlying properties. What about properties such as 
being annoying to fox terriers, being annoying to humans or being annoying to 
late twentieth-century bourgeois intellectuals? What seems to be the issue 
here is the underlying assumption that these properties are index-relative or 
what might be called rigidly response-dependent. Rosen is not considering a 
property such as being annoying simpliciter; only what is annoying to a certain  
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subject or group of subjects. In other words, the definition of annoying to fox 
terriers is rigidified to fox terriers as they actually are. Rosen does not address 
the possibility of disagreement among humans (or among fox terriers), for 
instance, about what is annoying. Defenders of the notion of subjective fact 
would be happy to concede that a statement such as “Boy-band music is 
annoying to 57% of humans” refers to an objective fact. Their point would be 
that this was not a statement about whether boy-band music is annoying, 
period. While facts about what is annoying to a particular subject or a 
unanimous group of subjects may be a pure matter of observation, facts about 
what is annoying are different. Rosen does nothing to address that difference. 
Another candidate for the relevant kind of subjectivity discussed by 
Rosen is based on Crispin Wright’s notion of judgment dependence (Wright 
1992): 
Let us say that a concept F is judgment-dependent if and only if 
[...] It is a priori that : x is F iff certain subjects S would judge 
that x is F under conditions C (Rosen 1994, p. 297). 
Rosen considers (and ultimately rejects) the following proposal: 
When  the  central  predicates  of  a  discourse  are  judgment-
dependent, the facts that discourse describes are less-than-fully 
objective (p. 298). 
Rosen claims that we have no reason to think of the facts in this case as 
anything short of fully objective. An example that shows that is the case of 
constitutionality, as judgment-dependent as anything gets: 
It is a priori that: A U.S. law is constitutional (at t) iff the majority 
of  the  US  supreme  court,  after  informed  and  unbiased 
deliberation, would judge it constitutional (at t) (p. 300).  
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Facts about how the majority of supreme court judges would vote after 
informed and unbiased deliberation seem no different from any other facts 
about how some certain subset of humans would behave under particular 
circumstances. And here we do not seem to have an index-relative property; 
there is no issue of constitutional-to-Jack vs. constitutional-to-Jill as 
constitutionality is by this definition tied to the majority vote of a pre-defined 
group. But let us revisit the discussion above of faultless disagreement and 
consider how constitutionality fares: If Jack and Jill disagree about whether a 
particular law is constitutional, the matter can be settled: Let the supreme 
court rule on it after informed and unbiased deliberation. The disagreement is 
not faultless; either Jack or Jill must be wrong. This definition of 
constitutionality would fall under what I call monarchy above. There is a 
specific group of subjects that gets to judge what is constitutional. Those who 
are wrong about how the supreme court would rule are wrong about what is 
constitutional; it is as simple as that.  
Rosen considers another case of judgment dependence, somewhat 
different from constitutionality: 
Suppose that 
It is a priori that: x is funny iff we would judge x funny under 
conditions  of  full  information  about  x’s  relevant  extra-comedic 
features (p. 301). 
The main difference between this example and the one of 
constitutionality is that here it is we who get to do the judging rather than a 
small group of supreme court judges. Who, exactly, the relevant “we” are is 
not specified. It can be the members of some subcultural group, the members  
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of a nation, the human race, etc. The important part is that we think of 
ourselves as insiders of the group.  
Rosen argues that an anthropologist who does not share the group’s 
sense of humor should be able to predict fairly reliably how our judgments of 
funniness will turn out, and thus which things have the property of being funny. 
The anthropologist has studied our behavior meticulously for an extended 
period of time and has accumulated reliable knowledge about how we behave 
and react in a great range of circumstances. From the outsider’s point of view, 
facts about which things have the property of funniness are just as objective 
as any other facts; they are simply facts about how we would behave under 
certain conditions. Facts about a judgment-dependent property boil down to 
being facts about our practices–facts about what kinds of judgments we make 
or would make given certain conditions–and it should not matter whether the 
point of view is the outsider’s or ours. As Rosen puts it: “From a metaphysical 
point of view, biography and autobiography are on a par” (p. 302). 
What is missing here is, as in the response-dependent case, the 
consideration of possible disagreement. What happens if “we” do not agree 
about what is funny? If funniness is determined by majority rule, it becomes a 
case of monarchy, just like constitutionality. The same holds if “we” are such a 
like-minded group that we always agree about what is funny (given the 
specified conditions). And while a monarchy definition may work for 
constitutionality, I doubt that such a definition is in order for funniness. Are we 
really willing to hand all ultimate decisions about what is funny to some 
unanimous group of comedic experts, even though “we” get to be members of 
that group?  
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Rosen’s examples and arguments show that there are ways to describe 
or define properties frequently thought of as subjective that do not make facts 
about their instantiation subjective. But they do not show that there are no 
properties about which there could be subjective facts. If we are to consider 
the strongest possible candidates for properties about which there are 
subjective facts, we must look at properties such as funniness simpliciter or 
beauty simpliciter. A very important aspect of funniness and beauty is that 
there is not universal agreement among us (whoever “we” are) about when 
and where they are instantiated. If we generally did agree about their 
instantiation, we would be less inclined to think of them as subjective. 
 
 
 
4.2.4. So, What About Subjective Properties? 
According to those who endorse relativism about facts or truth, it is 
precisely facts about the instantiation of properties such as funniness or 
beauty simpliciter (or propositions about such instantiation, depending on the 
version of relativism) that are relative. Such a view is, for example, held by Iris 
Einheuser (forthcoming) and John MacFarlane
27. On Einheuser’s view, certain 
facts, or facts about certain kinds of things, are relative to a perspective. 
MacFarlane’s version is slightly different: propositions about certain kinds of 
things have relative truth-values. What these views share is that they save 
faultless disagreement about the things in question. When Emma says 
“Grover is funny” and Harriet says “Grover is not funny”, they are genuinely 
                                                 
27 For more on relativism, see López de Sa (forthcoming), Kölbel (2004b), and Zimmerman 
(2007).  
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disagreeing yet both right because it is relative whether Grover has the 
property of funniness; he both has it and does not have it. 
If someone is to argue against the possibility of subjective properties on 
the basis of the assumption that they must rest on subjective facts, these are 
the kinds of accounts at which the argument should be directed. If we want to 
avoid the notions of relative truth and subjective/relative facts, we may infer 
that there are no such properties as funniness simpliciter. That is, it may be a 
good reason to adopt some version of indexical relativism about properties 
such as funniness. If, on the other hand, we are willing to accept that truth 
and/or facts can be relative, we can say that a property is subjective if 
propositions about its instantiation are relatively true or if facts about its 
instantiation are relative. 
What I am claiming is that we have two alternatives for providing an 
account of subjective properties. One involves adopting relativism of the kind 
endorsed by Einheuser and MacFarlane. On such an account, a property is 
subjective if facts about its instantiation are subjective or relative. Funniness is 
subjective if it can be a fact that Grover is funny and at the same time a fact 
that Grover is not funny.  
If the notion of subjective or relative facts turns out to be too hard to 
stomach, there is another way to account for subjective properties. This is the 
second alternative. Reliance on subjective or relative facts is not necessary for 
distinguishing between properties that are subjectively instantiated and 
properties that are objectively instantiated. We can say that subjective 
properties are those that can only be instantiated relative to a subject. If so, 
then there is no fact about whether Grover is or is not funny simpliciter; there 
is only the fact that Grover is funny-to-Emma and the fact that he is not funny- 
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to-Harriet. This subject-relative instantiation is what makes the property mind-
dependent. For each instance of the property, a subject’s attribution of it plays 
a crucial role in its instantiation. Contrast this with Grover’s height; whether 
Grover is 130 cm tall has nothing to do with how tall Emma, Harriet or anyone 
else thinks he is.  
Let us now go briefly over the available options in the case when Emma 
and Harriet seem to disagree about whether Grover is funny: 
1. The disagreement is genuine and it is faultless. If this is possible, 
there must be a way in which facts can be relative or truth can be relative. And 
in that case, facts/truth about subjective properties are/is relative and that is 
why they are subjective. On the other hand, facts/truth about objective 
properties is not relative and there can not be faultless disagreement about 
their instantiation. 
2. The disagreement is genuine but not faultless. This means that 
either Emma or Harriet must be wrong. That could be because the 
instantiation of funniness is objective; independent of what Emma, Harriet or 
anyone else thinks. That, however, does not exclude the possibility of some 
other properties being mind-dependent for their instantiation. Another option is 
that funniness is fixed to the judgments of one person or group, say Emma. 
Then it is still mind-dependent in the sense that it is designed to follow 
Emma’s judgments of funniness and thus different from a property attribution 
that tracks something independent from any mental activity, such as Grover’s 
height. 
3. The disagreement is faultless but not genuine. There are many 
ways to account for this but the most promising is indexical relativism. As  
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described above, a subject-relative property can be considered mind-
dependent in a sense in which some other properties are not. 
The conclusion is that whatever we end up thinking about the possibility 
of faultless disagreement, there are ways to account for a difference between 
subjective and objective properties. 
 
 
 
4.3. The Lure of Subjectivism 
After the above consideration of what threatens the existence of 
subjective properties, it is now in order to turn to the others: objective 
properties. Are there compelling reasons to deny their existence? 
The most likely suspect for a theory that would entail a rejection of 
objectively instantiated properties would be some version of subjectivism. 
Now, subjectivist theories come in many forms and flavors, but what they 
share is the claim that the world is mind-dependent in some sense or another 
which a corresponding objectivist would claim was mind-independent. Surely, 
some of these senses of mind-dependence must entail that what properties 
things have is always a matter of what we think. On an account involving such 
a view, there can be no objectively instantiated properties. Is there perhaps a 
subjectivist account that provides us with a compelling reason to reject 
objective properties? 
There is no doubt that we attribute various properties to objects around 
us, and it so happens that a property will never come under discussion unless 
we humans bring our attention to it at some point. Furthermore, our talk of 
properties is restricted by the way it suits us to classify things. Therefore, when  
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we assert that an object has a certain property, we are in part throwing light 
upon our own classification system. It should be no surprise that this would 
prompt some claims to the effect that properties are constructed by us. On the 
surface of it, it seems that if all properties are by their nature human 
constructs, subjective, or mind-dependent, there can hardly be any objective 
properties. The term objective property must be an oxymoron. However, we 
must bear in mind that there can be more than one sense of “objective 
property” in play. The distinction I am considering in my project has to do with 
property instantiation; with whether properties are instantiated subjectively or 
objectively. The view that the world’s structure is subjective has to do with 
property existence. One of the things I will consider here is whether 
subjectivism about property existence entails subjectivism about property 
instantiation. Below, I will take a closer look at some subjectivist accounts 
about the structure of the world and the motivations behind them. I will 
consider whether these accounts provide us with a good reason to deny that 
properties can be objectively instantiated. 
 
 
 
4.3.1. Egalitarianism 
Why is it that some properties seem to make more sense to us than 
others? We divide the world up in certain ways and attribute certain properties 
to things but not others. We speak of green cars but not of grue incars. The 
realist answer to why is that some things and some properties are more 
natural than others or somehow more eligible. The world comes pre-divided 
into objects and properties and our job is to figure out ways to track them. Let  
95 
us leave the objects aside and focus on the properties. The realist answer, 
then, to why we speak of greenness but not of grueness is that greenness is 
for some reason or another more eligible than grueness to be a property, 
whether it is because it is more natural or whatever it is called. The notion of 
greenness comes closer to tracking the way the world actually is, 
independently of us, than the notion of grueness
28. 
Some philosophers reject the realist explanation for why we privilege 
some properties over others. The reason, they say, is not that the privileged 
properties really are more natural or eligible independently of how we think of 
them. The privileging is done by us, because of the way we think of the world. 
This point is made, for instance, by Mary Kate McGowan in her paper 
“Privileging Properties” (2001), where she proposes an account she calls 
subjectivist. Among other examples, McGowans considers SAT analogy 
questions such as “A hand is to a glove as (a) a hat is to a head; (b) a couch is 
to a chair; (c) a foot is to a shoe; (d) a hoop is to a goat.” It could be argued 
that (d) was the correct answer, given that hands and hoops are both (in 
English) represented by words beginning with the letter ‘h’ and gloves and 
goats are represented by words beginning with ‘g’. Presumably, there are 
ways to argue for each of the answers. However, it is clear to most of us that 
the “correct” answer is (c). In this case, it is taken for granted that certain 
properties are more important than others, and that provides us with the 
correct answer. But why do some properties count more than others? 
McGowan’s answer is that the reason lies with us; we are responsible for 
                                                 
28 Such a view is held by Lewis (1983; 1986). For a detailed discussion of this topic, see Hirsch 
(1993).  
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making those properties more important. We, and the way we think, are the 
reason why some properties are privileged. 
The privileged properties are those that determine the structure of the 
world: 
The  subjectivist...maintains  that  since  we  are  fixing  which 
properties  are  structure-defining,  we  are  partially  determining 
the  world’s  structure.  That  is,  since  we  somehow  determine 
which properties individuate the world into the things and kinds 
of things eligible to be referred to, we are (in a sense) thereby 
determining which things and kinds of things there are. For a 
subjectivist,  therefore,  the  world’s  structure(s)  depends 
essentially on us (p. 10). 
The idea seems to be that there are all kinds of property candidates out 
there, greenness, grueness, being-the-Queen-of-England-or-a-chocolate-
glazed-donut-about-to-be-eaten-by-a-cop, etc., and in some sense they exist 
independently of us. The part that is up to us is to prioritize those pre-existing 
property candidates; to determine which of them get to count and thereby be 
parts of making up the world’s structure. Which of those property candidates 
are important to us or sufficiently relevant to us to catch our attention is up to 
us. This is a version of egalitarianism about properties. All properties are 
created equal, so to speak. The reason why some properties become 
privileged is that we privilege them; they do not come pre-privileged from 
nature. 
A view similar to McGowan’s is expressed by Catherine Z. Elgin (1995). 
Elgin focuses on the properties considered by scientists. She argues that if it is 
supposed to be independent from us which properties are natural, we have no 
way of knowing that the properties considered by the science we do are even 
close to being the natural ones. Not only the properties but our means of 
evaluating them would be inaccessible to us if they were objectively  
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determined. While there is a strong anti-skeptical element
29 in Elgin’s account, 
egalitarianism plays a role as well: 
Lewis’s natural properties constitute a metaphysical aristocracy. 
They are the elite whose standing derives from the refinement 
of  their  antecedents,  not  their  contribution  to  the  cognitive 
enterprise. But science, I suggest, is a meritocracy. [...] For the 
purposes of science, all schemes of organization that enable us 
to make maximally good sense of things are equally worthy, and 
are  preferrable  to  any  scheme  that  at  its  best  enables  us  to 
make less good sense than its rivals. And making good sense 
has to be measured by its own standards; for we have no other 
(p. 299).  
What makes most sense, says Elgin, is to consider the properties 
examined by science natural; not because they come to us that way, but 
because being the subject of natural science makes them so. This is an 
answer analogous to Euthyphro’s answer to Socrates’ question: an action is 
good because the gods like it; not the other way around: “Nothing confers 
naturalness on properties but their contribution to successful science. 
Properties are natural, then, only because natural science favors them. 
Naturalness of properties is an output of successful inquiry, not an input into it” 
(p. 300). 
The view I have described here entails that our thoughts and practices 
make up the properties of the world in a certain sense, which makes it a 
version of subjectivism. However, that certain sense in which we make up the 
properties has limits. It does not entail that the properties around us would not 
exist at all if it were not for us. Our contribution consists in awarding certain 
properties special status, so to speak, or perhaps in turning certain features 
into properties. It is not entailed that determining when and where those 
properties are instantiated is within our power. Hence, believing that what we 
                                                 
29 I discuss anti-skepticism in more detail below.  
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perceive in the world around us, how scientific experiments turn out, and more 
generally “what the world is like” is independent of us is consistent with 
McGowan’s and Elgin’s versions of subjectivism. Their subjectivism about the 
structure of the world is consistent with objectivism about the objects of human 
perceptions and research, and about the instantiation of the subjectively 
privileged properties. McGowan describes her view as follows: 
Determining  which  properties  are  privileged  is  distinct  from 
determining  where  and  when  properties  are  instantiated.  The 
objectivist and the subjectivist disagree about what determines 
the  structure-defining  status  of  certain  properties.  Neither 
position  implies  anything  about  what  determines  where  and 
when such properties are instantiated (2001, p. 11).  
It seems perfectly consistent with this view that some properties be such 
that it is not up to us when they are instantiated, i.e. that they are objectively 
instantiated. Therefore, an account motivated by egalitarianism does not pose 
a threat to the notion of objective properties. 
 
 
 
4.3.2. Pluralism 
One of Hilary Putnam’s reasons for rejecting metaphysical realism is 
what he calls conceptual relativity. He describes conceptual relativity with a 
fictional example of two characters to whom he refers as Carnap and the 
Polish logician (1987, pp. 18-20). The characters are asked how many objects 
there are in a world with three individuals. Carnap’s answer is that there are 
three: x1, x2, and x3. The Polish logician’s answer, however, is that there are 
seven: x1, x2, x3, x1+x2, x2+x3, x1+x3, and x1+x2+x3. Each of them is right, 
given their respective conceptual scheme. Hence, the truth about the number  
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of objects in the world is conceptually relative, says Putnam. There is no truth 
about how many objects there are, or the correct way to define an object, 
independent of a conceptual scheme:  
The suggestion ... is that what is (by commonsense standards) 
the  same  situation  can  be  described  in  many  different  ways, 
depending on how we use the words. The situation does not 
itself legislate how words like “object,” “entity,” and “exist” must 
be  used.  What  is  wrong  with  the  notion  of  objects  existing 
“independently”  of  conceptual  schemes  is  that  there  are  no 
standards  for  the  use  of  even  the  logical  notions  apart  from 
conceptual choices” (1988, p. 114).  
Putnam’s reaction is to reject metaphysical realism, the view that (at least 
some of) the objects and properties of the world are independent of our 
thoughts about them. How exactly this rejection is to be understood is not 
obvious. However, the idea seems to be that a conceptual scheme is a way of 
carving out the world’s properties. It is something that runs deeper than, say, a 
system of measurement. If Carnap and the Polish logician are looking at a 
pencil and one says it is 6 inches long while the other says it is 15 centimeters, 
they are not disagreeing in any interesting way
30. Their disagreement about the 
number of objects must run deeper than that.  
Another famous anti-realist example is Nelson Goodman’s claim that 
stars (as everything else) are made by us (Goodman 1978). They are “made 
rather than found”. Goodman’s view (which he calls irrealism) is a form of 
relativism; two conflicting statements can both be true at the same time. He 
claims that all facts, just as the whole world, are made by us. 
What the views of Putnam and Goodman share is the idea that there is 
more than one way to give a correct description of the world
31. Both of them 
                                                 
30 6 inches are roughly the same length as 15 centimeters. 
31 For a discussion of the differences between Putnam’s and Goodman’s versions of 
subjectivism, including the role of pluralism therein, see Cox 2003.  
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subscribe to a view we can call ontological pluralism. According to ontological 
pluralism, conflicting descriptions of what the world is like, or of what things 
there are in the world, can be true at the same time, such as Carnap and the 
Polish logician’s accounts of the number of objects. There is no ultimately 
correct account of the world, superior to the other accounts. Many different 
accounts are equally true. Given a certain conceptual scheme, it is true that 
there are three objects in the world and given another it is true that there are 
seven objects in the world. Given a certain conceptual scheme, or world, as 
Goodman puts it, it is true that there are stars, but given another it is not true 
that there are stars. 
Ontological pluralism is sometimes described as the view that the world 
has no particular structure or features independently of the structure or 
features that we attribute to it. Independently of our thoughts, the world is a 
turkey without joints, a formless blob, an amorphous lump; a giant piece of tofu 
that we give form and flavor with the cutting, cooking, and seasonings of the 
day. The world does not come fully formed, neatly divided into objects of 
various sorts, ready for us to discover. We are the ones responsible for 
dividing it into objects. No matter how we divide it, there is always some other 
possible way of dividing it that would have been equally good. The view 
opposite to pluralism, then, would be the view that the world does come with 
structure and features, and pre-divided into objects before we encounter it and 
start applying our conceptual resources onto it. The description of how the 
world is before we encounter it (or independently of our conceptions of it) 
would then be the ultimately correct description of it. 
Exactly how to interpret views such as those of Putnam and Goodman 
seems to be a constant matter of dispute. How much should we, for instance,  
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read into Goodman’s words about our making the stars? He can hardly mean 
that we literally make them in the same sense as we would make a ball out of 
clay. Sam Page (2006) has argued that we should take Putnam, Goodman, 
and other anti-realists to be arguing against what he calls individuative 
independence. On that reading, when Goodman says that we make the stars, 
he does not mean that the stars are causally dependent on us (i.e. that we 
caused the existence of their physical matter) or that they are structurally 
dependent on us (i.e. that the way a particular star is shaped, its mass, or its 
size are somehow figments of our mental activities). What he means is that 
what it is to be a star or the fact that a star is one object rather than, say, two 
objects (two star-halves), is dependent on our thinking. 
If we go with Page’s reading, ontological pluralism does not entail that the 
world has no structure independently of us. It has all kinds of features. 
However, what ontological pluralism means then is that the world is not 
divided up into objects except by us. This also holds for things such as 
properties. While some of the features of the world may be independent of us, 
ours is the job of constructing properties out of them. This means that the facts 
that there are such things as being 160 cm tall, being a dog, or being a granite 
rock are dependent on our dividing the world up that way.  
Is this view a threat to the notion of objectively instantiated property? I 
think not. Even though it is up to us which features of the world make up a 
certain property, such as what it constitutes to be 160 cm tall, and it is up to us 
how the world “stuff” is divided up into objects, then given that way of dividing 
up the world, it is not up to us which individual objects have these particular 
features. Or at least it does not follow that it is up to us (of course we could 
decide to make a 160 cm tall statue, but that is a different matter).  On this  
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kind of view the objectively instantiated properties would be those that are 
instantiated on the bases of features that occur independently of human 
thoughts. Subjectively instantiated properties, on the other hand, would be 
those whose instantiation is not based on clearly defined features of the 
objects or the world but rather on a subject’s reaction to such features. 
But what if we do not go along with Page’s conservative reading of the 
anti-realists? What if ontological pluralism involves the more radical claim that 
the world has no structure or features what so ever independently of what 
structure and features we assign to it? Then whatever features we consider 
the constituents of a property such as being 160 cm tall are also made up by 
us. And in that case, there seems to be nothing left that is independent of our 
mental activity and could determine which things have the relevant features 
and which things do not. If it is entirely up to us not only that the property of 
being 160 cm tall exists, and it is also the case that the world is no particular 
way independently of our thinking, it must be equally up to us whether a given 
case counts as an instance of the property. There are no independent features 
left on which it can be based. Mind-independent instantiation of a property 
must have some basis in mind-independent features of the object in question. 
The upshot is that for there to be objectively instantiated properties, there 
must be some mind-independent way for the world to be on which they can be 
based. That way does not have to be on the level of properties or objects; it 
can be more basic. But there must be something. Hence, a radical 
interpretation of ontological pluralism, let us call it radical subjectivism, is 
inconsistent with the notion of an objectively instantiated property. The 
question now, of course, is whether radical subjectivism is something we 
should be considering in the first place. Do we have a reason to adopt such a  
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view? It is not clear to me that we do, but it is clear that we have many 
reasons not to be radical subjectivists. It seems to be an important element in 
our common sense way of thinking that not everything in the world is a matter 
of our thinking about it (really, if it were, why didn’t I think my way to that Ph.D. 
a long time ago?). It seems to be an important element in our thinking about 
the world to think that there is at least something about it, on some level, that 
is independent of our thoughts
32. This may not provide ultimate proof against 
radical subjectivism, but it does give us a reason to be wary of it. Apart from 
this, it is not even clear who the proponents of radical subjectivism are (if they 
exist). 
Wanting to be a pluralist is not a sufficient reason to become a radical 
subjectivist. As discussed above, pluralism can involve a more modarate form 
of subjectivism. Furthermore, some say that ontological pluralism is consistent 
with metaphysical realism. Horgan and Timmons (2002) argue that by 
rejecting a direct correspondence theory of truth and adopting a theory of 
indirect correspondence based on what they call contextual semantics, we can 
make pluralism and realism live happily together
33. 
I believe I have shown here that if ontological pluralism is the motivation 
that tickles our fancy, we do not need to give up objective properties to fulfill it. 
That, of course, does not say much about the general appeal of pluralism. 
                                                 
32 Among countless arguments to this effect from one aspect or another, some of the most 
recent can be found in Nolt (2004), Sider (forthcoming), and Miller (2002). 
33 A similar argument can be found in Cortens (2002), although Cortens claim about the full 
compatibility of ontological pluralism with metaphysical realism is somewhat weaker. For 
reasoning in what we could call the opposite direction, i.e. that because of the flaws of 
ontological pluralism, ontological deflationists should look at other options, see Eklund 
(forthcoming).  
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4.3.3. Becoming Doubtfree 
It has sometimes been considered a drawback of metaphysical realism 
that it makes skepticism possible. If the world’s structure is independent of 
how we perceive it or think about it, then it seems a possibility that we might 
be systematically wrong about it. Sven Rosenkranz (2003) describes it so that 
realists are committed at least to the possibility of recognition-transcendent 
truths. If there is something that is independent of our knowing about it or 
thinking about it, it must be possible for us to be mistaken about it or even 
even to fail to know about it at all. This invites the possibility of our being 
wrong about a great deal of things that we think we know.  
A possible reaction to this invitation to skepticism is to reject the 
existence of the mind-independent. If the notion of mind-independence is 
considered meaningless (as it has been by some) or unperceived existence 
declared impossible, there is no room for worry about our being in error about 
it. As some say: the only way to make sure that the job gets properly done is 
to do it yourself. Avoid delegation. If all that exists is a product of our own 
mental activity, we do not have to worry about the possible results of some 
activity beyond our control. 
We might say that removing the mind-independent removes the 
possibility of underdetermination. We have the data and that is all we need. 
The true theory behind the data is the theory we construct. Elgin (1995) 
argues that is makes no sense for it to be possible that science is wrong about 
which properties are real or natural. That would make it possible for what we 
call natural science to be, in fact, unnatural science as it would be left open for 
the properties science really deals with to be unnatural. The only thing that 
makes sense, says Elgin, is to stipulate that the properties with which science  
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deals are natural properties. Worrying about the possibility of our being wrong 
about those properties should not be in the picture. In a similar vein, Sophie R. 
Allen (2002) argues that what she calls classificatory skepticism is a problem 
for metaphysical realism.  
So, should we abandon realism in order to avoid the possibility of doubt? 
If we do, must we also give up on the idea of objectively instantiated 
properties? Let us first consider the second question. As I have discussed 
above, whether objectively instantiated properties are consistent with 
subjectivism depends on how far the subjectivism is taken. Presumably, if we 
are to remove every trace of possibility of any kind of doubt about anything, we 
must become the most extreme subjectivists. That means adopting the view 
that there is nothing true about anything in the world independently of how we 
believe it to be. Surely, that would include truths about the instantiation of 
properties or about the occurrence of features on which properties would be 
based. However, nothing suggests that Elgin or Allen have that kind of view in 
mind. Their concern is the possibility of skepticism about the way the world is 
structured or what kind of properties there are in the world. That still leaves 
room for some features on which the properties are based to be independent 
of our thoughts. We can still delegate a bit even though we get to be in charge 
of management. 
 
 
 
4.3.4. Social Construction 
Humans are social animals and it seems clear that the power of human 
society over our way of thinking is considerable, to say the least. A number of  
106 
the things we use on a daily basis are obviously constructs of society and so 
are a great many concepts as well that we use to classify and categorize. This 
is also true of some properties or ways of classification that we tend to take as 
self-evident and/or “natural.” Notions like gender and race come to mind. 
Given that we are so enmeshed in a web of social constructs, it may be 
tempting to conclude that surely, that is all there is. Our only means of access 
to the properties of which we speak is through our concepts of them, and how 
do we come up with those concepts, really, if not by social construction? 
If we suppose that all our property concepts are socially constructed, 
there are still a number of questions that must be answered in order to 
determine the possibility of objectively instantiated properties. What does it 
mean for something to be socially constructed? Is everything that is socially 
constructed mind-dependent or subjective? If so, in what sense is it mind-
dependent? After all, people seem to mean all kinds of things when they say 
that something is socially constructed. 
In his book The Social Construction of What? (Hacking 1999), Ian 
Hacking describes a social construction account of phenomenon X as follows: 
“the existence or character of X is not determined by the nature of things. X is 
not inevitable. X was brought into existence or shaped by social events, 
forces, history, all of which could well have been different” (pp. 6-7). Hacking 
mentions that in many cases, this basic thesis is accompanied by the view that 
X is bad and even that we would be better off without it, but these additional 
claims are not essential to an account of social construction. 
Our conceptual system, including our ways of sorting things into 
properties, seems to be a good candidate for what Sally Haslanger (Haslanger 
1995) calls weak pragmatic construction, and defines as a distinction partly  
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determined by social factors (p. 100). The fact that various social factors come 
into play in determining our terms, concepts, classification systems and so on 
does not automatically preclude us from succeeding in using these terms to 
refer to things, properties or distinctions that exist or are instantiated 
independently of us. As Haslanger puts it: 
In  cases  of  weak  pragmatic  construction  our  choices  of 
descriptive terms, classificatory schemes, etc., are conditioned 
by social factors (values, interests, history, etc.), but of course 
this is compatible with those terms’ and classifications’ capturing 
real  facts  and  distinctions.  The  world  provides  us  with  more 
facts and distinctions than we could ever know what to do with; 
acknowledging that what ones we bother to notice or name is 
largely  determined  by  our  background  and  interests  does  not 
impugn in any general way the accuracy of our attributions (p. 
101). 
It is not too hard to accept that the way we speak of and think about the 
properties of things is socially constructed, both in the sense Hacking 
describes, and in Haslanger’s sense of weak pragmatic construction. Our 
concepts must be influenced by all kinds of social factors and it is quite 
plausible that they could have been different in a different environment with a 
different history and different social practices. But as can be gathered from 
Haslanger herself in a more recent paper (Haslanger 2003), her account of 
weak pragmatic construction does not qualify as social constructionist on 
Hacking’s account. According to Hacking, there is an important precondition 
common to all social constructionists about X: “(0) In the present state of 
affairs, X is taken for granted, X appears to be inevitable” (Hacking 1999, p. 
12). It is quite obvious to most of us that our ideas about things, including the 
concepts we form and the ways of classifying things, are influenced by social 
factors and that they could have been different under other circumstances. For 
something to qualify as a social constructionist account on Hacking’s terms, it  
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must refer to something more controversially social than our conceptual 
system, such as the properties to which those concepts refer. 
I do not think this failure of Haslanger’s weak pragmatic construction of 
conforming to Hacking’s account has any devastating effects. It may simply 
indicate that Hacking’s definition fails to cover all the options. Haslanger’s 
notion of weak pragmatic construction can still be non-trivial. Someone who 
denies the weak pragmatic construction of concept X is someone who claims 
that X gives us a perfect replicating picture of how something is in the world 
independently of us. It not only tracks a property of the world, P, but 
represents P exactly the way it is independently of the way we think of P and 
gives the only possible correct picture of P. Someone who thinks this might 
still agree that we could have had different ideas about P under different 
circumstances, but presumably it would then follow that in such a case we 
would be wrong about the way P is.  
It should be clear that even though our conceptual system is weakly 
pragmatically constructed, there is plenty of room left for at least some of the 
properties of things to be objectively instantiated. Even though the way we 
conceive of a property may always be influenced by social factors, it is still 
possible for those conceptions of ours to refer to properties of the world that 
things have whether we think they do or not. Furthermore, there could still be 
properties unknown to us that were objectively instantiated. 
But what about a stronger sense of social construction, such as a sense 
under which Hacking’s precondition is fulfilled? Suppose that not only our 
property concepts but the properties themselves are socially constructed. In 
that case, I think we have come back to ontological pluralism of some kind and 
everything said above about pluralism should hold. If the properties are  
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constructed out of some features of the world that are independent of our 
mental activities, there can be objectively instantiated properties. If not, there 
cannot be objectively instantiated properties, but the subjectivism entailed is 
quite extreme. 
 
 
 
4.4. Conclusion 
The threats to a division into subjectively and objectively instantiated 
properties are not devastating ones. The notion of subjectively instantiated 
properties may look doubtful if it requires relying on the possibility of faultless 
disagreement. True disagreement where neither party is wrong seems to 
require some way of accounting for relative truth or relative facts. And some 
might say that this is the only way to make a property subjectively instantiated. 
However, as I have shown, there are other ways to find a basis on which to 
consider a property subjectively instantiated, even though we may find the 
notion of relative fact or relative truth dubious. A subjectively instantiated 
property can simply be any property that is instantiated because someone 
thinks it is.  
While various versions of subjectivism have their appeals, it takes 
adherence to quite an extreme version to deny the possibility of an objectively 
instantiated property. Even though we consider ourselves to be the builders of 
the world, we can still think of some things as obtaining independently of our 
experiences as long as we stick with some consistency in architecture and 
some mind-independent building materials. Therefore, metaphysical realism is  
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not a necessary precondition for a distinction between subjective and objective 
properties.111 
CHAPTER 5 
ARE SENSORY PROPERTIES SUBJECTIVE OR OBJECTIVE? 
 
 
 
5.1. Sensory Properties 
In previous chapters I have argued for a distinction between subjective 
and objective properties on the basis of how they are instantiated. In this 
chapter, I will examine where sensory properties fall on the basis of such a 
distinction. 
I argue that rather than thinking of sensory properties as either objective 
or subjective, there is a way to think of them as both at the same time. 
Namely, by outlining the distinction as a continuum, ranging from entirely 
objective to entirely subjective and putting sensory properties somewhere in 
the middle. I will give an account below of how this can be accomplished. 
Before reaching this conclusion about sensory properties, I discuss two 
preliminary issues. The first has to do with how we think of color and what 
color seems to be. While I disagree with both color primitivism and error 
theories about color, I believe such theories reflect something that is important 
to consider. Namely, that we seem to want to think of color both as subjective 
and as objective. The second issue is the question of whether sensory 
properties should all be treated similarly or whether there are reasons to think 
of, say, some of them as subjective and others as objective. I argue that they 
should be regarded as equal in this respect. 
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5.2. Color 
Over the past few decades, the nature of color has been much discussed 
among philosophers. One of the important issues has been whether and how 
colors are subjective or objective properties. Views such as color 
dispositionalism, color physicalism, and color subjectivism have been put forth. 
While I will not cover those views here, I will discuss two views about the 
nature of color that I think express something important. The views I have in 
mind are error theories about color (or color projectivism), and color 
primitivism. While I disagree with both, I believe they do show us something 
important about the way we conceive of color, which in turn indicates what is 
reasonable to think that colors are. 
In his paper “How to Speak of the Colors”
34, Mark Johnston gives a list of 
(what he considers to be) our core beliefs about color. Core beliefs about color 
are, according to Johnston, beliefs we have about color resulting from our 
visual experience and that are such that a property of which they are not true 
cannot be color, i.e. it must be some other property. Among those beliefs is 
one Johnston calls Revelation and describes as follows: “The intrinsic nature 
of canary yellow is fully revealed by a standard visual experience as of a 
canary yellow thing” (1992, p. 138). The idea is that via our visual experiences 
of a color we get to know all there is to know about the nature of the color. 
Johnston claims that while we are tempted to believe Revelation, its 
inconsistency with some of the other of our core beliefs about color shows that 
we must abandon it. In order to save as many of the other core beliefs as 
possible, Revelation must be sacrificed. Even though it may be tempting to 
believe that the full nature of color is directly revealed to us in visual 
                                                 
34 Johnston (1992).  
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experience, it just cannot be the case that it is true. However, Johnston argues 
that there is a grain of truth in Revelation and he holds what he calls a 
qualified version of it: Visual experience does not reveal to us everything there 
is to know about the nature of color, but it still reveals to us important parts of 
its nature, such as similarity and difference relations between colors. 
While Johnston thinks Revelation must be abandoned, there are others 
who subscribe to it. Revelation also seems to be what Bertrand Russell thinks 
we get to know about a color sense-datum by acquaintance with it: “so far as 
concerns knowledge of the colour itself, as opposed to knowledge of truths 
about it, I know the colour perfectly and completely when I see it, and no 
further knowledge of it itself is even theoretically possible” (1912, p. 47). But 
believing this of sense-data is different from believing it of colors as properties 
of objects.  
According to David Lewis, people tend to have a belief such as 
Revelation about qualia: “Folk psychology says, I think, that we identify the 
qualia of our experiences. We know exactly what they are — and that in an 
uncommonly demanding and literal sense of ‘knowing what’ (1995, p. 141). 
Lewis argues, however, that if materialism is true, this folk psychological belief 
cannot be true. 
Those who think that Revelation is the standard, common sense belief 
about color can be divided in two camps. On the one hand, we have those 
who take it as a true belief, i.e. who think not only that Revelation is the 
standard, everyday view, but also that we are right to believe it. According to 
such a view, colors really are simple, mind-independent properties that are  
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exactly like our phenomenal experiences of them
35. I will be calling that view 
color primitivism. On the other hand, we have those who think our standard, 
everyday view of color to be false. In other words, that we do believe 
something like Revelation about color, but that the objects around us do not 
have any corresponding properties. I refer to this view as an error theory
36. 
Both primitivism and color error theories have, in my opinion, some serious 
flaws. Furthermore, I doubt that Revelation really is the common sense belief 
about color. However, I think that Revelation and how the two views that rely 
on it fail, show us something important about color. I will now go on to 
explaining how and why. 
 
 
 
5.2.1. Primitivism 
Good examples of Revelation about color, or the view I call color 
primitivism, are the account McGinn presents in his paper “Another Look at 
Color” (1996) and Campbell’s view, which he calls the “Simple View”, or 
“transparency”. Discussing color, Campbell says: “Still, if we take the 
appearances at face value, we will take it that we are seeing the properties of 
objects in virtue of which they have the potential to produce experiences of 
colour. The perception reveals the whole character of the property to us” 
(1993, p. 257). Campbell argues that (among other things) since the 
transparency thesis holds, colors can neither be microphysical properties nor 
                                                 
35 Examples of color primitivists are Campbell (1993), McGinn (1996), Strawson (1989), Stroud 
(2000), and De Anna (2002). 
36 Examples of error theorists are Boghossian and Velleman (1989), Mackie (1976), and 
Hardin (1988).  
115 
dispositions to cause experiences: “A simpler view of colours thus remains in 
play. On this view, redness, for example, is not a disposition to produce 
experiences in us. It is, rather, the ground of such a disposition. But that is not 
because redness is a microphysical property—the real nature of the property 
is, rather, transparent to us” (p. 258). So according to Campbell, colors are 
simple properties that are exactly as presented by our color experiences. 
McGinn rejects the dispositional view of color for similar reasons: “we just do 
not see colors as dispositions to cause experiences” (1996, p. 538), and finds 
any account of color unacceptable unless it claims that colors are exactly as 
we perceive them to be.  
A similar view is endorsed by Galen Strawson in his discussion of the 
meaning of color words:  
…any adequate account of the meaning of colour words must 
capture  the  fundamental  point  that,  whatever  else  they  are, 
colour words are words for properties whose essential nature as 
properties can be and is fully revealed in sensory (and indeed 
visual)  experience,  given  only  the  qualitative  character  that 
sensory (visual) experience has (1989, p. 213). 
So, according to color primitivism, colors are intrinsic properties of the 
objects we see. And these intrinsic properties are exactly as we perceive 
them; i.e. they are just like the sensation we have when we see them, just the 
way they are phenomenologically presented to us. Our perceptions give us 
direct access to colors exactly the way they are. The phenomenology of color 
vision is to be taken at face value: as we attend to our experiences of colors, 
we can infer that exactly this is how the colors are.  
Many arguments have been made against color primitivism. Among other 
things, it has been argued that it makes it impossible for colors to be the 
causes of our color experiences, that it makes it very unclear what kind of  
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properties colors should be, and that it is simply based on wrong assumptions 
about the way color vision works. But what I take to be the most serious 
problem with color primitivism is the idea of mind-independent, intrinsic 
properties to which we have direct perceptual access.  
Jim Edwards (1998; 2003) has argued in a powerful way that primitivism 
is incompatible with semantic externalism
37. I think the thought expressed by 
Edwards’s argument is very important and that a similar point can be made in 
a different way. But first, let us look at Edwards’s argument: 
Edwards asks us to imagine a planet he calls Z-land. In Z-land, 
everything is just like it is on our planet, the grass is just the way it is here and 
so on, except for one thing: the light in Z-land consists of Z-rays that have a 
color inverting effect. So, when someone in Z-land is looking at the grass, it 
looks just the way red things look here. The inhabitants of Z-land say that 
grass is green* and that poppy flowers are red*. If we assume that color 
primitivism holds, the sense of the term green* is that it applies to things that 
have the property we call redness (because the sense is determined by the Z-
landers’ experiences of things such as grass), yet the reference of green* is 
the property we call greenness (remember that the grass in Z-land is just like 
here; it’s just that the Z-rays make it look different). This means that there is a 
mismatch between sense and reference and the truth conditions of “This is 
green*” cannot be determined as they differ depending on whether we rely on 
the sense or the reference of ‘green*’. This does not happen if primitivism is 
abandoned, as in that case the sense and reference can be defined so that 
they match. For instance, the sense of ‘green*’ could then be “being disposed 
                                                 
37 Arguments against Edwards 1998, to which Edwards responds in his 2003, can be found in 
De Anna 2002.  
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to look red to standard perceivers in Z-land” which does not conflict with the 
reference being the property of greenness (2003, p. 110). 
The important point suggested by Edwards’s argument is that for 
something to be mind-independent, there must be a way of separating it from 
how it is experienced. In order for the greenness of the grass to be intrinsic to 
the grass and independent of our (or the Z-landers’) perceptions of grass, it 
must be freed from the requirement of being just like those perceptions. If 
greenness is truly mind-independent, it must be possible for it to fail under 
some circumstances to produce any sensations of green. Something that is 
mind-independent can only contingently produce a certain kind of subjective 
experience; that is what makes it mind-independent. Defining greenness as 
mind-independent and at the same time by definition identical to the subjective 
experience it contingently produces simply does not work. While Edwards’s 
argument is phrased in linguistic terms, I think it expresses the same idea as I 
am describing. If the reference of a term is externally determined, it is 
determined independently of the subject’s experiences. Hence it cannot be 
defined in the same way as the internally determined sense of the term. 
Let me state another version of the argument that does not rely on 
semantic externalism: 
Imagine Zoë the Z-lander, an avid color primitivist. When she looks at 
grass, her experience is phenomenally the same as that of her earthly 
counterpart when she looks at a red poppy. This means that Zoë believes that 
grass has an intrinsic property that is exactly like this experience of hers. But 
remember that the grass in Z-land is intrinsically just like the grass on Earth; 
it’s those blasted Z-rays that make it look different. Assuming that we 
Earthlings have it right about what color grass is; then Zoë must be wrong.  
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The grass in Z-land does not have an intrinsic property that is just like Zoë’s 
experience of it (on the other hand, poppies do, but Zoë does not know that). 
This seems to mean that an error theory about color is true in Z-land: the Z-
landers are systematically mistaken about colors. But saying that the Z-
landers are the ones who are mistaken and not Earthlings seems completely 
arbitrary. If greenness is mind-independent, then grass’ being green has 
nothing to do with us Earthlings rather than Z-landers, so why assume we 
would be the lucky ones who have it right?
38 Perhaps the rays of our Sun are 
those that invert the colors. Hence, we cannot even distinguish for sure 
between primitivism and an error theory. 
While I find the idea of mind-independent properties being identical with 
subjective experiences problematic, I am much more open to primitivism about 
subjective properties; properties whose instantiation is mind-dependent. 
Suppose for a moment that colors were mind-dependent so that an object 
would be green if and only if someone perceived it as green, i.e. had 
phenomenally green responses to it. Then there does not seem to be a 
problem associated with assuming that greenness is exactly like our 
sensations of green. Grass is green on Earth, at least during the day for most 
people, and poppies are green in Z-land for most people most of the time. It is 
not a problem for the property to be exactly like our perceptions of it when it is 
our perceptions who cause it to be instantiated anyway. Having direct 
perceptual access to something that our perceptions make up does not seem 
too problematic. 
My conclusion is that while primitivism might be true for some subjective 
properties, it cannot be true for mind-independent properties. Note that this is 
                                                 
38 A related criticism can be found in Chalmers 2006, pp. 67-68.  
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not the issue of whether we can know all there is to know about the nature of 
the property in question. In some cases, we know everything about what 
constitutes an instantiation of a property because we have made and/or 
defined it ourselves, yet the property can be objectively instantiated. An 
example of that could be the property of being legal (let us suppose that it 
were never open to interpretation whether an act was legal or not). Obviously, 
that does not make the property of being legal exactly like the phenomenal 
content of our experiences of legality. There is no such phenomenal content 
and no such experience. Assuming that a property is exactly like how we think 
of it does not amount to Revelation about it, and the view that we are correct 
to assume that does not amount to primitivism. We may judge or infer that 
something is legal, but there is no such thing as the way it is to perceive 
something legal. Revelation and primitivism are only applicable to properties 
that can be associated with a sensation.
39 
 
                                                 
39 Zoltán Jakab (2006) argues that what he calls conceptual revelation is true of shape 
properties. The idea is that our perception of variously shaped objects accompanied with 
intellectual reflection is sufficient for revealing the nature of shape properties. In this respect, 
he contrasts shapes with colors, about which conceptual revelation is not true. That is, 
perception and intellectual reflection alone do not yield an uncontroversial account of what 
colors are. If colors are microphysical properties or some kind of properties subject to color 
science, it is clear that regular color perception does not come close to revealing their nature. 
But how does my claim that primitivism cannot be true of mind-independent properties fare on 
this account? Is Jakab endorsing primitivism about shapes? 
The notion of conceptual revelation does not amount to primitivism or the kind of perceptual or 
sensory revelation involved in that theory. Jakab is not claiming that shape properties are 
exactly identical to the phenomenal content of our shape experiences. On his account, visual 
perception (or any perception)alone does not reveal the nature of shapes; reflection is 
necessary as well. Hence, Jakab’s notion of conceptual revelation is not the same as the 
notion of visual revelation involved in color primitivism. The difference between the two is 
important. While conceptual revelation of some objective properties seems possible, the 
argument against color primitivism presented above applies to visual revelation (or sensory 
revelation of any kind). 
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5.2.2. Error Theories 
According to error theorists about color, we believe Revelation, that 
colors are mind-independent properties whose nature is revealed in visual 
perception, but we are mistaken in that belief. The objects around us do not 
have any mind-independent properties just like our sensations of color; 
therefore we are guilty of a systematic error. I have just argued that there are 
no such mind-independent properties as those described by Revelation. Does 
that mean that I think an error theory of color is true?  
The short answer is no. The long answer is that I think there are a couple 
of reasons why an error theory of color is not true. Let me elaborate: 
In his paper “Perception and the Fall from Eden” (2006), David Chalmers 
argues that our experiences have several different representational contents. 
One of them is their phenomenal content, which Chalmers describes as 
follows: “A phenomenal content of a perceptual experience is a 
representational content that is determined by the experience’s phenomenal 
character” (p. 50). He defines representational content as a condition of 
satisfaction of the experience in question, and phenomenal character as what 
it is like to have the experience (Ibid.). According to Chalmers, if the objects 
we see around us had properties that were exactly like the phenomenal 
content of our color experiences, these properties would be what he calls 
perfect colors and our experiences of them would be perfectly veridical. 
However, things do not have perfect colors (if they did, color primitivism would 
be true) and our color experiences are not perfectly veridical (pp. 66-69).  
Even though our color experiences are not perfectly veridical, they can 
be imperfectly veridical, says Chalmers. They are imperfectly veridical if the 
objects we see have properties that are good enough to serve as matches for  
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the phenomenal content, even though they do not bear a perfect resemblance 
to it. So, instead of a red apple having the property of perfect redness it could 
be the case that it has the property of imperfect redness. The route Chalmers 
takes to accomplish this involves dividing the phenomenal content into two 
stages, so that an experience has two phenomenal contents. One is what he 
calls Edenic content, which can only be satisfied by the object’s having a 
perfectly resembling property, and the other is a Fregean content, a mode of 
presentation of the object and its properties which is determined by the Edenic 
content (p. 72). An experience of redness is veridical if and only if the object of 
the experience possesses a property that matches perfect redness, i.e. it 
normally causes phenomenally red experience. It is, however, not perfectly 
veridical unless the object has a property perfectly matching the Edenic 
content. Instead, it is imperfectly veridical, which is really all we can hope for. 
This is what Chalmers calls the two stage view of phenomenal content. I 
believe this two stage view is one way an error theory about color can be 
avoided. Even though the objects around us do not have properties that are 
perfect resemblances of the way they are phenomenologically presented to 
us, or what Chalmers would call Edenic content, they can have properties that 
serve well enough as matches for those experiences. As long as our color 
terms successfully and consistently refer to properties that objects actually 
have, it does not seem necessary for those properties to perfectly resemble 
the phenomenal content of our color experiences.  
And here is another reason why I do not think an error theory about color 
is true: I do not think we actually believe Revelation about color. If we sincerely 
believed that our color terms referred to objective properties perfectly 
resembling the phenomenal content of our color experiences, and then the  
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objects around us did not have any such properties, there would be an error in 
play. Our beliefs about color would be systematically false. But why should we 
assume that we believe Revelation?  
Imagine a young child’s drawing of her mother. The drawing does not 
look much like the mother; it shows a squiggly stick figure. However, we 
accept the drawing as a representation of the child’s mother. Presumably, the 
reason is that we can account for an appropriate causal chain
40 between the 
mother and what we see in the picture and that chain is sufficiently strong to 
make the squiggly stick figure on the sheet of paper a true representation of 
the person in question. 
If the child believed the drawing of her mother showed exactly the way 
she really looked, there would be an error involved. But that would have to be 
a very literal belief. We will even accept claims such as “this is how I see her” 
as not involving an error.  Similarly, if we literally believed that grass had a 
property that was exactly like the way greenness is phenomeonologically 
presented to us, we would believe Revelation and be in error. But the belief 
that grass has a property that is presented to us in this particular way does not 
entail the belief that the property literally is exactly as we picture it. We can 
believe that the way greenness is phenomenologically presented to us is 
representative of a property in the grass without believing that the property of 
the grass really is exactly like that. And why should we believe the latter?   
 
                                                 
40 Of course, not just any causal chain will do in this respect. The mother could for instance 
cause the child to draw a picture representing something completely different. I take it that in 
addition to the causal chain some degree of resemblance of the picture to the mother may be 
needed, as well as an intent on the child’s behalf to have the picture represent her mother.   
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5.2.3. A Resemblance Thesis Upside Down 
One of the important elements in Locke’s distinction between primary and 
secondary qualities is the claim that our ideas of primary qualities resemble 
properties in the objects whereas our ideas of secondary qualities do not: 
“That the Ideas of primary Qualities of Bodies, are Resemblances of them, and 
their Patterns do really exist in the Bodies themselves; but the Ideas, produced 
in us by these Secondary Qualities, have no resemblance of them at all” 
(1975, II. 8. §15). As I discussed in Chapter 2, some have taken the distinction 
between primary and secondary qualities as one between objective and 
subjective properties. The claim I made in the past section was, however, that 
objective properties could not possibly be perfect resemblances of the way 
they are phenomenologically presented to us. Am I making the claim that 
Locke had it all turned upside down when he said that primary qualities 
resembled our ideas of them and secondary qualities did not? 
A key issue is what Locke means with ideas and resemblance. The only 
way to make my claim opposite to Locke’s resemblance theory is if we take his 
ideas to refer to phenomenal content. I am no Locke scholar, but from what I 
gather this would not be considered a very plausible interpretation of his ideas. 
Hence, I do not consider my claim to be an upside-down version of Locke’s 
resemblance theory. However, it can be considered an upside-down version of 
some resemblance theory. My upside-down resemblance theory goes like this: 
An objective property cannot bear a perfect resemblance to the phenomenal 
content of an experience of it. A subjective property can bear a perfect 
resemblance to the phenomenal content of an experience of it.  
This upside-down resemblance thesis of mine can obviously only apply to 
properties experiences of which have phenomenal content. Locke’s  
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resemblance thesis has sometimes been interpreted as an error theory about 
secondary qualities.
41 The way that interpretation goes is roughly that Locke’s 
ideas are concepts, and that in the case of secondary qualities the objects 
have no properties that correspond to our secondary quality concepts. Does 
my upside down resemblance thesis entail an error theory about objective 
properties? 
I think not. As I explained above, I doubt that we really believe Revelation 
about colors (whether they are subjective or objective properties, which I have 
not established yet). And I do not think we believe Revelation in general about 
properties that can be considered objective. 
 
 
 
5.2.4. Color Concepts and Color Properties 
While neither color primitivism nor an error theory of color is a viable 
option, both views express something important about our color concepts. 
Both views involve the idea that we generally believe Revelation about colors. 
While I doubt that we really do, that we really believe that colors are mind-
independent properties that are perfect resemblances of our color sensations, 
I think we do believe that our color sensations show us something important 
about colors. That is, even though we do not strictly believe that the colors are 
exactly like our sensations of them, we do think we can make all sorts of 
judgments about them purely on the basis of those sensations.
42 One example 
is relations of similarity and difference between the colors: We take it for 
                                                 
41 Cf. Mackie 1976 and Alexander 1977. 
42 My view here is similar to that of Johnston’s mentioned above.  
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granted that orange is more similar to red than it is to blue simply because our 
sensation of orange is more similar to that of red than to that of blue. Another 
example is the belief that colors are visible; that we can tell by sight, at least 
most of the time under most conditions, which colors objects have. That is, we 
believe that our sensations of blue give us, at least usually, the information 
that the object at which we are looking is blue.  
What matters here is that we do not have to believe Revelation about 
color in order to believe that there is an extent to which our sensations of color 
tell us exactly what the colors are and what they are like. We can believe that 
our color sensations reveal to us everything about the colors that matters to us 
for our most of our everyday purposes. According to that belief, our color 
sensations reveal to us which colors are similar and which are different, which 
colors “go well” together and which do not, that when we mix blue paint with 
yellow we get green paint, etc., and for those practical, mundane purposes it 
may be sufficient for me to point to something blue and say “look at that” in 
order to explain what it is for something to be blue. But this does not mean that 
we really believe that our color sensations actually reveal all there is to know 
about the nature of color. It no more does that than the claim of an 
experienced author that she knows all about book writing commits her to the 
claim that she knows everything there is to know about all the things involved, 
such as the writer’s brain processes or the hardware of the computer used to 
write the books. Even though we may believe that color sensations reveal 
everything that matters about the colors in a certain context, it does not 
commit us to such a belief in all contexts, or the belief that colors are nothing 
above and beyond what color sensations reveal to us. And it does not commit  
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us to the belief that colors actually are properties that perfectly resemble our 
color sensations.  
The fact that there is a context in which we believe that our color 
sensations reveal everything, or at least everything that matters, about the 
colors suggests that our color sensations play an important role in our color 
concepts. They are response-dependent. This means that it is essential to our 
concept of blueness that it be of a property responsible for ous sensations of 
blue. A property that is not behind those phenomenological experiences of 
ours has to be something other than blueness (this is similar to what Johnston 
and others have said about core beliefs about colors).  While our color 
concepts are not of properties exactly like our color sensations, they are 
concepts of properties strongly tied to that phenomenal content. Hence, the 
subjectivity of our experiences is relevant when it comes to defining color 
properties. 
As I have been speaking of concepts of properties, let me stipulate this 
before going further: The colors are the properties to which our color concepts 
refer. If it so turns out that there are no properties corresponding to our color 
concepts, that means that our color concepts are misplaced or fail to refer to 
anything real. For a property to be the property of blueness, it must 
correspond well enough to our concept of blueness to be its proper referent. It 
does not have to be exactly like our current concept of blueness—we could be 
wrong about a thing or two—but presumably it must resemble it to a 
considerable degree. For this reason, I think we can say a great deal about 
properties such as colors on the basis of our concepts of them. 
Now, having established this much about our color concepts, what can 
we conclude about whether color properties are subjective or objective with  
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respect to their instantiation? What does this tell us about whether they are 
instantiated independently of our experiences of them? 
We seem to have some good reasons to think of colors as objective in 
this sense. According to color objectivism, objects have their colors 
independently of our color experiences. The colors are identified as the 
physical properties of the objects that cause us to perceive them as colored. It 
is not a matter of our thoughts or perceptions whether and when such a 
property is instantiated in an object. This seems consistent with many things 
we believe about colors. Suppose I color a piece of paper green, then put it in 
my desk drawer and forget all about it. Then there is nobody who thinks this 
piece of paper in my desk drawer is green. However, it makes sense to say 
that the piece of paper is still green. A flower growing wild that nobody has 
ever seen or shed any kind of thought can still be blue. Someone might 
wonder on what basis that flower is blue and providing the answer to that has 
been somewhat difficult for the color objectivists. The answer that the flower is 
blue on the basis of its microphysical properties is dubious in light of the 
multiple realization of color and color metamerism. There is no one 
microphysical property (or even two or three...or two hundred) that the things 
we call blue have in common. 
The unwanted result if we insist that colors are microphysical properties 
is that we cannot tell one color from another by vision alone. In response to 
this problem, some have suggested that colors are spectral reflectance 
profiles. There already, we have a subjective element, as the sorting into 
spectral reflectance profiles will be based on human color vision. If our color 
vision were different, those profiles would be differently compiled. But even 
though there is a subjective element involved in fixing the reference of color  
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terms, the instantiation of colors is not thereby mind-dependent. The 
objectivists can still say that once a spectral reflectance profile has been 
defined, it is an objective matter whether an object falls under it or not. So 
there are some good reasons to say that colors are objective properties. 
But there are also some good reasons for calling the colors subjective. 
One is that in some cases it seems to be a matter of opinion what color an 
object has. People disagree, for instance, about where exactly to put “true 
blue” or “true red” on the spectrum. When asked to pick out a color chip that 
shows the true blue color, one person may select a chip that another 
considers slightly green or slightly purple. This seems to be due to variation in 
human color vision. While there are those who claim that this means that only 
some humans have correct color vision and thus correctly select the 
objectively true blue chip
43, others take this to show that there is no such thing 
as true blue simpliciter
44. This seems to suggest that at least in some cases, it 
is our perception—not which microphysical properties the object has—that 
determines whether a certain color is instantiated. 
Neither the claim that colors are objective nor the claim that colors are 
subjective seems to be a particularly good fit. Let us consider the notion of 
faultless disagreement, or the appearance of faultless disagreement, from 
chapter 4, and use that as a test for the subjectivity of colors. On the account I 
gave there, a property is subjectively instantiated if two people can disagree 
about its instantiation, or at least appear to disagree about it, yet both be right. 
Is this true of colors? The answer seems to be that sometimes it is and 
                                                 
43 This is argued by Michael Tye (2006). Tye claims that while we have no way of knowing 
which of us are the lucky right perceivers of true blue, the fact of the matter is that some of us 
are. 
44 For an example of this, see Cohen, Hardin & McLaughlin (2007).  
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sometimes it is not. If Jack and Jill are looking at a color chip and Jack says it 
is truly blue while Jill says it is slightly greenish (and thus not truly blue), it 
makes sense to say that neither of them is wrong. On the other hand, if Jack 
says that the chip is blue and Jill says that it is red, at least one of them must 
be wrong. What does this suggest? Are colors subjective or are they 
objective? 
 
 
 
5.2.5. Colors are Subjective and Objective 
Determining whether colors are subjective or objective is no easy matter. 
One thing we may consider is whether the reason is simply that color terms 
are vague. That would make it possible for colors to be objective; the only 
issue would be that the boundaries between where one color category ends 
and another begins were vague. I believe color terms are vague, but not that it 
solves the issue of true colors. A painted wall that one person considers 
reddish orange may be considered yellowish red by another. Their 
disagreement is terminological; it is not over the color itself but over what to 
call it. But this is not the case when one person perceives a color chip as truly 
blue while another perceives it as greenish blue. That is a case of differences 
in perception of the color itself. The two people have different sensations when 
they look at the color chip; their sensory responses to it differ. This is 
analogous with the question of whether Grover is funny. Emma has the 
response of being amused and Harriet does not and these different responses 
cause them to form different judgments about whether Grover is funny. They  
130 
can still be in perfect agreement about how to define funniness; something 
they would not be if this had to do with the vagueness of the term in question. 
One possible approach when it comes to addressing the relativity of color 
is to claim that color terms have multiple meanings. On such an account, the 
term ‘blue’ has (at least) two possible referents, and it depends on the context 
which one is at play
45. One referent is some kind of appearance property; the 
color the object in question looks to have, blue-as-we-see-it. Another referent 
is an intrinsic property of the object, a spectral reflectance profile or even a 
specific microphysical property. So the term ‘blue’ does not refer to just one 
property but to several properties of different types. This approach solves 
some problems. One is this: When I look at an object that I judge to be 
uniformly colored, say, an orange, there is also a sense in which it does not 
appear to have just one color. If I focus my attention to the way the surface of 
the orange reflects light, parts of the surfact may look white or yellow, for 
instance. So in one sense the orange looks to me as having various colors 
while in another sense it looks to me as being simply orange. 
Another problem that a multiple referent theory of color can solve is the 
fact that people seem to disagree when it comes to their intuitions about 
imagined cases of radical changes in our color vision. Suppose that humans 
become afflicted with a highly contagious virus that causes permanent 
changes in their visual system
46. Over the course of a few weeks, every single 
human gets infected. The virus causes a spectrum inversion; grass now looks 
to us to have the color that ripe tomatoes looked to have before the plague. Is 
                                                 
45 An account along these lines can be found in Brown (2006), Maund (1995), and Rosenthal 
(1999). 
46 We can suppose that the virus causes genetic changes as well so that future generations of 
humans will be born with the same kind of visual system as their ancestors who got the virus.   
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grass still green after this change or has it become red even though its intrinsic 
properties have not changed? Answers to this question, apparently based on 
intuition, seem to vary
47. However, on a multiple referent theory of color terms, 
it can simply be said that those who answer ‘yes’ have one referent of ‘green’ 
in mind whereas those who answer ‘no’ have another referent in mind. In the 
first case, the referent of the term ‘green’ is fixed by actual human experiences 
of green as they are now, whereas in the second, the referent of ‘green’ is not 
fixed in this way. 
But does a multiple referent theory solve the matter entirely? Let us 
compare the case of Jack and Jill looking at a color chip and disagreeing 
about whether it is truly blue or greenish blue with the case of their disagreeing 
about whether the chip is blue or red. In the first case we will most likely want 
to say that both of them are right. From the point of view of a multiple referent 
theory, it must be because we think that Jack and Jill are speaking of the way 
the chip appears to them so the chip can have different appearance colors 
while it of course only has one set of spectral reflectances. But if so, why can 
we not say the same thing when Jack says the chip is blue and Jill says it is 
red? If the chip looks blue to Jack and looks red to Jill,
48 why is there a 
problem if there is none when the chip looks truly blue to Jack and greenish 
blue to Jill? Why do we say that either Jack or Jill (or possibly both of them) 
must be misperceiving the color chip if one of them sees it as red while the 
                                                 
47 See Simon Blackburn (1985) for someone whose intuition seems to be that the color of 
grass would have changed: “if we were to change so that everything in the world which had 
appeared blue came to appear red to us, this is what it is for the world to cease to contain blue 
things, and come to contain only red things” (p. 14). Sydney Shoemaker’s (1994) intuition is 
quite the opposite: “...I don’t think that if overnight massive surgery produces intrasubjective 
spectrum inversion in everyone, grass will have become red and daffodils will have become 
blue” (p. 32). 
48 Let us suppose that neither Jack nor Jill is wearing tinted glasses, looking through a colored 
sheet or anything of the kind. Furthermore, neither of them is hesitant about their judgment; 
each of them states with conviction that the chip is blue/red.  
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other sees it as blue, but not if one of them sees it as truly blue while the other 
sees it as greenish blue? 
The answer to the above question is this: Because the judgments Jack 
and Jill are making are dependent on intrinsic features of the color chip. There 
is a certain range of intrinsic properties that allows for their bearers to be 
somewhere in the blue range (or a part of that range). On the other hand, 
there is no range of intrinsic properties that makes it possible for one and the 
same thing to be blue or red, depending on the perceiver’s experiences. A 
certain set or range of intrinsic properties is the set of acceptable candidates 
for true blue. None of them is also a member of the set of acceptable 
candidates for red.  
Similar things can be said about some properties that tend to be 
considered subjective, such as funniness. When Emma says that Grover is 
funny and Harriet says that he is not, we accept both judgments as valid 
because the properties Grover has independently of Emma and Harriet’s 
judgments are such as to make him an acceptable candidate for funniness. 
But suppose Emma says that losing a loved one is funny and Harriet says it is 
not. These are not two equally valid judgments; Emma is plainly wrong. Losing 
a loved one is not an acceptable candidate for funniness. If Emma 
experiences amusement at losing a loved one, there is something wrong with 
her psychological makeup. 
An account of multiple referents does not seem to be the best way to 
deal with this, whether for colors, funniness, or any of the other properties I am 
sure we can all think of for which something similar holds. If we suppose that 
the referents of color terms are fixed, we cannot explain how both Jack and Jill 
can be right when one of them says the chip is truly blue and the other says it  
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is greenish blue. If we suppose that the referents of color terms are not fixed, 
we cannot explain why there is a problem when Jack and Jill disagree over 
whether the chip is red or blue. To solve this, I propose that we think of the 
properties in question as both subjective and objective. Let me explain how: 
The color chip at which Jack and Jill are looking has various intrinsic 
features. Among them are features that put it in the blue color range and make 
it an acceptable candidate for true blue. The fact that these features are in 
place is mind-independent. It is not up to the thoughts or judgments of Jack or 
Jill, you or me that the chip has these features. However, it is mind-dependent 
whether these features make it so that the chip is truly blue or greenish blue. 
We might say that this is because the facts about that are perceiver-relative or 
we might say it is because a property such as true blue simpliciter cannot be 
instantiated; only true-blue-to-Jack, true-blue-to-Jill, etc. Either way, this 
makes the instantiation subjective, as I argued in chapter 3. But the 
instantiation of true blue is also objective to a considerable degree as the fact 
that the chip’s intrinsic features place it in the range of acceptable candidates 
for true blue is mind-independent. 
A similar case can be made for a property such as funniness. While it is a 
matter of opinion to a large degree whether funniness is instantiated, we still 
differentiate between things that are potentially funny and things that are not. 
Losing a loved one, torture, and mass murder do not have mind-independent 
features that place them in the potentially funny category. Grover, slipping on 
banana peel, and Margaret Cho do.  
According to this account, there can be an objectivity/subjectivity 
spectrum for properties. At one end, there are properties that are entirely 
objective, i.e. their instantiation is purely objective, and at the other end we  
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have properties that are entirely subjective. Properties that have a wide range 
of features for their acceptable candidates fall near the subjective end of the 
spectrum while those with a narrow range fall near the objective end of the 
spectrum. Consider a property such as being 75.3 cm long. There is only one 
way to fulfill the instantiation of that property, i.e. the set of acceptable 
candidates has only one member. The perceiver of the object has no say 
when it comes to voting between hopeful candidates; there is only one who 
qualifies. This makes the instantiation of being 75.3 cm long entirely objective. 
True blue has a fairly narrow range of acceptable candidates. The subject has 
some say in which color chip is the one that is truly blue, but the restrictions 
determined independently of the perceiver are reasonably fixed. The range of 
acceptable candidates for funny things is wider; the subject has more choices 
than in the true blue case, and thus funniness gets a spot on the spectrum 
closer to the subjective end than blueness gets
49.  
This account does not exclude the possibility of color terms having 
multiple referents. That may very well be the case, and perhaps that is the 
best explanation of some apparent problems that arise when we speak of 
color. But multiple reference is not sufficient as a solution to all color issues. If 
we want an explanation of why disagreement about true blue vs. greenish blue 
is acceptable wheras disagreement about blue vs. red is not, thinking of colors 
as both subjectively and objectively determined is better
50. 
                                                 
49 It is not clear to me whether restrictions on funniness can go the other way as well, that is, 
whether there are things whose intrinsic features are such that someone who fails to find 
anything amusing about them must have an impaired sense of humor. If so, then those things 
are not in the range of “potentially not-funny” candidates. Subjects then still have some 
freedom in judging their degrees of funniness, such as whether the thing in question is 
hilarious or just rather funny.  
50 It is possible that some might object to this idea of being both subjectively and objectively 
instantiated and prefer to speak of restricted subjectivity instead. I am not certain whether 
such an objection would mainly be terminological or run deeper than that.  
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5.3. Sensory Properties 
Recent decades have given us a vast literature about the status of color 
with various intricacies to ponder. But what about color’s siblings in the 
sensory family? While Locke and Berkeley and some of their contemporaries 
seemed almost as interested in smell and sound as they were in color, very 
little has been added to the philosophical literature about such properties, at 
least in the context under consideration, by our contemporaries. Of the 
sensory properties, philosophers have mainly been concerned with color. 
Philosophical accounts of other sensory properties are few and far between. 
Perhaps there is some good answer to why philosophers nowadays 
seem to find color so much more interesting than any other sensory property. 
Is it easier to use color as an example or somehow more salient? Or is it the 
other way around; is color more difficult to grasp than the other sensory 
properties, and thereby a more interesting and worthwhile research topic? 
 At any rate, we have a reason to wonder whether color can rightfully be 
used as a paradigm sensory property. I have now given an account claiming 
that we have good reasons to consider the instantiation of color as both 
objective and subjective. Can those results be considered representative of all 
the sensory properties or must we deal with each property separately? Can we 
then assume that something analogous to the color account holds for each of 
the other sensory properties?  
I believe that while we cannot extrapolate everything there is to be said 
about color to claims about other sensory properties, what differences there 
are between colors and other sensory properties do not affect the issue of 
where to put the properties on the subjective/objective spectrum. That is, that 
what makes it so that colors are both subjective and objective also holds for  
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other sensory properties. I will argue that looking at recent scientific research 
on how the different sense modalities work together supports my view that the 
properties we perceive with our senses should be considered together. While 
much of the literature on color has certainly been inspiring and illuminating in 
various ways, focusing on color alone by itself can be limiting. 
First, let us consider what it is that makes a property sensory. By sensory 
property I mean a property that we perceive with one of our five senses, and 
associate with a certain sense modality. Our concept of it is to some degree 
based on the sensation we have when we perceive it. Colors are in this sense 
undoubtedly sensory properties, and so are odors, flavors, and sounds. It 
seems somewhat more difficult to specify which property it is that we perceive 
and associate with our sense of touch. Some have said it is heat. In addition to 
this list, there is another list of possible candidates. Some would argue that 
while proper shape properties are not sensory properties because we do not 
base our concepts of them on a sensation or tie them to a specific sense 
modality, there can be properties such as “squareness-as-seen” or 
“squareness-as-felt” that are sensory. In my discussion of sensory properties 
here, I will stick to the original list. However, issues such as seen shapes 
versus felt shapes will become relevant in my discussion of the different sense 
modalities. 
Secondly, let us consider what it is that gives color, on my account, the 
status of being partly subjective and partly objective. What seems important is 
that our color concepts are response-dependent; our sensations of color are of 
high importance when it comes to determining what colors are. Whatever 
properties the colors really are, they must be the properties that correspond to 
those sensations of ours. And given that some variation between people  
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regarding which properties cause which sensations is considered normal, we 
want the perceiving subjects to have some power of decision when it comes 
the question of instantiation. What also seems important is that by looking at 
the colors of things we learn about the world around us. Perceiving colors is a 
means of access to the external world; to finding out about things that are not 
just figments of our imagination. So we do want and expect the “way the world 
is” to determine what colors things have. 
What I just said about colors seems to hold for other sensory properties 
as well. Touching, smelling, tasting, and listening are all methods we use to 
find out about the way the world is. The sensations associated with them are 
also vital and we want the perceiving subjects to have a say when it comes to 
determining when the corresponding properties are instantiated. We expect 
some variation to be possible without the assumption that someone must be 
wrong as a result. So we have some good reasons to hold that these 
properties are, just like colors, instantiated somewhat subjectively and 
somewhat objectively. But before reaching a final verdict, we should examine 
what evidence there is to the contrary. 
 
 
 
5.3.1. Why Should there Be a Difference? 
Shoemaker’s intuition. In his paper “Phenomenal Character” 
(Shoemaker 1994), Sydney Shoemaker compares bitterness with color and 
claims that colors are more objective than flavors: 
Consider Jonathan Bennett’s example of phenol-thio-uria, which 
tastes bitter to three-quarters of the population and is tasteless 
to the rest [...] If as the result of selective breeding, or surgical  
138 
tampering,  it  becomes  tasteless  to  everyone,  I  say  it  has 
become tasteless. And if more drastic surgical tampering makes 
it taste sweet to everyone, I say it has become sweet. But I don’t 
think that if overnight massive surgery produces intrasubjective 
spectrum inversion in everyone, grass will have become red and 
daffodils will have become blue (p. 32). 
The reason for this difference, according to Shoemaker, is that the 
semantics of color terms and flavor terms differ and that our color concepts 
are more objective than our flavor concepts. The idea seems to be that the 
reference of color terms is fixed by our actual color experiences whereas the 
reference of flavor terms is not. The semantics of flavor concepts is more 
strongly tied to their associated sensations than that of color concepts is (fn. 6, 
p. 37).  
I think this is an example that shows how a dual referent theory can be 
useful. Surely, we can say for each of the imagined cases that on one 
understanding of the term, the properties will have changed, and that on 
another understanding of it, they will not have changed
51. There is a way to 
use ‘bitter’ that makes it so that phenol-thio-uria will still be bitter, and there is 
also a way to use ‘bitter’ that makes it so that phenol-thio-uria will no longer be 
bitter. Ditto for the color case. When and whether one understanding of the 
term is more valid than the other can be difficult to tell and there may be 
occasions on which we are uncertain about which one is at play. Shoemaker’s 
intuition about the difference may suggest that we use the fixed versions of 
color terms more often than we do for flavor terms, but I very much doubt that 
we always use them in the case of color and never in the case of flavor.  
Both these notions of flavor, the one where the referents of the terms are 
fixed and the one where they are not, have room for my mixed 
                                                 
51 I am using my loose notion of ‘property’ here, which is considerably broader than 
Shoemaker’s.  
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subjective/objective account of instantiation. Assume the non-fixed notion, so 
that phenol-thio-uria would be tasting sweet after the surgical tampering. We 
might still say that someone who claimed it tasted salty had to be 
misperceiving. Even though changes in the subjects as a group would result in 
changes in the instantiation of the property, the intrinsic features of phenol-
thio-uria are still relevant to determining which flavor properties are 
instantiated in it. Assume the fixed version of flavor terms and we get the 
same results as with a fixed version of color terms. 
 
Differences between sense modalities. Various accounts have been 
given according to which our sense modalities work in fundamentally different 
ways. Frequently, such accounts involve the idea that perception via some 
sense modalities is spatial, or yields conceptual material we can use for 
forming spatial concepts, while perception via other modalities is non-spatial. 
Now, how would this affect the properties perceived by the sense modalities? 
This is how: Let us consider the Kantian claim that a conception of space is an 
essential element in our conception of mind-independence; of unperceived 
existence. Suppose this claim is true
52. Then it is the case that the concept of 
an objective property, a property that can be instantiated independently of 
what we think or perceive, involves a spatial element. We must be able to 
make sense of the idea of the property being instantiated in an object that is 
located such that we cannot or do not perceive it. I.e. we conceive of the 
object as having another location than we do ourselves. The concept of a 
sensory property is strongly tied to the associated sense modality. As I have 
                                                 
52 I myself find this claim fairly plausible. Arguments for it can be found in Strawson 1959 and 
Evans 1980.  
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argued above, such a concept is response-dependent and thus fixed to a 
certain sensory response associated with the appropriate modality. If the 
sense modality in question is non-spatial, it is unclear how the concept of a 
corresponding property could be spatial. Thereby, the concept—and thus the 
property—is missing an element essential to its objectivity. The conclusion is 
that properties perceived via non-spatial sense-modalities must be exclusively 
subjective
53. 
If the argument I have just outlined is sound, properties perceived via 
non-spatial sense modalities cannot be objective. It is only via the spatial 
modalities that we can perceive properties that are objective, or to some 
extent objective. This suggests that we cannot infer from an account of color, a 
property perceived by vision, to properties perceived by other sense 
modalities. However, I do not think the argument is sound. Its weakness lies in 
one of its two main premises; that there are fundamental differences between 
the sense modalities that make some of them spatial and some non-spatial. 
Let us examine some of the things that have been said in its favor. 
In Individuals (Strawson 1959), P.F. Strawson claims that hearing is a 
non-spatial modality, whereas touch and vision are spatial. He creates an 
example of a purely auditory being, and argues that this being cannot possibly 
possess spatial concepts, the reason being that sounds are essentially non-
spatial: 
[Sounds]  have  no  intrinsic  spatial  characteristics....  The  fact 
that, with the variegated types of sense-experiences which we 
in  fact  have,  we  can,  as  we  say,  ‘on  the  strength  of  hearing 
alone’  assign  directions  and  distances  to  sounds,  and  things 
that  emit  or  cause  them...is  sufficiently  explained  by  the 
existence of correlations between the variations of which sound 
                                                 
53 This argument is not without flaws. However, I hope the reader will accept that this could be 
argued, perhaps more convincingly than in the outline I provide here.  
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is  intrinsically  capable  and  other  non-auditory  features  of  our 
sense experience (p. 169). 
Evaluating the plausibility of Strawson’s proposal is difficult, especially 
because of difficulties imagining a purely auditory experience. A being who is 
blind, cannot smell or taste, unable to move and has no sense of touch—this 
is a being who presumably cannot even feel her own body. Can trying to 
imagine the experiences of such a being really tell us much about what our 
actual auditory concepts are like? I think not, and shortly I will explain why. But 
first I will consider some other claims about differences between sense 
modalities. 
An account of sound considerably different from Strawson’s is proposed 
by Robert Pasnau (1999). Pasnau claims that hearing is like vision, and unlike 
the senses of touch and olfaction, in being a locational modality. Locational 
modalities, according to Pasnau, are those that “directly yield information not 
just about sensory qualities, but about the location of those qualities”
54 
(Pasnau 1999, p. 313). On the other hand, says Pasnau; smell, taste, and 
touch are non-locational. He makes the claim that we do not perceive smell as 
being located anywhere in particular and a similar claim about heat: that we do 
not perceive heat as existing in the hot or heat-emitting object, but in the 
medium: 
...we do not perceive the heat to exist at its source. Accordingly, 
it is reasonable to think of heat, like odour, as existing in the 
object  and  in  the  medium.  Again  there  is  a  fundamental 
difference between sight and hearing (the locational modalities) 
and  smell,  taste  and  touch.  Only  sight  and  hearing  perceive 
things as being out in the world, at a distance from the body (p. 
314). 
                                                 
54 I think we can safely assume here that Pasnau is referring to instances of the qualities being 
located somewhere. In the following discussion, this will be the implied use.  
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The difference between locational and non-locational sense modalities is, 
according to Pasnau, a fundamental one (Ibid.). Seeing and hearing yield 
information about the location of the properties seen or heard. Smelling, 
touching, and tasting do not yield such information, says Pasnau; we do not 
perceive odor, heat and flavor as being anywhere in particular. 
If Pasnau is right, his view might lend support to an argument for the 
claim that colors and sounds have an objective element but other sensory 
properties not. Pasnau himself does not make any such claim, but as 
discussed above, an argument of this kind is based on the premise that 
differences between sense modalities make some of them spatial and some 
non-spatial. Being locational can be seen as a form of being spatial, therefore 
Pasnau’s locational modalities could fulfill the role of the spatial modalities 
while the non-locational modalities would be the non-spatial ones. What is 
interesting if we contrast Pasnau’s view with Strawson’s is, of course, that 
according to Strawson hearing is non-spatial while on Pasnau’s account it is 
locational. 
I find Pasnau’s account unconvincing from an empirical point of view. For 
instance, Pasnau makes the following claim: “Even though we can sometimes 
make inferences about where the heat is coming form, based on which part of 
our body feels the heat most intensely, we do not perceive the heat to exist at 
it s source” (p. 314). I cannot speak for others, but this most certainly counters 
my experiences of heat. Let us imagine that I enter a kitchen, in which there is 
a transistor radio on the counter next to the stove. One of the burner plates on 
the stove is turned on and so is the radio. By touching the hot burner plate, I 
will perceive heat as being in the burner; the burner will feel hot to me. 
Similarly, I will hear music coming from the radio and perceive it as being in  
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the radio. Why Pasnau thinks there is some fundamental difference, 
locationally speaking, about the two perceptions eludes me.  
As support for his claims, Pasnau offers the example of the game 
HOT/COLD in which one searches for an object with the aid of clues in the 
form of HOT and COLD (HOT means one is close to the object and COLD that 
one is far from it). About this, Pasnau says:  
This  process  is  entirely  inferential,  in  that  one  never  directly 
senses that the object must be in one direction or another. The 
game faithfully mirrors our perception of temperature, and also 
the way we perceive odours. In contrast, hunting for a cricket in 
one’s  home  by  its  sound  is  not  like  playing  the  game 
HOT/COLD. In hunting for the cricket one tries to discern where 
the sounds are located, and then one moves in that direction. 
One  does  not  move  randomly;  one  does  not  zero  in  on  the 
target by listening to whether the noises get louder or softer as 
one moves around...The task is not inferential, but a matter of 
attempting to hear the sound accurately. (p. 314) 
Again, Pasnau’s description is not consistent with my behavior or 
experiences. Has he never been bothered by a faint, annoying sound which he 
has had trouble locating? Has he never moved around randomly in order to 
find out if the high-frequency sound that is driving him nuts is coming from 
inside his house, from outside or inside his own ears? And how can he claim 
that the game HOT/COLD is exactly like our actual experiences of heat and 
odor? If the heat or odor is strong enough, I do not find myself moving around 
randomly to locate them. I will perceive the heat or odor as coming from a 
certain direction, just as I do in the case of a sufficiently clear and distinct 
sound.  
Another problem with Pasnau’s account is that he seems to take it for 
granted that perception of heat is what the sense of touch is all about. While it 
is true that touch is how we perceive heat and cold, we can also perceive  
144 
other qualities via that modality. Smoothness and roughness come to mind. 
And it seems utterly impossible for the smoothness of a glass pane to be 
perceived as anywhere but in the pane. This does not have to mean that 
smoothness and roughness are sensory properties. What matters is that they 
can be perceived via touch, since the issue here is the nature of the modality 
and not the properties associated with it. 
 
 
 
5.3.2. Crossmodality and Molyneux’s Question 
Recent research in neuropsychology indicates that we are better at 
locating things and at determining their shapes when more than one sense 
modality is involved. For instance, sound location becomes more acute when 
tactual cues are provided (Menning et al., 2005; Kitagawa et al., 2005). More 
generally, there seems to be vast evidence available for crossmodal 
integration, i.e. that our senses work better when they work together (Amedi et 
al. 2005; Kirchner & Colonius 2005), and that there are structural reasons for 
this in the neural system (Macaluso & Driver, 2005; Meredith, 2002). Research 
on brains of humans and other primates suggests that the neocortex is to a 
great extent multisensory (Ghazanfar and Schroeder 2006). This suggests that 
sensory integration takes place early in the perceptual process and thus that 
our experiences of the world are never unisensory but always to some extent 
crossmodal. The world is then not presented to us through one modality at a 
time, but through several of them jointly. 
These findings from neuropsychology make any radical representational 
differences between our sense modalities seem implausible. It simply does not  
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seem to be the case that we perceive the world piece by piece through the 
respective modalities and then put the pieces together. Instead, the evidence 
suggests that our perception of the world is a process that relies on a joint 
effort by the different senses. Of course there are differences between the 
sense modalities, as is evident to us all. We do not get seeing something 
mixed up with hearing it, for instance, and there is something unique that we 
associate with each modality and the sensations it produces. But the 
information we acquire does not seem to differ fundamentally from one sense 
to the other; this is where the senses work together.
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This issue is strongly related to issues concerning the so-called 
Molyneux’s question. In his Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Locke 
1975), Locke describes a question posed to him by William Molyneux: 
Suppose a Man born blind, and now adult, and taught by his 
touch to distinguish between a Cube and a Sphere of the same 
metal, and nighly of the same bigness, so as to tell, when he felt 
one and t’other, which is the Cube, which the Sphere. Suppose 
then the Cube and the Sphere placed on a Table, and the Blind 
Man to be made to see: Quaere, Whether by his sight, before 
he touch’d them, he could now distinguish, and tell, which is the 
Globe, which the Cube? (Locke 1975, II, ix, 8, p. 146). 
Molyneux’s question has been interpreted in many different ways. There 
are several perspectives from which it can be addressed. Among other things, 
Molyneux’s question can be one about whether we perceive the same 
property when we see an object of a certain shape and when we touch it. Are 
seen cubeness and touched cubeness the same property? Another 
interpretation is this: assuming we do perceive the same shape property via 
                                                 
55 For an account of the senses as different modes of awareness of the same environment, 
see Noë 2002.   
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vision and touch, do these two modalities provide us with one and the same 
concept of it or with two different concepts?
56 
The empirical evidence provided by the neuropsychological research 
suggests that the spatial concepts are crossmodal, i.e. that the spatial 
concepts are the same whether we see the shapes or feel them. If 
crossmodality plays such a strong role in our perceptual experiences as the 
research indicates, and the sense modalities support each other, the likelihood 
of there being different spatial concepts associated with each modality gets 
small
57. Hence, it is very likely that the answer to Molyneux’s question 
interpreted as one about whether the concepts are the same will be “yes”.  
Let us now return to the issue under consideration. The idea was that if 
some sense modalities are non-spatial, that could be used to argue that the 
properties perceived by them are non-spatial and thus missing an objective 
basis. There is no reason to think that any of our sense modalities are non-
spatial. Obviously, we do not smell or taste shapes (or hear them, for that 
matter), but our senses of smell and flavor do give us information about 
location. We taste things as being inside our mouth or at least as touching our 
tongue. And although our sense of smell is not as acute as that of a dog, we 
can use it to locate things. Furthermore, there are good reasons to think that 
our spatial concepts are crossmodal or not tied to any particular modality. 
 
                                                 
56 The importance of making a distinction between the two different issues involved in these 
two interpretations of the question is stressed by Hopkins 2005. MacDonald (2004) argues 
that the important issue involved is whether there are two kinds of spatial concepts associated 
with the modalities. 
57 Research used specifically to address Molyneux’s question is cited by Meltzoff (1993) and 
MacDonald (2004). The evidence is all in the favor of crossmodality of the concepts.  
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5.4. Conclusion 
I have just argued that we do not have a reason to differentiate between 
our sense modalities when it comes to experiencing things in space or as 
having a location. Hence, if we were to consider, say, colors and sounds as 
something we perceive as having a location while odors, flavors and heat were 
perceived as being nowhere in particular (or even in ourselves), it would have 
to be on some other basis than an alleged difference between modalities. I do 
not believe there is such a basis. 
What all sensory properties have in common is that the phenomenal 
content of our experiences of them plays a role in their definition. They are all 
properties we perceive objects around us as having, and that we think they 
have, at least some of the time and/or in some cases, independently of our 
perceptions of them. The exact circumstances of when and whether to think of 
the property as mind-dependent or mind-independent may vary to some 
degree from one property to another. But what all sensory properties share is 
sufficient to put them in the same category on the subjectivity/objectivity 
spectrum. 
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CHAPTER 6 
AFTERTHOUGHTS 
  
My primary concern has been to defend a distinction between subjective 
and objective properties based on how they are instantiated. Objective 
properties are instantiated independently of what we in a broad sense think. 
Subjective properties are instantiated on the basis of what we think, i.e. 
because we think they are or at least because we are having a corresponding 
subjective response.  
In Chapter 2 I claimed that distinguishing between subjective and 
objective properties on the basis of how we conceive of them is not sufficient 
for my purposes. Yet in another sense, how we conceive of the properties 
plays a crucial role. Let me clarify:  
Our concept c of a property p is our primary means of access to it when it 
comes to discussing or speculating about its nature. If I want to describe what 
p is like, I inevitably rely on c as my source of information. It follows that if I am 
considering the mind-dependence of p, I must consider whether c is a concept 
of a mind-dependent property. C is guaranteed to be a reliable source about p 
because we fix its reference as whichever property corresponds to c. It could 
be the case that p is never instantiated and that we are thus mistaken when 
we think that this or that object has it. But as long as our understanding of c is 
adequate, we cannot be in error about what p is like. So of course c is 
important when it comes to determining whether p is objective or subjective.  
However, this does not make the distinction between the two kinds of 
properties rest on a distinction between two kinds of concepts. We can of 
course come up with a distinction between concepts in this respect; in one  
149 
group we put concepts of subjectively instantiated properties and in the other 
group we put concepts of objectively instantiated properties. But note that this 
is a distinction not based on how the concepts are constructed, or on how they 
come to be, or on how we come to possess them. What makes the two kinds 
of concepts different is that they are of different kinds of properties. The basis 
of the distinction does not lie in the concepts, but in the properties of which 
they are concepts. 
This is important to keep in mind when the issue of response-
dependence comes up. What is it that is supposed to be response-dependent, 
concepts or properties, and in what is dependence meant to consist? This can 
get confusing. For instance, Johnston’s notion of response-dependent 
concepts is, after all, in a certain sense property-based rather than concept-
based. Even though he speaks of concepts, what makes these concepts 
response-dependent has to do with the properties of which they are concepts. 
A response-dependent or response-dispositional concept, for Johnston, is a 
concept of a disposition to produce a subjective response. So while we in one 
sense need to look at the concept in order to evaluate the nature of this 
property, the disposition in question, we do not get any closer to the property’s 
nature by considering the concept qua concept. It is the concept’s content that 
becomes the focus: the property.  
By considering how the instantiation of a property can be dependent on 
the occurrence of a subjective response, we do get subjective properties in the 
sense in which I am interested. If a property p is instantiated only if subjective 
response R occurs, then the instantiation of p is dependent on the occurrence 
of R. And then the instantiation is mind-dependent in the sense that it takes 
place because of the mental activities of a subject.  
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This very idea, that some properties are instantiated if and only if a 
subject thinks they are, has its problems. On the one hand, we can allow for 
the possibility of subjects disagreeing about the instantiation of such a 
property. And what happens then? If subject A thinks that p is instantiated and 
subject B thinks it is not, then is p instantiated or not? If we want to say that 
both A and B can be right, then how do we account for that? If we assume that 
only one of A and B can be right, there does not seem to be anything mind-
dependent about the instantiation of the property. As I have argued in Chapter 
4, I believe there are ways to make the judgments and/or responses of A and 
B equally good, which retain the mind-dependence of the instantiation of a 
certain set of properties.  
Someone might be tempted to hold that this set of subjectively 
instantiated properties should include all properties. Since our concepts of the 
properties are our only available resource when it comes to speculating about 
them, and our perceptions of the world are all we have when it comes to 
determining which properties are instantiated, then why not just assume that it 
is all up to us and our judgments and perceptions? In Chapter 4 I argued that 
most subjectivist theories about what properties there are in the world have 
room for mind-independent instantiation of some of these properties. The most 
extreme forms of subjectivism, however, do not allow for objectively 
instantiated properties. I do not address such views in any way. Let it suffice to 
say that I think they come with their own set of serious problems and that if my 
readers feel drawn to them, they must accept them at their own risk. I work 
under the assumption that at least some of the world’s features, however 
basic, are independent of what we think of them.   
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Perhaps it is my belief in those basic features that makes me reluctant to 
consider any properties entirely subjectively instantiated. Even when property 
p is instantiated in an object because of my judgment that it is so, then there 
are some features of the object on which I base my judgment. Of course it 
does not have to be the case that my judgment is entirely because of these 
particular features; I might have formed the same judgment even though the 
object had somewhat different features. But it cannot be the case that I would 
have formed the same judgment regardless of what features the object had. 
There is a limited set of features on the basis of which I would judge the object 
to have p. If the object’s features fall outside this set and I still judge it as being 
p, then I am wrong. Perhaps my understanding of what it means for something 
to be p is lacking or perhaps there is something wrong with my perceptual 
system or my ability to form value judgments. But whatever the reason is, my 
judgment is flawed. 
Sensory properties are a clear example of properties straddling the two 
realms; the objective and the subjective. We use our perceptual system to 
gain information about the way the world is around us. In fact, it is the mind’s 
only means of access to the material world. If we are to believe in our ability to 
learn about the external world at all, we must assume that our senses provide 
us with mind-independent information. But the sensory properties are also 
strongly associated with their respective sense modalities. There are good 
reasons to think that a lollipop’s being green and sour has something to do 
with it looking green and tasting sour to us, at least in some sense or to some 
extent.  
It is this fine balance between our being presented with the world and our 
molding the world that I find so intriguing. 
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